Quintanilla v. K-Bin, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. G-97-608. |
| Citation | 8 F.Supp.2d 928 |
| Parties | Mario QUINTANILLA v. K-BIN, INC., Shintech, Inc., and N.F. Giannone, M.D. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
David A. Jameson, Galveston, TX, for David Jameson.
David T. Lopez, David Lopez & Associates, Houston, TX, for Mario NMI Quintanilla.
G. Mark Jodon, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Houston, TX, Ervin A. Apffel, Jr., McLeod Alexander, Galveston, TX, for K-Bin, Inc., Shintech, Inc., N F Giannone, M.D.
In this action, Plaintiff Mario Quintanilla asserts claims of race discrimination, national origin discrimination, false light invasion of privacy, negligence and gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Now before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants K-Bin and Shintech, filed May 18, 1998, and of Defendant Giannone, filed May 5, 1998. By Order entered February 2, 1998, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims of false light invasion of privacy, negligence and gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants K-Bin and Shintech, and sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff's claims of false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Giannone. Defendants K-Bin and Shintech now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination and national origin discrimination under Title VII and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Defendant Giannone moves for summary judgment on the only claim remaining against him, negligence. For the reasons stated below, Dr. Giannone's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and K-Bin and Shintech's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff, a Hispanic male, was employed by Defendant K-Bin as a process development technician supervisor in K-Bin's Research and Development Department, located within Shintech's Freeport, Texas manufacturing complex. In accordance with K-Bin's regular policy and practice of periodically testing its employees for the use of illegal controlled substances, Quintanilla was randomly tested on or about May 21, 1996. The test result came out positive for a cocaine metabolite.
Upon being informed of the positive result, Quintanilla immediately informed his supervisor that he suspected the result was due to an herbal tea called "Te Nervioso" that he had purchased in Mexico. Quintanilla also informed the Medical Review Officer ("MRO"), Dr. Giannone, who was hired to investigate the positive test result, that he suspected the tea was the cause of the positive result. Giannone questioned Plaintiff about possible medical reasons for the presence of cocaine metabolite, and determined that there were none. Giannone did not test the tea samples that Plaintiff provided. Upon determining that there was no medical explanation for Plaintiff's result, Giannone forwarded his report indicating such to Quintanilla and Shintech. Shortly thereafter, Quintanilla was terminated for violating company policy.
Plaintiff alleges that after he was fired, his former employer rejected his offer to have the teas tested by a laboratory, and that even after testing by an independent laboratory confirmed that the tea would produce a "minute" quantity of cocaine metabolite, the company steadfastly refused to reinstate Quintanilla. He also asserts that similarly situated white males, who were known by K-Bin and Shintech to be users of controlled substances, were not terminated immediately, but were given a chance to rehabilitate. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that his employers illegally discriminated against him because of his race or national origin.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Rule 56(e) requires that when a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party must set forth set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "That the movant appears more likely to prevail at trial is no reason to grant summary judgment; it is not the province of the court on a motion for summary judgment to weigh the evidence, assess its probative value, or decide factual issues." Byrd v. Roadway Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 85, 87 (5th Cir.1982). If the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment should not be granted. Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
To plead a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must show a legal duty, breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex.1987). The only issue that must be considered in Giannone's Motion for Summary Judgment is whether Dr. Giannone owed a legal duty to Plaintiff to test the tea for cocaine. In making this enquiry, the Court must consider "several interrelated factors, including the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant." Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990).
Plaintiff argues that Giannone had a duty to test the tea after Plaintiff informed him that he suspected the tea had caused the positive result, and after Giannone brought up the idea of having the tea tested. According to Plaintiff, "[o]nce having entered into a course of conduct which could avoid the harm to Mr. Quintanilla, Dr. Giannone assumed a duty not to act in any way which would frustrate the effort or worsen the situation." Plaintiff is correct in that there is at common law a rule that imposes liability for injuries caused by the negligent performance of a gratuitous undertaking. See Colonial Sav. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. 1976). However, a person generally is under no legal duty to come to the aid of another in distress, and is only under a duty to avoid any affirmative act which might worsen the situation. See Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983).
Even assuming that Giannone's testing of the tea would have helped Plaintiff,1 in this case Plaintiff has failed to show by competent summary judgment evidence that Giannone voluntarily agreed to test the tea for Plaintiff. If Giannone did not voluntarily agree to do so, then he had no affirmative duty under the reasoning advanced by Plaintiff to do any affirmative act, other than those required of him as a MRO. Moreover, the evidence shows that Giannone's duties, under his agreement with Shintech and K-Bin, were only to determine whether there was a medical reason for the positive drug result, such as prescription medication. This duty is consistent with the legal duties of MROs under federal drug testing programs. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 199.15(c) (). In fact, Plaintiff himself has submitted the letter of a medical consultant who concluded that Dr. Giannone had no independent duty to test the tea, and that he did all that was required of him as a MRO.
Plaintiff cites to no authority which would require a MRO to investigate every possible reason that a test subject may advance to explain a positive drug test result, and the Court is persuaded by Giannone's argument that imposing such a duty on MROs would "create[] a situation where the scope of a MRO's duties is limited only by the scope of [a] plaintiff's imagination as to what caused the positive test result."
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show causation and damages. The record shows that Plaintiff did have the tea tested by an independent laboratory, and submitted the results to K-Bin, showing that the tea contained trace amounts of cocaine. However, Plaintiff's employer refused to reinstate him. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that Giannone's action caused him any damages; the record shows that K-Bin would have terminated Plaintiff anyway.2 Therefore, the Court finds that Dr. Giannone was under no legal duty to test the tea. Accordingly, Giannone's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and all claims against such Defendant are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
K-Bin and Shintech (collectively, "K-Bin" or "Defendants") argue for summary judgment of the Title VII and section 1981 claims against them. Plaintiff alleges that the corporate Defendants discriminated against him because of his race or national origin, in violation of these federal statutes.
Section 1981 provides in part that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). The phrase "make and enforce contracts" is defined to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and...
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