Quintana v. City of Westminster, No. 98CA2240.

• Docket Nº: No. 98CA2240.
• Citation: 8 P.3d 527
• Case Date: February 03, 2000
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado

8 P.3d 527

Randolph L. QUINTANA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The CITY OF WESTMINSTER and Timothy Torres, Defendants-Appellees

No. 98CA2240.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

February 3, 2000.

Certiorari Denied September 5, 2000.

Fasing Law Firm, P.C. Gregory J. Fasing, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff Appellant.

8 P.3d 529

Martin McCullough, City Attorney, Jeffrey M. Betz, Assistant City Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee City of Westminster

Senter, Goldfarb & Rice, L.L.C., Thomas S. Rice, Peter H. Doherty, for Defendant Appellee Timothy Torres.

8 P.3d 528

Opinion by Judge NEY

Plaintiff, Randolph L. Quintana, appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing his complaint against defendants, City of Westminster and Timothy Torres, a City of Westminster police officer, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. Because the trial court failed to make complete findings, we remand with instructions.

The police officer attempted to stop a car because he suspected the occupants were involved in an armed robbery. The car sped away, and a police chase ensued. The officer pursued the suspects at a high rate of speed with his siren and overhead lights activated. The actual speeds of the vehicles were contested. The plaintiff was injured when the suspects' vehicle hit his.

The plaintiff filed this action against the City and the police officer involved in the chase. The City moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), pursuant to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, § 24-10-101, et seq., C.R.S.1999 (Act).

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss, ruling that the officer's actions were legally justified, that probable cause existed, and that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the emergency vehicle exception of the Act. The plaintiff appeals from this dismissal.

I.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the City is immune. We agree with plaintiff's contention that the trial court did not make a necessary finding whether the officer, while speeding, endangered life or property. Therefore, we remand for further findings.

The Act provides immunity for public entities and their employees from liability for claims which lie in tort or could lie in tort. Section 24-10-106. This immunity is waived for actions based on the operation of motor vehicles. Section 24-10-106(a).

As pertinent here, an exception to the immunity waiver exists for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles when they are "in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law." Section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1999. However, this emergency exception to the waiver of immunity is limited in that an emergency vehicle may:

Exceed the lawful speeds ... or exceed the maximum lawful speed limits . . . so long as said driver does not endanger life or property.

Section 42-4-108(2)(c) (emphasis added). See also City of Grand Junction v. Sisneros, 957 P.2d 1026 (Colo.1998).

Whether immunity has been waived under the Act is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The burden of proving jurisdiction is on the plaintiff, and the trial court's findings of fact supporting a determination under the Act will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo.1993) (the trial court is the factfinder regarding jurisdictional determinations under the Act, and appellate review is highly deferential).

Any factual dispute upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn is for the trial court to resolve, and the issue is one of law only if the underlying facts are undisputed. Swieckowski v. City of Ft. Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo.1997).

In this case, the trial court found that the officer initially had...