Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp.

Citation613 F.2d 438
Decision Date08 January 1980
Docket NumberNo. 576,No. 79-7561,D,576,79-7561
PartiesLeo A. QUINN, Appellant, v. SYRACUSE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD CORPORATION; Peter White, Individually and in his capacity as Executive Director of Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corporation; Lee Alexander, Individually and in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Syracuse; David S. Michel, Individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Community Development for the City of Syracuse; John Mungovan, Individually and in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Community Development for the City of Syracuse and the City of Syracuse, Appellees. ocket
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

William R. Morgan, Syracuse, N. Y., for plaintiff-appellant.

David M. Garber, Syracuse, N. Y. (James L. Gelormini, Syracuse, N. Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees City of Syracuse, Lee Alexander, David S. Michel and John Mungovan.

William S. Andrews, Syracuse, N. Y., for defendants-appellees Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp. and Peter White.

Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge, and SMITH and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges.

KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:

The "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary governmental interference is a necessarily amorphous concept, which continues to evolve as courts apply it to the specific circumstances of individual cases. Thus, where an infringement of a constitutionally protected interest in "liberty" is alleged, it is essential that a litigant be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prove facts which, taken together, state a claim. Summary dismissal of alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations based on deprivations of this interest, therefore, is appropriate only when prior case law leaves no doubt that the defendant must prevail as a matter of law. In the instant case, we hold that the district court granted summary judgment prematurely and denied plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to prove that his liberty interest has been unlawfully infringed.

I.

The appellant, Leo A. Quinn, seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from his discharge as Rehabilitation Director of the Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corporation (SMNC). 1 Because Quinn's claims were dismissed on summary judgment, the facts underlying this case must be considered in a light most favorable to him.

SMNC was organized in 1971 as the instrument through which urban redevelopment in Syracuse would be accomplished. The Corporation was charged with acquiring and rehabilitating residential properties in declining neighborhoods for rental to low and moderate income families. At first, the lion's share of SMNC's funding was provided by the federal government subject to the approval of the City Department of Community Development. Moreover, Mayor Lee Alexander, an appellee here, apparently had authority to name the original members of the SMNC Board of Directors. Among his initial selections was Leo Quinn who, as a skilled carpenter and longtime business agent of the local carpenters' union, brought to the Board both technical knowledge and important ties to organized labor.

The Board's early business included the appointment of an executive director. Quinn resigned his seat on the Board to seek this post, but was passed over in favor of appellee Peter White. Nevertheless, Mayor Alexander and the Board were sufficiently impressed with Quinn that they instructed White to offer him a position as Rehabilitation Director, the second-ranking employee of SMNC. Although he had not yet been officially hired, White communicated the offer to Quinn at a luncheon meeting. Quinn hesitated, understandably reluctant to leave his secure position with the union. White, however, assured Quinn that "as long as we were funded and did our job, we could probably be there forever." He went on to assert that federal funding was guaranteed for a number of years and that, in the not-too-distant future, SMNC would become self-sufficient, relying solely on rents collected from rehabilitated properties. From this conversation, Quinn inferred a mutual understanding that his position would be tenured, as consideration for relinquishment of his union job. On this basis, Quinn accepted the position as Rehabilitation Director, and was "formally" notified of his "appointment" in a letter from SMNC dated June 23, 1972. The letter was silent concerning the precise terms of his employment. Four days later, however, the SMNC Board promulgated a "Staff Handbook," which stated that "staff is hired on a probationary status for a period of 90 days. During this time, the individual or agency may terminate the relationship." For Quinn, this statement reaffirmed his expectation of "tenured" employment.

Quinn began his work for SMNC in late June 1972, and remained there until February 16, 1976. Initially, his annual salary was $16,000, but it was gradually increased to $18,900 by 1976. His duties, which he performed competently, included inspection of buildings for possible purchase by SMNC, supervision of rehabilitation and continuing maintenance, preparation of grant requests, and development of work schedules.

In the Spring of 1975, White and Quinn learned that some SMNC funds could not be accounted for. Neither man reported the shortage at that time but, following an audit conducted in late 1976, independent accountants reported to the Mayor and Commissioner of Community Development David S. Michel that approximately $18,000 in tenant rent payments could not be located. Immediately thereafter, the Syracuse Police Department seized the financial records of SMNC.

Appellee Michel and his deputy, appellee John Mungovan, then attempted to elicit an explanation from White, Quinn, and SMNC treasurer James Barbour. When none was forthcoming, Michel notified the SMNC Board, by letter dated January 12, 1976, that "the Mayor has requested that all further Community Development funding . . . be suspended until the police investigation is completed." A series of meetings with SMNC officials followed, as a result of which Michel, Mungovan, and Alexander demanded the resignations of White, Quinn, and Barbour as a prerequisite to restoring funding. Michel informed the SMNC Board of this decision on January 20, in a letter explaining that the City had "lost confidence" in the SMNC administration. Michel "emphasized" that "this position does not imply that criminal actions have occurred but only responds to the clear evidence that there is a complete lack of administrative control."

On January 26, SMNC Board Chairman Laurence Hoefler responded in a letter to Mayor Alexander. He informed the Mayor that the resignations of White and Barbour had been requested, secured, and, in the case of Barbour, accepted. Although White's resignation would be held "in abeyance," it was "the feeling of the Board that at this time there is no reason to warrant our asking for the resignation of Mr. Quinn." For his part, Quinn maintained that his duties were wholly unrelated to the financial affairs of SMNC, and that tendering his resignation would amount to an unwarranted admission of guilt. Nevertheless, the City, speaking through Michel, rejected the Board's decision concerning Quinn, and advised on January 27 that all funding would be permanently terminated in 30 days if Quinn were not dismissed.

In addition, the City began a publicity campaign designed to coerce the SMNC Board to fire Quinn. A series of articles appeared in the local Syracuse press suggesting that Quinn was responsible for the missing funds. For example, the Syracuse Herald Journal reported that Alexander and Michel had called for the dismissal of Quinn, but that White's resignation had not been accepted because he was "cooperating." Similarly, under headlines such as "Mayor Calls for Firing" and "Hint, Criminal Case," the Syracuse Post-Standard informed its readers that the case had "taken on a criminal aspect," specifically mentioning Quinn. Also during this period, Mayor Alexander told at least one city legislator that Quinn was not cooperating with the criminal investigation, and would be fired.

Faced with this publicity and the threatened termination of its financial support, the SMNC Board dismissed Leo Quinn on February 16. One week later, the City restored all funding to the Corporation. At about the same time, a grand jury was impaneled to consider possible criminal charges against Quinn and others, an event that attracted considerable media attention. The cumulative result of this publicity, according to the affidavit of City Counselor Vincent O'Neill, "left in the minds of many the erroneous impression that plaintiff was guilty of incompetence, mismanagement or even possibly some type of criminal activity."

The Grand Jury reported the results of its investigation the following April, concluding that no criminal prosecutions were warranted. Significantly, it affirmatively stated that Quinn had no responsibility for the financial management of SMNC, that he was wrongfully discharged, and that he should be reinstated. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to win reinstatement, Quinn initiated a state court action, which is still pending, seeking restoration and back pay. On June 20, 1978, more than two years after his discharge, Quinn also commenced the instant suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivations of his liberty and property without due process of law. He named as defendants the City, SMNC, White, Alexander, Michel, and Mungovan, requesting several million dollars in damages from each. In his complaint, he alleged that his "wrongful discharge" by SMNC and the activities of the other defendants, including the City of Syracuse, were deliberate acts "designed to create the public impression that plaintiff was in some manner responsible for the shortage of funds . . . and that the problem of said shortage of funds was being...

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