O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 24269,24269
• Citation: O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 493 P.2d 344, 177 Colo. 190 (Colo. 1972)
• Parties: Hollis T. O'QUINN, Plaintiff in Error, v. WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, INC., a California corporation, and Gerald H. Phipps, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Defendants in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 344

493 P.2d 344

177 Colo. 190

Hollis T. O'QUINN, Plaintiff in Error, v. WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, INC., a California corporation, and Gerald H. Phipps, Inc., a Colorado corporation Defendants in Error.

No. 24269.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Jan. 31, 1972.

Ralph B. Rhodes, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Yegge, Hall & Evans, Richard D. Hall, Don R. Evans, Denver, for Walt Disney Productions, Inc Erickson & Littell, Duane O. Littell, Denver, for Gerald H. Phipps, inc.

KELLEY, Justice.

The parties in this case appear in the order in which they appeared in the trial court. The plaintiff-appellant will be referred to as O'Quinn. The defendants-appellees will be referred to as Disney and Phipps.

On August 13, 1968, Phipps entered into a general contract with Disney to perform certain construction work on the latter's premises in Denver. On August 21 Phipps entered into a subcontract with Metal Fabricators, Inc., O'Quinn's employer. During the performance of the subcontract, O'Quinn, an iron worker, fell from the decking above the ceiling of the business premises of Disney and was injured. O'Quinn claimed and received Workmen's Compensation as an employee of Metal Fabricators, Inc. Later he filed an action in tort against Phipps and Disney, alleging that Phipps had negligently installed the decking from which O'Quinn fell and that Disney had negligently failed to inspect the faulty decking. Phipps filed a motion to dismiss premised on an immunity conferred by C.R.S.1963, 81--3--2 on general contractors as statutory employers of subcontract employees. C.R.S.1963, 81--9--1. Disney filed a similar motion based on his status as a real property owner-employer. C.R.S.1963, 81--9--2. The trial court granted both motions.

The appellate courts of this state have had occasion to invoke the provisions of C.R.S.1963, 81--9--1 and 81--9--2. In Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 166 Colo. 118, 444 P.2d 397, this court barred a tort claim against a real property owner and in Nicks v. Electron Corp., 29 Colo.App. 114, 478 P.2d 683, the Court of Appeals barred a tort claim against a general contractor. Conceding applicability, plaintiff asserts that C.R.S.1963, 81--9--1 and 81--9--2 are unconstitutional because they (1) deprive O'Quinn of a property right without due process of law, (2) deny him equal protection, and (3) constitute special legislation granting Disney and Phipps a special privilege and immunity. We disagree.

As to plaintiff's first argument, this court and others have many times considered whether or not the abrogation of a common law remedy constitutes a taking under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article II, section 25 of the Colorado constitution. As a general proposition, courts have concluded that, so long as a statute in abrogation of the common law does not attempt to remove a right which has already accrued, there is no taking. See Finn v. Industrial Commission, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542; Tipton v. A., T. and S. F. Railway, 298 U.S. 141, 56 S.Ct. 715, 80 L.Ed. 1091; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Meese, 239 U.S. 614, 36 S.Ct. 223, 60 L.Ed. 467; Lowman v. Stafford, 226 Cal.App.2d 31, 37 Cal.Rptr. 681; Clark v. Olson, 96 Mont. 417, 31 P.2d 283.

In Lowman, supra, the court stated:

'Although rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process, the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at will by the Legislature . . .. '. . . It may create new rights or provide that rights which have previously existed shall no longer arise, and it has full power to regulate and circumscribe the methods and means of enjoying those rights, so long as there is no interference with constitutional guarantees."

In his second argument, O'Quinn states that he is denied equal protection as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 6 of the Colorado constitution. He urges various cases which stand for the proposition that a statutorily created employment relationship which is contrary to fact is unconstitutional. We cannot accept these cases as controlling as a matter of law or of logic. The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed as a remedial act to insure workmen for work-related injuries regardless of the negligence of the employer. Although the act uses an employment relationship as the basis for recovery, the underlying concept is one of no fault.

According to 1 A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 49.11, some 42 states have adopted statutes which create statutory employment where there is no direct employment. At § 49.22 Larson states:

'. . . (T)here is no reason why the legislature's power cannot extend to a simple declaration that compensation coverage is extended to a particular category of admitted nonemployees, since, although the opposite view was at one time urged in the...