Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp.

• Citation: 159 F.3d 759
• Decision Date: 05 November 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. 97-9045
• Parties: 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 371, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,617 Stephanie J. QUINN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREEN TREE CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Page 759

159 F.3d 759

78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 371,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,617

Stephanie J. QUINN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREEN TREE CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 97-9045.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Submitted June 5, 1998.

Decided Nov. 5, 1998.

Stephanie J. Quinn, Scotia, NY, pro se.

Mark L. Dunn, Martin, Ganotis, Brown, Mould & Currie, P.C., Dewitt, NY, for Appellee.

Before: OAKES, MESKILL, and CABRANES Circuit Judges.

JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

It sometimes happens--more frequently than might be imagined--that an employee whose primary claim of discrimination cannot survive pre-trial dispositive motions is able to take to trial the secondary claim that he or she was fired or adversely affected in retaliation for asserting the primary claim. This is such a case.

Stephanie J. Quinn appeals from the summary judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Gustave J. DiBianco, Magistrate Judge ), entered in favor of defendant Green Tree Credit Corporation ("Green Tree" or the "Company"), Quinn's former employer. ¹ Because we find that Quinn has failed to adduce facts sufficient to support a sex discrimination claim for a hostile work environment, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant as to that claim. However, we conclude that Quinn has developed a factual record sufficient to withstand summary judgment as to her claim for retaliatory discharge. Accordingly, we vacate so much of the district court's judgment as disposed of that claim, and we remand for further proceedings.

Background

Between October 1983 and January 1992, Quinn worked at the Syracuse office of Green Tree, a company based in St. Paul, Minnesota that makes loans to mobile home dealers. Quinn was hired for the position of "Loan Processor I," and, by December 1989, had been promoted to "Loan Processor III." During the relevant years of Quinn's employment, her immediate supervisor was Paul Fahey, a credit manager whose own superior was Charles Harwood, the office's regional manager.

From 1984 until 1991, all but one of Green Tree's annual evaluations of Quinn rated her performance "satisfactory" (a three out of a possible five, with five being the highest score) or better in each category. The one exception was Quinn's last review, dated November 29, 1991, which rated as "needs improvement" Quinn's "Communication/Interpersonal Skills" and commented that she "must continue to develop a better working relationship with her fellow employees." Prior reports, by contrast, had noted that Quinn "[h]as a good rapport with dealers and customers" and "continues to demonstrate a good work attitude." On her penultimate review (conducted in November 1990), the report had concluded that, "[t]hroughout all the changes we have been through, she has continued to be an asset to the company." Harwood recommended Quinn for a six percent pay raise following the November 29, 1991 evaluation, and Quinn was given that raise.

In July and September 1991, Quinn had called the New York Division of Human Rights ("DHR") to inquire about possible discrimination occurring at Green Tree. Subsequently, in a letter bearing a receipt stamp of November 21, 1991, Quinn complained to Green Tree's main office of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment at the Syracuse office. Quinn's letter included allegations of sexual harassment perpetrated by Fahey and Harwood, and informed the Company that an identical complaint would be filed with the DHR on December 23, 1991. ² Thereafter, on November 29, 1991, Quinn received her regular annual evaluation and the six percent pay raise. In December 1991, Green Tree responded by letter to Quinn's complaint. Based on an investigation in the Syracuse office conducted by Harwood, Green Tree's human resources director, located in St. Paul, wrote Quinn that there was no support for her allegations. Quinn responded by filing a charge on December 27, 1991 with the DHR, alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. ³ Then, on January 6, 1992, Green Tree fired Quinn. In March 1992, Quinn filed a second charge with the DHR against Green Tree, alleging retaliatory discharge.

Following the December 16, 1993 issuance of a "right to sue" letter by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Quinn promptly filed a complaint in the district court. As amended in August 1994, that complaint alleges that Green Tree (a) discriminated against her on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; and (b) fired her in retaliation for her filing a sexual harassment complaint with the DHR, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.

In her complaint and discovery responses, Quinn alleged that she was subjected to over thirty separate incidents of sexual harassment during her tenure at Green Tree. The perpetrators of this conduct allegedly included Fahey and Harwood (Quinn's supervisors), Quinn's co-workers, and Green Tree clients. The alleged conduct principally consisted of offensive comments, referring either to the speaker's own sexual prowess, to Quinn's body, or to Quinn's (and her husband's) perceived sexual orientation. Other allegations included the display to Quinn of pornography, the pantomiming of sexual acts, and one instance of Fahey brushing against Quinn's breasts with papers he was carrying.

Following the completion of discovery, Green Tree moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, Green Tree submitted, along with other documentary evidence, an affidavit subscribed by Harwood. Harwood denied "all ... allegations of harassment or unlawful employment practices." Harwood averred that Quinn had not informed him of any alleged sexual harassment prior to her November 1991 complaint to Green Tree's main office. In addition, Harwood cited complaints from Green Tree clients and other Green Tree employees regarding Quinn's poor "attitude" and "interpersonal skills." Green Tree contended that its decision to discharge Quinn had turned exclusively on these complaints. Quinn resisted summary judgment, submitting copies of her own discovery statements as well as documentary evidence relating principally to her past job evaluations.

In June 1997, the district court granted Green Tree's motion for summary judgment. In considering Quinn's harassment claim, the district court first ruled that all incidents alleged to have occurred prior to March 2, 1991 would be time-barred under the applicable three-hundred-day limitations period, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), ⁴ and that, because Quinn had failed to demonstrate that the alleged conduct amounted to a "continuing violation," the limitations period could not be tolled. Looking only at the acts alleged to have occurred within the limitations period, the district court held that the conduct described by Quinn failed to rise to the level of an actionable hostile work environment. In addition, the court ruled that none of the alleged conduct could be imputed to Green Tree.

As to Quinn's retaliatory discharge claim, the district court, applying the burden-shifting rules of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), ⁵ found that Quinn had adduced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case, and that Green Tree had responded by articulating a permissible reason for her discharge--namely, a desire to preserve Green Tree's good will with clients, who had complained about treatment they received from Quinn. The court determined that Quinn had thereafter failed to rebut Green Tree's response with any evidence of pretext, and accordingly dismissed Quinn's retaliatory discharge claim.

Judgment was entered on June 30, 1997, and Quinn's timely appeal followed.

Discussion

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, see Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir.1997), construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Services, Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir.1998). "A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law." Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995). In addition, because New York courts require the same standard of proof for claims brought under section 296 of the Human Rights Law as for those brought under Title VII, see Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1304 n. 4 (2d Cir.1995), we can analyze these claims in tandem.

I. Hostile Work Environment

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to reach, among other conduct, "requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) ("hostile work environment" as sex discrimination). This form of harassment is actionable "when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Which Allegations Are Timely?

As a preliminary matter, we turn to the question of...