Quinn v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 February 1910 |
| Citation | 141 Wis. 497,124 N.W. 653 |
| Parties | QUINN v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
A law giving, under specified circumstances, a right of action for damages to particular surviving relatives of a person when his death has been caused by actionable negligence of another, does not apply to wrongs antedating the law though death resulted therefrom subsequently.
Though there may different rights of action for damages arise from the injury and death of a person through actionable negligence of another, each springs from a remedial right, as distinguished from a violation of it, existing at the time of the wrongful act.
The right of action accruing in favor of surviving relatives of a person upon his death being caused by actionable negligence of another, is not one which survives since it does not exist till death occurs.
Though the right of action arising in favor of surviving relatives of a person upon his death being caused by actionable negligence of another comes into existence when death occurs, it has an inchoate existence as soon as the negligent act produces the injury.
A statute which is not by its terms retroactive but is ambiguous, is to be strictly construed in favor of nonretroactive character.
Though the Legislature may provide new remedies for past wrongs it cannot create new obligations therefor.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Iowa County; Geo. Clementson, Judge.
Action by Mary E. Quinn, administratrix of Stephen Quinn, against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
The claim of the plaintiff was that on the 25th day of June, 1907, Stephen Quinn was injured by actionable negligence of the defendant. He commenced an action to recover compensation therefor. Pending the action, he died by reason of his injuries, leaving no lineal descendants or ancestors, but leaving two sisters. The action was revived in favor of his personal representative and a supplemental complaint served containing the old cause of action and a second supposed cause for recoverable damages for the benefit of the sisters.
Subsequent to the injury and prior to the death, by chapter 164, Laws 1907, it was provided that in case of the decease of a person from the wrongful act of another in such circumstances that if death had not ensued the injured person might have maintained an action to recover damages in respect thereto, the wrongdoer should be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death, in favor of surviving brothers and sisters, in case of there being any and there being no husband or widow or lineal descendant or ancestor to claim damages. Prior to such law collateral relations had no such right of action. The defendant demurred to the new cause of action for insufficiency, and the demurrer was sustained.
Fiedler & Fiedler, for appellant.
Spensley McIlhon & Priestly (Chas. E. Vroman, of counsel), for respondent.
MARSHALL, J. (after stating the facts as above).
Appellant submits for decision this proposition: Does a law passed subsequent to the injury of a person and before his death resulting therefrom; the injury having been caused by negligence of another under such circumstances that had such person lived he could have recovered of such other compensation for his injury; creating a right of action for damages sustained by particular surviving relatives, apply to them?
As indicated by the statement, when plaintiff's intestate was injured, by the statutes of this state (St. 1898, §§ 4255, 4256), an action accrued to him to recover damages in respect thereof, and, contingent upon his death ensuing from such injury leaving no widow, a right of action accrued in favor of his personal representative for the benefit of his lineal descendants, in case of there being any, otherwise in favor of his lineal ancestors, in case of there being any, for the damages suffered to them by reason of the wrong. No right of action, in any event, existed in favor of collateral relatives. After commission of the wrong, by chapter 164, Laws 1907, section 4256 was amended adding a third class of beneficiaries, viz.: brothers and sisters, in case of a death caused by such an injury under the circumstances named. It will be observed that the right of action in such a case as this is dependent upon, 1st, death of a person caused by actionable negligence of a legally responsible party, 2d, survival of relatives mentioned in the statute who had a pecuniary interest in the continuance of the life....
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Parsons' Estate, Matter of
...In re Weaver's Estate, 195 Misc. 405, 90 N.Y.S.2d 770; Nohrden v. North Eastern R.R., 54 S.C. 492, 32 S.E. 524; Quinn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., 141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653; 22 Am.Jur.2d Death § 7 at 611 ("Statutes which create a cause of action for wrongful death or which change the rig......
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Theodosis v. Keeshin Motor Exp. Co.
...courts have, however, sustained the principle. Keeley v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 139 Wis. 448, 121 N.W. 167; Quinn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653; O'Reilly v. Utah, N. & C. Stage Co., 87 Hun. 406, 34 N.Y.S. 358, approved in Isola v. Weber, 147 N.Y. 329, 41 N.E. ......
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In re Beausoleil
...a statute enacted after the injury but before the death. Slate v. Fort Worth, Tex.Div.App., 193 S.W. 1143;Quinn v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway, 141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653. The contention of the claimant loses sight of the fact that the date of the injury determines not only who ar......
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Johnson v. PHYSICIANS ANESTHESIA SERVICE, PA
...62 Wis.2d 432, 215 N.W.2d 369 (1974) (dicta); Slate v. City of Fort Worth, 193 S.W. 1143 (Tex.Civ.App.1917); Quinn v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653 (1910). The instant case, however, involves the striking in its entirety of Delaware's existing wrongful death statute......