Quinn v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.
| Decision Date | 20 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 8:18-cv-01876-HMH-JDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Sherry L. Quinn, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motions for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. 68] and for review on statute of limitations and grant relief of equitable tolling and/or relief estoppel to file discrimination claim [Doc. 70], and on Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 69]. Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff alleges violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). [Doc. 1-5 at 3.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Plaintiff brought suit in this Court on July 9, 2018. [Doc. 1.] On April 23, 2019, the Court granted Defendant's partial motion to dismiss the ADA claims and request for punitive damages. [Doc. 58; see Doc. 53.] On July 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding her EPA claim and a motion for review on statute of limitations and grant relief of equitable tolling and/or relief estoppel to file discrimination claim1 ("Plaintiff's motions"). [Docs. 68; 70.] On July 29, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 69.] On August 2, 2019, the Court filed an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment procedure and of the possible consequences if she failed to adequately respond to Defendant's motion. [Doc. 74.] Responses and replies have been filed related to all motions. [Docs. 76; 77; 83; 84; 89; 91.] Accordingly, all three motions are now ripe for review.
As an employee of Defendant, Plaintiff "was subjected to intimidation" and "disparate terms and conditions" and was "denied equal wages from on or about September 1, 2010, through on or about May 12, 2017." [Doc. 1-1 at 2.] Plaintiff was "denied equal opportunities for career development, enrichment, and seminar/convention participation"; "evaluated unequally compared to the evaluations of similarly-situated employees"; "excluded from chain of command communications between managers/subordinates (males)"; "denied promotions to positions for which [she was] qualified"; and "paid lower wages than other employees (male) in similar positions and male subordinates." [Id.] Defendant "has shown a pattern and practice of limiting the advancement opportunities of female employees and treating them less favorably than males." [Id.] Additionally, Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment by her male supervisor and her malesubordinates, one of whom "threatened [her] with physical harm." [Id.] She "complained to Human Resources (HR), but no corrective action was taken." [Id.] Then, while she was "on medical leave due to a severe injury, [her] disability income was incorrectly calculated based on [her] previous salary before the salary increase mandated by the state legislature, and [her] insurance premium contribution incorrectly included the premium for [her] long term disability insurance, both of which resulted in a decrease in [her] benefits." [Id.] Plaintiff "was subjected to such treatment because of [her] sex, medical condition, and in retaliation for [her] complaints of discrimination." [Id.]
Plaintiff "was denied a reasonable accommodation from February 14, 2017, through on or about May 12, 2017." [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff "was released by [her] doctor to return to work following medical leave related to [her] injury." [Id.] "However, [her] job description was amended while [she] was on leave to include duties that would prevent [her] from returning with [her] restrictions." [Id.] Additionally, her "requests to transfer to a position where [she] would be able to work with [her] restrictions, or work from home, were denied." [Id.] "[O]ther employees (male) were allowed to work from home." [Id.] She "was denied a reasonable accommodation and the same opportunities afforded to male employees because of [her] medical condition [and] sex, and in retaliation for her complaints." [Id.]
Plaintiff "was discharged on or about May 12, 2017" and "not allowed to return to work and separated from service due to [Defendant's] rejection of [her] requests for reasonable accommodation." [Id.] Plaintiff's "employment was terminated because of [her] medical condition and in retaliation for [her] complaints." [Id.] She was "discriminated against based on [her] sex (female) [and] qualified disability, and in retaliation for engaging in [protected activities]." [Id.]
In August 2017, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission ("SCHAC") based on the allegations set out above.3 [Doc. 1-1 at 2-3.] Plaintiff received her Notice of Right to Sue and initiated the present action. [Docs. 1; 1-1 at 5.] Her Complaint demands reinstatement of employment as well as compensatory and punitive damages. [Doc. 1-5 at 5-6.]
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe her pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial. . . . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court should "construe the facts and reasonable inferences . . . in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party]." Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, "[t]he court must accept all well pleaded factual allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings as true and reject all contravening assertions in the moving party's pleadings as false." Integon Gen. Ins. Co. v. Bartkowiak ex rel. Bartkowiak, No. 7:09-cv-03045-JMC, 2010 WL 4156471, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court should grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings "only if the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lewis v. Excel Mech., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-281, 2013 WL 4585873, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. Whendetermining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
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