O'Quinn v. State

Decision Date16 October 2020
Docket NumberNo. 122,236,122,236
Citation473 P.3d 385 (Table)
Parties Justin T. O'QUINN, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas; Prison Review Board; and Joel Hrabe, Warden, Norton Correctional Facility, Appellees.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

Bradley T. Steen, of Law Office of B. Truman Steen, LLC, of Ellsworth, for appellant.

Robert E. Wasinger, legal counsel, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for appellees.

Before Malone, P.J., Buser and Powell, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam:

Justin T. O'Quinn appeals the district court's denial of his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, which requested that additional jail credit be applied to his prison sentence in a 2016 criminal case. O'Quinn contends, rather than crediting 365 days of jail time to his term of lifetime postrelease supervision from a prior 2011 criminal case, the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) should have awarded that time as jail credit to his 2016 case. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions that the time O'Quinn was in jail from February 2016 through February 2017 be credited to the 2016 case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In Sedgwick County case No. 11CR2794 (2011 case), O'Quinn pled guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. He received a controlling sentence of 32 months in prison and a lifetime period of postrelease supervision. O'Quinn satisfied the prison portion of his sentence and was released on postrelease supervision in June 2015.

On February 2, 2016, O'Quinn was arrested and placed in custody for violating the Kansas Offender Registration Act in Sedgwick County case No. 16CR194 (2016 case). O'Quinn was held in the county jail for 365 days until he was sentenced on February 1, 2017. The district court sentenced O'Quinn to 24 months in prison for the offender registration violation. O'Quinn was awarded 365 days of jail credit, but the journal entry of sentencing noted that "[f]rom 02/02/16 to 02/01/17 defendant was held on 16CR194 and KDOC warrant. If defendant has received credit for these dates in 11CR2794 then he is not eligible for duplicate credit for these dates in 16CR194."

After O'Quinn was sentenced in the 2016 case, the Kansas Prisoner Review Board (KPRB), in March 2017, revoked his postrelease supervision in the 2011 case The KPRB granted O'Quinn parole to his 24-month sentence in the 2016 case effective October 1, 2018. While in prison, O'Quinn submitted requests which asked the KDOC to apply his 365 days of jail credit to the 2016 case. The KDOC declined and applied the jail credit to the 2011 case because O'Quinn was on postrelease supervision.

O'Quinn timely exhausted his administrative remedies and in June 2019 filed a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, arguing that his 365 days of jail credit should apply to his 2016 case and his lifetime postrelease supervision was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the United States and Kansas Constitutions. The district court summarily dismissed the cruel and unusual punishment claim but ordered the State, the KPRB, and the warden of the Norton Correctional Facility (collectively Respondents) to answer the jail credit issue. After Respondents moved to dismiss the K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, the district court ruled that the 365 days of jail time were properly credited to the 2011 case and O'Quinn was entitled to no jail credit for the 2016 case. O'Quinn filed a timely appeal.

ANALYSIS

O'Quinn contends the 365 days of jail time he served between February 2, 2016, and February 1, 2017, should have been credited to his 2016 case because his postrelease supervision had not been revoked before he was sentenced in that later case.

Preliminarily, O'Quinn does not challenge the district court's dismissal of his cruel and unusual punishment claim and, therefore, he has abandoned that issue. See State v. Arnett , 307 Kan. 648, 650, 413 P.3d 787 (2018) (An issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned.).

We begin the analysis with a brief summary of Kansas law relating to K.S.A. 60-1501 petitions, our standards of review, and statutory principles of awarding jail credit. To state a claim for relief under K.S.A. 60-1501, a petition must allege "shocking and intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a constitutional stature." Johnson v. State , 289 Kan. 642, 648, 215 P.3d 575 (2009). "[I]f, on the face of the petition, it can be established that petitioner is not entitled to relief, or if, from undisputed facts, or from uncontrovertible facts, such as those recited in a court record, it appears, as a matter of law, no cause for granting a writ exists," then summary dismissal is proper. 289 Kan. at 648-49 ; see K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1503(a).

We exercise unlimited review over a district court's summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. 289 Kan. at 649. Moreover, our review of the district court's jail credit determination requires us to interpret the revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. Interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. State v. Warren , 307 Kan. 609, 612, 412 P.3d 993 (2018).

Kansas provides a statutory right to jail time credit. State v. Hopkins , 295 Kan. 579, 581, 285 P.3d 1021 (2012). Under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6615(a), a defendant's sentence starting date is computed to allow credit for "the time which the defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case." Our Supreme Court has clarified that a defendant is entitled to jail credit for all time held in custody solely on the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced. State v. Harper , 275 Kan. 888, 890, 69 P.3d 1105 (2003).

Of particular importance to this appeal, our court has repeatedly held that a defendant may not receive jail credit towards an unrevoked term of postrelease supervision for time spent incarcerated on a new charge which results in a conviction and sentence. White v. Bruce , 23 Kan. App. 2d 449, Syl. ¶ 2, 932 P.2d 448 (1997) ; State v. McLemore , No. 116,119, 2017 WL 6625552, at *2 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (listing cases). Instead, postrelease supervision is suspended when a defendant is incarcerated, unless the State revokes that postrelease supervision. White , 23 Kan. App. 2d at 455. As a result, when a defendant's postrelease supervision has not been revoked before sentencing on a new charge, any jail time credit earned on the new charge must be credited towards the new sentence—not the older postrelease period or any undetermined administrative punishment later arising from a potential postrelease violation. State v. Bray , No. 119,560, 2019 WL 3756205, at *2 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion).

O'Quinn was held in custody for 365 days between February 2, 2016, and February 1, 2017, on the offender registration violation charge in the 2016 case. Because his postrelease supervision was not revoked until after he was sentenced, O'Quinn’s postrelease supervision was suspended during the time he was in jail. As a result, under White and the plethora of unpublished cases that faithfully adhere to that opinion, the district court erred by finding that the 365 days of jail time was properly credited towards the 2011 case.

While acknowledging the caselaw contrary to their position, Respondents maintain the KDOC correctly credited the 365 days of jail time towards the term of postrelease supervision in the 2011 case. They claim that, contrary to the reasoning in White , " ‘postrelease supervision’ is not a location in the community that automatically tolls if the offender is confined. Rather ’postrelease supervision’ is a specific time period comprising a sentence obligation that follow[s] upon the expiration of the specific sentence obligation consisting of the ’prison portion’ of the sentence." In support of their legal contention, Respondents point to K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3717, K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3722, and K.S.A. 75-5217, which address aspects of postrelease supervision.

Postrelease supervision is defined as "the release of a prisoner to the community after having served a period of imprisonment." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6803(p). Inmates are released on postrelease supervision after the prison portion of their sentences is terminated and "[t]ime served while on postrelease supervision will vest." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-3717(q). Another reference to vesting of the time served while on postrelease supervision is found in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3722, which addresses the service and discharge of postrelease supervision. This statute provides that "[t]he period served on postrelease supervision shall vest in and be subject to the provisions contained in K.S.A. 75-5217, and amendments thereto, relating to an inmate who is a fugitive from or has fled from justice." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3722.

As suggested in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3722, time served on postrelease supervision is subject to K.S.A. 75-5217(f), which is a lengthy provision explaining that a released inmate receives no credit towards his or her sentence from the date an arrest warrant for violating conditions of release is issued and another time depending on the circumstances. The subsection states, in part:

"If the secretary of corrections issues a warrant
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