Quinn v. Quinn, 84-91-A

• Decision Date: 14 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-91-A,84-91-A
• Citation: 512 A.2d 848
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: Lois D. QUINN v. Thomas H. QUINN. ppeal.

Page 848

512 A.2d 848

Lois D. QUINN v. Thomas H. QUINN.

No. 84-91-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 14, 1986.

Jerry L. McIntyre, Edwards & Angell, Providence, for plaintiff.

Howard I. Lipsey, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This is an appeal by Thomas H. Quinn (husband) from an interlocutory decree entered in the Family Court granting the petition of Lois D. Quinn (wife) and the husband's cross-petition for absolute divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. We affirm.

The parties were married on August 12, 1952. Two children, both of whom have since attained the age of majority, were born of the marriage. From 1952 until 1978 the Quinns resided in a twenty-room dwelling situated on sixteen acres of land on Woodside Avenue in the town of West Warwick. At the time of the marriage, the property was owned by Mr. Quinn's father, Patrick H. Quinn, who resided therein until his death in 1956. As the sole beneficiary of his father's estate, the husband inherited various parcels of real estate, including the Woodside Avenue property. Inherited assets also included a corporation, Phenix Mills, and other securities and personalty.

During the course of the marriage, Mr. Quinn sold several of the inherited parcels of realty. The proceeds were used to satisfy various financial obligations, including the cost of the children's education and miscellaneous household expenses. The husband would reinvest any surplus in money-market funds, stocks, and other securities. Mr. Quinn's testimony indicates that the investments that he made during the marriage involved a commingling of funds traceable to inherited assets with monies derived from other sources.

In 1977 the husband sold the Woodside Avenue property. The proceeds from the sale were placed in a certificate of deposit bearing the names of both parties. A smaller marital residence, located on Doyle Avenue in the city of Providence, was ultimately purchased with a portion of the funds. Title to the property was acquired by the parties as joint tenants. ¹

During the early years of their marriage, prior to the birth of the parties' first child, Mrs. Quinn was employed, part-time, in her husband's law office. Throughout the marriage, she also served as treasurer of Phenix Mills. In this capacity Mrs. Quinn maintained the corporation's books and records. In exchange for such services she received compensation in the amount of $100 per month. Upon the parties' separation in 1981, Mrs. Quinn was relieved of her duties as treasurer of Phenix Mills. Thereafter, the wife's sole source of income was her part-time employment in a hospital gift shop. Her earnings from this employment total approximately $80 per week.

By interlocutory decree entered on October 19, 1983, the Family Court granted both parties' petitions for absolute divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The trial justice found the husband's alcoholism to be the basis for the deterioration of the marital relationship. At trial Mrs. Quinn testified that Mr. Quinn began consuming excessive amounts of intoxicating beverages shortly before the birth of their first child and that such behavior continued throughout the marriage. On several occasions, the husband's alcoholism necessitated his hospitalization. The court found that the wife was not responsible for the breakdown of the marital relationship. Further, the trial justice credited her with being primarily responsible for the preservation of assets acquired during the marriage.

In addressing the economic issues presented, the court, after determining that the Doyle Avenue property was part of the marital estate, awarded all right, title, and interest therein to the wife. ² The court found that the funds used to purchase the Doyle Avenue residence, although derived from the sale of the husband's inherited Woodside Avenue realty, had lost their character as inherited property. Specifically, the trial justice viewed the husband's placement of the proceeds from the sale of the Woodside Avenue property in a certificate of deposit bearing the names of both parties and the subsequent acquisition of the Doyle Avenue domicile in joint tenancy as indicative of an intent to confer the right of joint, equal ownership upon the wife.

Further, the court assigned to the wife all furnishings contained in the marital domicile. Although many of the furnishings had been acquired by the husband through inheritance, the court found that as a result of the placement and continuous use of such items in the marital domicile during nearly thirty years of marriage, they had lost their character as inherited property and had become part of the marital estate. However, the court found that other inherited furnishings, which the husband had placed in storage, had retained their inherited nature and therefore were not assignable as marital property.

The court determined that with the exception of certain shares of stock which were directly traceable to inherited investments, all securities held by Mr. Quinn were the result of commingling of inherited and noninherited assets and therefore were part of the marital estate. Accordingly, the trial justice ordered the husband to transfer to the wife one-half, or the cash equivalent thereof, of such securities.

The trial justice also concluded that the wife was entitled to retain ownership of three pieces of jewelry which, although initially acquired by the husband through inheritance, had remained in her possession throughout the course of the marriage.

In awarding alimony, the trial justice noted that, as a result of his earlier sale of Phenix Mills, the husband would receive installment payments of $3,506.70 per month over the succeeding forty-eight months. The court ordered the husband to pay to the wife, as alimony, one-half of each of such monthly payments. Thereafter, alimony would cease.

On appeal the husband challenges the trial court's determination that certain inherited property and assets traceable thereto had become part of the marital estate and were thus subject to distribution. Such an argument presents us with two issues. First, we must address whether such assets may, under any set of circumstances, lose their inherited nature and become part of the marital estate. If so, we must determine whether, under the facts presented, the trial court's determination was erroneous. For the reasons set forth below, we answer the first question propounded in the affirmative and respond negatively to the second.

Our equitable-distribution statute, G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 15-5-16.1, as amended by P.L.1982, ch. 403, § 1, provides in pertinent part as follows:

"Assignment of property.--In addition to or in lieu of an order to pay alimony made pursuant to a complaint for divorce, the court may assign to either the husband or wife a portion of the estate of the other. In determining the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the court after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, and the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of their respective estates, and the contribution and services of either party as a homemaker. The court may not assign property or an interest therein held in the name of one of the parties if said property was held by said party prior to the marriage, but may assign income which has been derived therefrom during the term of the marriage. The court also shall not assign property or an interest therein which has been transferred to one of the parties by inheritance before, during or after, the term of the marriage."

Equitable distribution is a three-step process. First, the trial justice must determine which of the parties' assets are marital property and which are nonmarital property. Second, the trial justice must consider the factors enumerated in § 15-5-16.1. Third, he or she must distribute the marital property. Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481 A.2d 7, 10 (R.I.1984).

In conducting the first phase of this three-part analysis, the trial justice found that the marital domicile, although undisputably purchased with proceeds from the sale of the husband's inherited Woodside Avenue property, was part of the marital estate. In challenging this determination, the husband contends that neither the initial placement of the sale proceeds in a certificate of deposit held by the parties in joint tenancy nor the parties' subsequent joint acquisition of the Doyle Avenue property was indicative of any intent to grant the wife an interest in the property. We disagree.

When, during the course of a marriage, title to property for which one spouse has paid the purchase price is acquired in the names of both spouses, the transaction is presumed to be a gift or advancement for the benefit of the other spouse. Matracia v. Matracia, 119 R.I. 431, 435-36, 378 A.2d 1388, 1390 (1977). In addressing issues similar to those presently before us, courts in other jurisdictions have viewed the placement of one spouse's nonmarital assets or property traceable thereto in the names of both spouses as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety as bringing such assets into the marital estate. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 87 Ill.2d 174, 57 Ill.Dec. 567, 429 N.E.2d 465 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S.Ct. 1751, 72 L.Ed.2d 162 (1982); Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me.1980); Ayars v. Ayars, 50 Md.App. 93, 436 A.2d 490 (1981); Madden v. Madden, 336 Pa.Super. 552, 486 A.2d 401 (1984); Bonnell v. Bonnell, 117 Wis.2d 241, 344 N.W.2d 123 (1984). In so doing, courts have relied on the...