Quinones v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 06 December 2011
• Citation: Quinones v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 2011 NY Slip Op 8923, 933 N.Y.S.2d 907, 90 A.D.3d 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
• Parties: Dora H. QUINONES, appellant, v. LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 08923

90 A.D.3d 632

933 N.Y.S.2d 907

Dora H. QUINONES, appellant,

v.LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Dec. 6, 2011.

Fashakin & Associates, P.C., Richmond Hill, N.Y. (Janet Fashakin of counsel), for appellant.

Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Christopher Simone

and Lena Holubnyczyj of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O'Donoghue, J.), dated May 14, 2010, which granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The nature and degree of the sanction to be imposed on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 is within the broad discretion of the motion court ( see Zletz v. Wetanson, 67 N.Y.2d 711, 713, 499 N.Y.S.2d 933, 490 N.E.2d 852; Pirro Group, LLC v. One Point St., Inc., 71 A.D.3d 654, 655, 896 N.Y.S.2d 152; Novick v. DeRosa, 51 A.D.3d 885, 858 N.Y.S.2d 371; Martin v. City of New York, 46 A.D.3d 635, 847 N.Y.S.2d 621; Bomzer v. Parke–Davis, Div. of Warner Lambert Co., 41 A.D.3d 522, 839 N.Y.S.2d 110). “The striking of a pleading may be appropriate where there is a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful and contumacious” ( McArthur v. New York City Hous. Auth., 48 A.D.3d 431, 431, 851 N.Y.S.2d 271; see Workman v. Town of Southampton, 69 A.D.3d 619, 620, 892 N.Y.S.2d 481; Northfield Ins. Co. v. Model Towing & Recovery, 63 A.D.3d 808, 809, 881 N.Y.S.2d 135).

Here, the plaintiff's willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from her repeated failures, despite the defendants' requests, to provide authorizations for trial and expert witness disclosure, and the absence of any reasonable excuse for these failures ( see Workman v. Town of Southampton, 69 A.D.3d at 620, 892 N.Y.S.2d 481; Novick v. DeRosa, 51 A.D.3d 885, 858 N.Y.S.2d 371; Suazo–Alvarez v. Nordlaw, LLC, 48 A.D.3d 670, 850 N.Y.S.2d 906; McArthur v. New York City Hous. Auth., 48 A.D.3d 431, 851 N.Y.S.2d 271; Horne v. Swimquip, Inc., 36 A.D.3d 859, 861, 830 N.Y.S.2d 218; Powell v. Cipollaro, 34 A.D.3d 551, 824 N.Y.S.2d 409; Devito v. J & J Towing, Inc., 17 A.D.3d 624, 625, 794 N.Y.S.2d 74). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126.

DICKERSON, J.P., ENG, ROMAN and SGROI, JJ., concur.