Quinteros v. United States

• Docket Number: 8:22-cv-677-MSS-JSS
• Decision Date: 23 February 2023
• Parties: MARCOS A. PADRON QUINTEROS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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MARCOS A. PADRON QUINTEROS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 8:22-cv-677-MSS-JSS

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

February 23, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JULIE S SNEED, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendant United States of America moves to dismiss Plaintiff Marcos A Padron Quinteros's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (Motion, Dkt. 14.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (Dkt. 15.) On January 4, 2023 the court held a hearing on the Motion. At the hearing, the United States provided additional cases and argument in support of its Motion. (Id.) As a result, the United States was directed to file a reply that included its arguments, and Plaintiff was granted leave to file a surreply. (Dkt. 19.) The Motion is now fully briefed (Dkts 21, 22), and ripe for review. For the reasons that follow the court recommends that the Motion be granted.

BACKGROUND

This is a negligence action brought against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2674. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff is seeking compensation for damages resulting from injuries he sustained on July 25, 2020, while picking up mail from the United States Postal Service (USPS) in Tampa, Florida. (Id.)

Prior to the accident, the USPS had subcontracted part of its contractual obligation to deliver mail to Matson American Transportation Services. (Dkt. 14-2 at 6, 8-19.) As part of the contract between Matson and the USPS, Matson was required to maintain and furnish evidence of workers' compensation, which it did. (Dkt. 15 at 4; Dkt. 14-2 at 52; Dkt. 15-1 at 4). Matson further subcontracted Windy City Carriers, Inc., who contracted with Plaintiff to transport loads of mail on behalf of the USPS. (Dkt. 14 at 2, 58-91; Dkt. 15 at 5; Dkt. 15-1 at 1-2; Dkt. 15-2 at 1-2, 4.)

According to Plaintiff, after he arrived at the USPS Grant Street Processing and Distribution Center, the dispatcher sent him to the dock and instructed him to operate the ramp himself to load the trailer. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 4, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that the dispatcher did so without providing Plaintiff any instruction or training about how to operate the ramp. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he backed his trailer into position at the dock, then lowered the ramp into place before a forklift operator loaded the trailer. (Id. ¶ 7.) When Plaintiff attempted to remove the ramp so that he could depart with the load, Plaintiff alleges that he was struck by a metal bar which caused serious injuries to his eye. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff avers that after the accident, he did not apply for, nor receive, any workers' compensation benefits. (Dkt. 15-2 at 6.) Following the accident, Plaintiff filed suit against the United States.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The United States previously moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See (Dkt. 7.) Plaintiff objected and requested limited jurisdictional discovery. See (Dkt. 8.) The court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, granted the parties 90 days to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery, and permitted the United States to renew the motion, if warranted. (Dkt. 10.)

The United States now renews its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. 14.) Specifically, the United States contends Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal as the United States “is shielded from liability due to sovereign immunity because a similarly situated private party would be immune for a workplace injury by an employee of a sub-subcontractor when it ensured that its subcontractor provided workers' compensation insurance coverage to its employees.” (Id. at 1-3.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be based upon either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc., 998 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990)). “A ‘facial attack' challenges whether a plaintiff ‘has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.'” Id. at 1529 (quotation marks omitted). Id. A factual attack, however, challenges the underlying facts supporting the court's jurisdiction. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2011). When evaluating a factual attack, “the district court is not obligated to take the allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. Instead, the court “may consider extrinsic evidence such as deposition testimony and affidavits.” Id. And from this evidence, the court may “independently weigh the facts, and is not constrained to view them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Id. Here, the United States asserts a factual attack to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

A. Federal Tort Claims Act

As noted above, Plaintiff brings suit against the United States pursuant to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2674. (Dkt. 1.) The FTCA “provides a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity for tort claims.” See Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States, 717 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the United States is liable “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2674, the United States is liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. See also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962) (discussing the FTCA); Hurst v. U.S. by & through Dep't of the Agric. U.S. Forest Serv., 782 Fed.Appx. 978, 980-81 (11th Cir. 2019) (discussing section 2674 of the FTCA). The term “like circumstances” does not mean “identical” or “same” circumstances. Turner ex rel. Turner v. United States, 514 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead, “like circumstances” means “similarly situated.” Id.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “the FTCA provides that the United States may be held liable for damages for ‘personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.'” Schippers v. United States, 715 F.3d 879, 883 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). The FTCA's reference to the law of the place “means law of the State- the source of substantive liability under the FTCA.'” Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2674 work together to “preclude liability of the federal government absent a showing by the plaintiff that a private individual . . . in like circumstances[ ] would be liable for the particular tort under governing state law where the tort occurred.” Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FTCA. Id.; Motta, 717 F.3d at 844; Tursom v. United States, No. 20-cv-20811-BLOOM/Louis, 2021 WL 3493207, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2021) (“The party asserting the FTCA claim bears the burden of demonstrating that a private individual in like circumstances would be liable for the tort at issue under governing state law.”) (citation omitted).

Here because the FTCA requires federal courts to apply the substantive law of the state where the claim arose, the undersigned reviews the United States' Motion under Florida law. See Stone v. United States, 373 F.3d 1129, 1130 (11th Cir. 2004) (“As the alleged tort here occurred in Florida, Florida tort law applies.”); Triolo v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-919-MMH-JBT, 2022 WL 843580, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2022) (“In considering claims brought under the FTCA, the Court applies the substantive law of the place where the claim arose.”). To determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's negligence claim against the United States pursuant to the FTCA, the court must analogize the United States to a private actor in a similar situation and apply Florida state law to determine amenability to suit. See Zelaya, 781 F.3d at 1323-24, 1324 n.4 (noting that “the analogy that must be made is one between the federal government and a private person”); Ochran, 273 F.3d at 1317 (“[U]nless the facts support liability under state law, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide an FTCA claim.”); Fisher v. United States, 995 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting “we may exercise jurisdiction over this [FTCA] suit if-and only if-it could be brought against a private person under Florida tort law”). If a private person under similar circumstances would be liable under Florida law in this case, the United States' sovereign immunity would be waived. See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1528 (“Unless, according to the law of Florida, the United States could be liable for this alleged tort . . . if it were a private person, then not only is the sovereign's immunity intact, but the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction and...