Quinn v. Haynes

• Decision Date: 28 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-7520,99-7520
• Citation: 234 F.3d 837
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2000) JAMES QUINN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILLIAM S. HAYNES, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center; DARRELL V. MCGRAW, JR., Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, Respondents-Appellees. . Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 837

234 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 2000)

JAMES QUINN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILLIAM S. HAYNES, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center; DARRELL V. MCGRAW, JR., Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 99-7520.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

Argued: September 28, 2000.

Decided: December 6, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.

Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge.(CA-98-74-5) [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL ARGUED: David Robert Bungard, ROBINSON & MCELWEE, L.L.P., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Leah Perry Macia, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkins and Judge Traxler joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

On October 6, 1994, James Quinn was convicted in the Circuit Court of Wetzel County, West Virginia of the felony offense of sexual abuse by a custodian, in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-8D-5 (1986). After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction on direct review in the West Virginia state court system, Quinn filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against William S. Haynes, Warden of Huttonsville Correctional Center ("Haynes"),¹. claiming that the trial court denied Quinn his Sixth Amendment rights, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, by limiting his ability to present evidence related to impeaching the credibility of the key prosecution witness.² The district court granted summary judgment on behalf of Haynes, holding that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals's ruling affirming his conviction neither violated clearly established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence nor constituted an unreasonable application thereof. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's judgment.

I.

In November of 1992, T.M.³ was five years old and lived with her mother and several siblings in Wetzel County. James Quinn is the father of one of T.M.'s siblings. Sometime in early November, Quinn babysat the children overnight while their mother was away. A couple of weeks later, T.M. told her aunt that she had been sexually molested by Quinn during that evening. At trial, T.M. testified that Quinn took off her panties, touched her between her legs with his hand, tried to hurt her "between [her] privates" with"[his] private thing," and that Quinn tried to put his "private thing" in her"private thing." (J.A. at 208). T.M.'s testimony was the State's only evidence of the abuse, as there were no eyewitnesses, and no medical evidence was admitted to corroborate T.M.'s testimony.

Prior to trial, Quinn filed a motion seeking permission to crossexamine T.M. about the fact that T.M. had made similar accusations of sexual abuse against two of her step-brothers and her grandfather. Quinn sought to impeach the minor victim's general credibility by attacking the victim's allegations of sexual abuse by others through cross-examination of the victim as to each alleged specific act and by presenting the testimony of each alleged perpetrator denying his alleged conduct (collectively, "proffered impeachment evidence"). The Guardian Ad Litem appointed to represent T.M. opposed Quinn's motion, arguing that West Virginia's rape shield law, W. Va. Code § 61-8B-11 (1986), prohibited the admission of the impeachment evidence offered by Quinn.

During an in limine hearing based upon Quinn's motion to admit the impeachment evidence, the trial court considered arguments regarding the relevance of Quinn's proposed line of questioning. After determining that such evidence only would be admissible if the allegations were false, the trial court allowed Quinn's attorney to proffer evidence demonstrating the falsity of T.M.'s other allegations of sexual abuse.

Quinn's attorney was able only to submit the simple denial testimony of those accused as evidence of falsity of T.M.'s other allegations. As part of his proffer of evidence, Quinn had T.M.'s psychiatrist testify outside the presence of the jury. During this testimony, the trial court specifically asked the psychiatrist if she had any reason to disbelieve T.M.'s other allegations, and the psychiatrist replied, "[N]o." (J.A. at 344). Quinn's proffer revealed that Quinn had no proof of falsity, other than the mere denials of those accused, and sought to cross-examine T.M. to uncover evidence that would support Quinn's speculation that the other allegations were false. Ultimately, the proffered evidence established only that T.M. had made the other allegations to several different people and never had recanted the allegations or admitted their untruth.⁴ Additionally, Quinn's proffered line of questioning required the introduction of extrinsic evidence as part of his impeachment of T.M.'s general credibility.

After argument and briefing, the trial court denied Quinn's motion for the requested presentation of impeachment evidence, ruling that Quinn failed to produce sufficient evidence of falsity. Without such a showing, the trial court held that the evidence of other allegations of sexual assault fell within the protection of West Virginia's rape shield law.⁵ As to Quinn's proffered denial testimony, the trial court held that the simple denial testimony did not demonstrate falsity and, if allowed, would result in mini-trials on the other allegations of sexual abuse, which would ultimately distract the jurors and possibly result in psychological harm to T.M.⁶

The jury convicted Quinn of one count of sexual abuse by a custodian in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8B-5 (1986).⁷ Quinn was sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration of five to fifteen years. Quinn timely appealed the denial of his proffered impeachment evidence to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. See State v. Quinn, 490 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1997). That court upheld the limitation on the scope of Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence, holding that although false accusations of sexual abuse are not protected by West Virginia's rape shield law, Quinn had not introduced evidence sufficiently demonstrating the falsity of T.M.'s other allegations. See id. at 41. In its ruling, the state supreme court developed a standard that requires "strong and substantial proof of the actual falsity of an alleged victim's other statements" before such statements will be admissible. Id. at 40. Because it noted that, with respect to the proposed cross-examination of T.M., Quinn had failed to "point to any evidence showing that such an admission [of falsity] might be forthcoming, nor to a substantial impossibility, discrepancy or other defect in T.M.'s statements that provided a strong indicium of the statements' falsity," the state supreme court held that the trial court properly limited the cross-examination. Id. at 41 n.10.

On June 15, 1998, Quinn filed for habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. In his petition for habeas relief, Quinn argued that the exclusion of his proffered impeachment evidence violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The district court referred Quinn's case to a magistrate judge, who submitted a recommendation that Haynes's motion for summary judgment be granted and Quinn's motion for an evidentiary hearing be denied. After a de novo review of the magistrate judge's findings, the district court adopted the recommendation. The district court held that the state supreme court's exclusion of Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence regarding T.M.'s other accusations of sexual abuse neither violated clearly established federal law nor constituted an unreasonable application of such law.

On October 25, 1999, Quinn requested that the district court issue a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) and Rule 22(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. On November 3, 1999, the district court granted Quinn's request and issued a certificate of appealability for Quinn's Sixth Amendment claim as it pertained to the state supreme court's limitation on Quinn's right to present the proffered impeachment evidence. In reviewing the district court's holding, we must determine whether the state supreme court's restriction on Quinn's presentation of impeachment evidence through the application of its rape shield law was objectively unreasonable in light of controlling Supreme Court precedent.

II.

Before turning to the merits of Quinn's argument, we first must consider whether we lack jurisdiction to hear Quinn's appeal due to Quinn's failure to file a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Although neither party addressed this issue, we are duty-bound to clarify our subject matter jurisdiction because questions of subject matter jurisdiction "`concern the court's very power to hear the case.'" Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 442 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.30 [1] (3d ed. 1998)); see also Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 1272, 1274 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Although plaintiffs have not questioned the district court's jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that requires sua sponte consideration when it is seriously in doubt.").

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which governs appeals in civil cases, provides that a party has thirty days after the entry of the district court's final judgment or order to note an appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The district court issued its memorandum opinion and order on September 21, 1999. Quinn filed...