Quinn v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1887
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: QUINN v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. Co.

12 A. 97

56 Conn. 44

QUINN

v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. Co.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June Term, 1887.

This was an action against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, for causing the death of one Quinn. Judgment was rendered against the defendant, and it appeals.

W. K. Townsend and Q. D. Watrous, for appellant. J. P. Pigott and W. S. Pardee, for appellees.

LOOMIS, J. This is a complaint to recover damages for causing the death of Michael Quinn, a track repairer in the employ of the defendants, on the Air Line Road. The court found that the death of Quinn was caused by the neglect of the defendant to provide a reasonable system of rules and regulations, and the execution of the same, relative to giving notice to its employes of the running of extra trains. It was also found that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, nor of any company employe, unless it arises as matter of law on the facts. At the time of the injury, the deceased, with three other track repairers, were in a hand car going to their work, when an extra train suddenly appeared coming towards them. All the men in the hand car except the defendant jumped off before the collision, and were saved, but the defendant remained, and was killed in the collision. One prominent ground of contention on the trial was whether the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Upon this issue "the defendant introduced Timothy Hayes, another of the gang of track repairers, who was on said hand car, and testified that he saw the engine about nine hundred feet away; that he called out to have the brakes on the hand car; that the car stopped and that all got off except the deceased. The witness stated at length and in detail all the facts relating to the matter in controversy, and was finally asked, upon direct examination, 'Was there or was there not time for Quinn to jump off?' and again, 'State whether or not there was time for Quinn to jump off, between the time when the order to brake was given, and the time of collision?' The defendant claimed these questions to show negligence on the part of the deceased."

The court states its ruling as follows: "If the testimony of the witness was true, it was manifest that the deceased had ample time to get off the car before the collision, and there was no occasion for the opinion of the witness. The court therefore excluded the questions for the reason aforesaid, and also upon the ground that the questions called substantially for the opinion of the witness as to the negligence of the deceased." We cannot accept either the rulings or the reasons given as sound. The fact that Quinn had time to get off the car was material, if not absolutely controlling, upon the question of contributory negligence. The court, directly in the face of the proposed evidence, found that he "was unable to jump off the car in season to save himself," and thereupon negatived the existence of any contributory negligence as matter of fact.

The court gives two reasons for excluding the evidence. The first justifies the exclusion upon the assumption that the witness' evidence, as far as received was true, the implied argument being, that if true, it proved beyond a doubt the fact which the excluded evidence was designed to prove, and hence no harm was done if the exclusion was erroneous. It is, however, obvious that the reason as given was not operative. The court did not, in reality, assume or find the statements true; for in repudiating a conclusion stated as the manifest one upon the assumption referred to, the court, in effect, repudiated the evidence already given, and found it untrue. The controlling reason therefore was not expressed, but was an implied alternative; that is, the evidence as given was not true, and therefore any further evidence would not be believed, and hence, again, no harm was done. The counsel for the plaintiff, both in their brief and in argument, state the point in these words: "The witness was not telling the truth, and the court knew he was not; and his opinion would not have had the slightest effect on the court." It seems to us this reasoning is...