Quinn v. Valiquette

• Decision Date: 16 January 1908
• Citation: 80 Vt. 434,68 A. 515
• Parties: QUINN v. VALIQUETTE.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

68 A. 515

80 Vt. 434

QUINN

v. VALIQUETTE.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland.

Jan. 16, 1908.

Appeal in Chancery, Rutland County; E. L. Waterman, Chancellor.

Suit by Michael Quinn against William H. Valiquette. From an adverse decree, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

This is a bill in chancery to avoid and set aside an extension of a lease of the Berwick House property in the city of Rutland, for that the lessors were insane when they executed the extension. The bill alleges that before and on February 28, 1906, Harriet L. Richardson and Fred H. Richardson, her son, were the owners of said property, a large part of which was occupied for hotel purposes; that on March 26, 1906, on application dated the 16th of said March, filed in the probate court the 19th, notice thereof having been duly served on said Richardsons, said court adjudged them insane and mentally incapable of taking care of themselves and their property, and appointed Homer L. Hoag of said city their guardian, who thereupon accepted the trust, and entered upon the duties thereof; that at the time of said appointment the defendant was in possession of said premises after the expiration of a written lease thereof under seal for a term of 10 years, terminating on January 1, 1906, and had not vacated the same, nor surrendered possession thereof to said Richardsons who were his lessors; that at said time the defendant operated said hotel property, and continued to operate it by a manager, servants, and agents, and spent, and still spends, a large part of his time in New York City, engaged in other business, and leaves the operation of said property in the hands of such manager, servants, and agents, without proper care and supervision, returning to the city of Rutland only occasionally. The bill further alleges that at the time of the appointment of said guardian, and for six months or more prior thereto, the orator is advised and believes that said Richardsons were insane and wholly incompetent to transact any business and to comprehend and understand any business transaction, and that the mother was controlled and dominated by the son, and that both were easily influenced and dominated by others, all which the defendant well knew; that immediately after his appointment the guardian went to said premises and interviewed the manager thereof to ascertain as best he could the true contract, if any there was, and the claims, under which the defendant was holding possession of said premises; that being unable to get any satisfactory information upon the subject he wrote to the defendant at New York for information, and received from him by due course of mail a letter, dated March 28, 1906, reading as follows: "Your letter of the 27th inst. is at hand. There is an agreement with Mr. Richardson as to terms of a new lease, which has not been signed, owing to the fact that it was thought best by Mr. Coolidge to wait until a guardian was appointed"; that afterwards, on the 16th of October, 1906, the guardian obtained a license to sell all of the real estate of his wards, and thereupon, on the same day, relying on said letter and such other information as he was able to get on the premises, he bargained and sold said property to the orator for a large sum of money, which he paid; and that afterwards, on the 5th day of November, 1906, the guardian executed and delivered to the orator a deed of said property, free and clear of all incumbrances, except the mortgages thereon, which the orator assumed and paid, which said deed the orator caused to be recorded the 6th day of said November; and said deed is referred to and made a part of the bill. The bill further alleges that before the orator bought said premises as aforesaid, seeing them occupied by the defendant, his manager and servants, he applied thereon to the servants and agents, and to the guardian, to ascertain under what agreement, contract, or claim the defendant, his servants and agents, were then possessing, occupying, and holding said premises, and that he ascertained that the defendant had held over under a lease that terminated January 1, 1900, and was paying rent therefor by the month, and that he could obtain possession thereof on a month's notice to quit, and that there was then in existence no written lease of the premises; that upon applying to the guardian he presented to the orator the defendant's letter; and that thereupon relying upon the representations therein, he made said purchase and paid the consideration thereof. The bill further alleges that on the 19th of said October, at 1 o'clock and 40 minutes in the afternoon, as the orator is advised and believes, the defendant left for record at the city clerk's office in the city of Rutland a writing, purporting to be dated March 15, 1900, and to be signed and sealed by the defendant and the Richardsons in the presence of two witnesses, and to have been acknowledged by them at said city on the l6th of said March before a notary public, the body of which said writing is in the words and figures following: "We hereby agree to extend the within lease according to its terms for a further period of 10 years from January 1, 1906, to January 1, 1916"; that said writing was duly recorded in the land records of the city of Rutland, and purports to be an extension of an original lease duly recorded in said land records, and that the orator understands that said writing is written on, and attached to, the lease between the defendant and the Richardsons, terminating January 1, 1900, and that the defendant now pretends and claims that said writing operates as an extension of the term of said lease for 10 years, and claims to hold possession of said premises by virtue thereof; that said pretended extension, if the same was ever executed by the Richardsons, was procured by the defendant by fraud and undue influence, and that the signatures thereto are not their signatures, made of their own free will, and that at the time said writing purports to have been executed, they were wholly incompetent to make a valid contract of that character, and that said writing was and is void and ought to be set aside; that said pretended extension and said lease together constitute an incumbrance on the title of said property, and are being used and insisted upon as a right of possession and control thereof by the defendant; that up to about the time of the record of his said deed the orator had no knowledge or information of said extension, or of the claim as now made by the defendant, but relied upon the defendant's letter that there was no written extension of said lease or completed contract in respect thereto; that on November 19, 1906, the orator notified the defendant to quit and surrender possession on January 1, 1907, which the defendant refused to do, and still holds possession; and that the orator further notified the defendant that the value to him of the use of said premises is $800 a month, which the defendant refuses to pay. The bill further alleges that the rent reserved in said lease is entirely inadequate for the use of said property, and that the orator is being deprived of fair and adequate returns for such use by reason of the fraudulent conduct of the defendant aforesaid; that said property is very valuable, and consists of buildings and hotel property that rapidly depreciates in value, and requires careful and adequate care, which it is not receiving at the hands of the defendant; and that by reason of the defendant's possession the orator is prevented from using said property, and carrying on the hotel business thereon, and receiving the profits that might and would result therefrom. The bill is demurred to for want of equity, for want of sufficient privity between the orator and the Richardsons, for want of showing that the consideration for said extension was not adequate and beneficial to the Richardsons, for want of showing fraud on the part of the defendant in procuring said extension, and for that the orator has an adequate remedy at law. The demurrer was overruled, the bill taken as confessed for want of an answer, and a pro forma decree for the orator according to the prayer of the bill for possession of the premises and an accounting. Appeal by the defendant.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and TYLER, MUNSON, and WATSON, JJ.

O. M. Barber, for appellant. Butler & Maloney, for appellee.

ROWELL, C. J. There is no sufficient allegation that the defendant procured the extension of the lease by fraud; for it is not enough to characterize a thing as fraudulent, without alleging that which makes it fraudulent, and there is no such allegation. Nor is there a sufficient allegation that the defendant knew before and at the time the guardian was appointed that the Richardsons were insane; for that allegation is a part of an allegation of the orator's information and belief that they were then insane, and that the orator knew it, without alleging the fact of such insanity, and knowledge, based upon that information and belief. Watkins v. Childs, 80 Vt. 99, 106, 66 Atl. 805. There is in another connection, a sufficient allegation that the Richardsons were insane when they executed the extension, but there is no allegation that the defendant knew it. No notice need be taken, as affording matter of estoppel, of what the bill alleges that the orator was informed when he inquired on the premises, for it is not alleged that he relied upon that information. But it is claimed that the defendant is estopped by his letter to the guardian from now setting up the extension of the lease as genuine and binding, since the orator was thereby led to believe that the extension had not been signed, and relied and acted upon the statement therein to that effect. But here is no estoppel, not even as to the guardian, much less as to the orator; for it is not alleged that the guardian informed the defendant of his appointment, or of the purpose of his...