Quinones v. Ladejo

• Decision Date: 14 June 2021
• Docket Number: NO. 2021-T-0003,2021-T-0003
• Parties: Susan QUINONES, as Legal Guardian of David N. Scheehle, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Olanyanju LADEJO, et al., Defendants, ProServ Logistics LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

174 N.E.3d 407

Susan QUINONES, as Legal Guardian of David N. Scheehle, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. Olanyanju LADEJO, et al., Defendants,ProServ Logistics LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 2021-T-0003

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Trumbull County.

Decided: June 14, 2021

Christopher J. Van Blargan, Kisling, Nestico & Redick, LLC, 3412 West Market Street, Akron, OH 44333 (For Plaintiffs-Appellants).

Kurt D. Anderson and Patrick M. Roche, Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, LLC, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, OH 44145 (For Defendant-Appellee).

OPINION

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.

[174 N.E.3d 496]

{¶1} Appellants, Joyce McKenzie and Susan Quinones, the mother and the guardian of David N. Scheehle, respectively, appeal from the judgment dismissing their complaint. We reverse and remand.

{¶2} This case stems from a vehicle collision on the Ohio Turnpike where a commercial tractor-trailer operated by an employee of Wisconsin Trucks, Inc. ("Wisconsin Trucks") rear-ended Scheehle's vehicle. As a result of the collision, Scheehle sustained serious injuries. Appellants filed a complaint against several parties including Wisconsin Trucks and its freight broker, ProServ Logistics, LLC ("ProServ"). Appellants maintained that Wisconsin Trucks, ProServ, and others were vicariously liable for the truck driver's negligence, that they negligently entrusted the truck driver with the tractor-trailer, and that they breached their duties as "employers, brokers, or shippers to exercise reasonable care in hiring competent drivers’ and/or carriers and in instructing, training, supervising, and retaining driver and/or carriers."

{¶3} Thereafter, ProServ filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that appellants’ claims against it were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act ("FAAAA").

{¶4} On December 23, 2020, the trial court dismissed appellants’ claims against ProServ. On January 8, 2020, the trial court entered an entry nunc pro tunc to the December 23, 2020 judgment finding there was no just cause for delay pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B).

{¶5} Appellants assign one error:

{¶6} "The trial court erred in finding the FAAAA preempted Quinones’ claim of vicarious liability and negligent selection, supervision, and retention, and in dismissing those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Civil Rule 12(B)(1)."

{¶7} We review a trial court's dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) de novo.¹ Jones v. Ohio Edison Co. , 2014-Ohio-5466, 26 N.E.3d 834, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.), citing Washington Mut. Bank v. Beatley , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1189, 2008-Ohio-1679, 2008 WL 928424, ¶ 8.

{¶8} The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the U.S. Constitution and "the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law.

[174 N.E.3d 497]

Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. , 80 Ohio St.3d 62, 68, 684 N.E.2d 648 (1997), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. , 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). However, "[i]t has ‘long been settled’ that a preemption analysis begins with the presumption that federal statutes do not preempt state law." (Emphasis added.) State v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 2020-Ohio-2665, 154 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.), appeal allowed , 159 Ohio St.3d 1486, 2020-Ohio-4232, 151 N.E.3d 635, ¶ 13, quoting Bond v. United States , 572 U.S. 844, 858, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014) ; Minton at 69, 684 N.E.2d 648 ("[I]n considering issues arising under the Supremacy Clause, courts must start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (Citations omitted.)).

{¶9} At issue here is the preemptive effect of the FAAAA:

After deregulating trucking through the Motor Trucking Act of 1980, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Authorization Administration Act ("FAAAA") in 1994 in an effort to avoid "a State's direct substitution of its own governmental commands for ‘competitive market forces’ in determining (to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide."

Creagan v. Wal-Mart Trans., LLC , 354 F.Supp.3d 808, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2018), quoting Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assn. , 552 U.S. 364, 368, 372, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008). The general express preemption clause of the FAAAA provides in relevant part: "Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State * * * may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a * * * service of any * * * broker * * * with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1) ; see also Minton at 69, 684 N.E.2d 648 (state law may be preempted through express, field, or conflict preemption). Common law duties are within the scope of the "law[s], rule[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s] having the force of law" for purposes of the FAAAA. See Krauss v. IRIS USA, Inc. , E.D.Pennsylvania No. 17-778, 2018 WL 2063839, *4 (May 3, 2018) ; see also Gillum v. High Std., LLC , W.D.Texas No. SA-19-CV-1378-XR, 2020 WL 444371, *3 (Jan. 27, 2020) ; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 522, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) ("the phrase ‘state law’ [includes] common law as well as statutes and regulations").

{¶10} Here, the parties do not dispute that ProServ is a "broker" for purposes of the FAAAA. See 49 U.S.C. 13102(2) (broker is "a person, other than a motor carrier * * * that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out * * * as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by a motor carrier for compensation"). Instead, the parties argue whether the negligence claim is "related to" a broker's "services" with respect to the transportation of property.

{¶11} "The FAAAA's preemption provision was modeled on similar language in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which had already been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 504 U.S. 374 [112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157] (1992)." Krauss at *3, citing Rowe at 368, 128 S.Ct. 989. Therefore, courts similarly interpret the preemption provisions of the FAAAA and the ADA. Id. In interpreting these provisions, the phrase "related to" is broadly construed in accordance with its ordinary usage: " ‘to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association or

[174 N.E.3d 498]

connection with.’ " United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Flores-Galarza , 318 F.3d 323, 335 (1st Cir. 2003), citing Morales at 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979). Therefore, if the state law at issue "refers to and has a forbidden significant effect" on the "service of [a] broker * * * with respect to the transportation of property," such a law would come within the scope of the general preemption provision. See United Parcel Serv. at 335 ; Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey , 569 U.S. 251, 260, 133 S.Ct. 1769, 185 L.E.2d 909 (2013). See also Rowe at 375, 128 S.Ct. 989, quoting Morales at 388, 112 S.Ct. 2031 ("[S]tate laws whose ‘effect’ is ‘forbidden’ under federal law are those with a ‘significant impact’ on carrier rates, routes, or services." (Emphasis sic.)).

{¶12} However, " ‘the breadth of the words "related to" does not mean the sky is the limit.’ " Loyd v. Salazar , 416 F.Supp.3d 1290, 1295 (W.D. Oklahoma 2019), quoting Dan's City Used Cars at 260, 133 S.Ct. 1769. "The Supreme Court has ‘cautioned that [ section] 14501(c)(1) does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and services in only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner.’ " Loyd at 1295, quoting Dan's City Used Cars at 261, 133 S.Ct. 1769. "Federal district courts are sharply divided on how to apply these guiding principles to personal injury claims alleging negligence by brokers in selecting motor carriers for the transportation of property." Loyd at 1295. See, e.g., Ciotola v. Star Transp. & Trucking, LLC , 481 F.Supp.3d 375, 390 (M.D. Pennsylvania 2020) (negligence claim not preempted because claim "does not directly reference prices, routes, or services of a broker or motor carrier, and does not place a significant financial impact on a broker or motor carrier's prices, routes, or services"). But see, e.g., Loyd at 1297-1298 (state-law negligent brokering claim is directly "related to" a broker's "services" of arranging for motor carriers to transport property).

{¶13} Appellants contend that because "[n]egligence claims alleging personal injury result[ing] from the failure of a business to use reasonable or ordinary care are generally applicable to all businesses," and because "such claims do not target the motor carrier industry," the claims only tangentially affect a broker's services. This argument finds support in the decisions of several federal district courts as discussed above and is consistent with the principle that "[i]n the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the States, * * * a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 663-664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). "There could be no better example of a subject which is ‘traditionally governed by state law’ than a common-law tort claim." In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation , 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 261, 626 N.E.2d 85 (1994).

{¶14} However, given the broad language employed in the general preemption...