Quinton v. Mulvane
| Decision Date | 07 July 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,116 |
| Citation | 81 P. 486,71 Kan. 687 |
| Parties | MARY K. QUINTON v. JOHN R. MULVANE |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided. July, 1905.
Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. HAZEN, judge.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
CONTRACTS--Optional and Unilateral--Validity. A written contract, by the terms of which M. undertakes to pay Q. a sum of money at a stated time in consideration of the conveyance by Q. and her husband of certain real estate to the Amusement Syndicate Company, subject to a lease and to a note and mortgage "the same being a first lien upon the property conveyed the Amusement Syndicate Company assuming and agreeing to pay the same," is not, on its face, an unenforceable contract.
A. B. Quinton, E. S. Quinton, and M. T. Campbell, for plaintiff in error.
Garver & Larimer, Mulvane & Gault, and Frank Doster, for defendant in error.
OPINION
The plaintiff in error brought an action in the district court of Shawnee county against John R. Mulvane, and in her petition alleged "that on or about the 17th day of February, 1903, she and the defendant, by and through C. E. Gault, who was the defendant's duly authorized agent for that purpose, entered into a written contract, which was then duly executed by them," by the terms of which, in consideration of the conveyance by the plaintiff and her husband to the Amusement Syndicate Company of three lots in the city of Topeka, subject to a certain lease, and to a note and mortgage, which the amusement company was to assume and pay, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $ 20,000. She further alleged that immediately thereafter she and her husband, in compliance with the contract, conveyed the lots therein described by executing and delivering to the Amusement Syndicate Company a deed thereto, which was then tendered and delivered to the defendant, and that she had fully complied with all the conditions of the contract on her part. She further alleged that, on demand, the defendant neglected and refused to pay the money contracted to be paid, or any part thereof, and she claimed judgment for the amount, with interest.
On the trial of the case, which was had without a jury, the court, after hearing a mass of evidence as to the circumstances that led up to the making and signing of the contract, and as to what occurred thereafter between the parties in relation thereto, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant for costs, and also filed a written opinion for the purpose, as it says, of informing this court as to the grounds upon which it acted, in case its judgment should be brought here for review. The opinion disclaimed any decision upon the evidence. Among other things the court said:
"It is contended on behalf of the defendant that this is not such a contract as can be enforced, even if its execution be admitted; and this is the proposition upon which the court proposes to decide the case--whether the contract before us is one that can be enforced."
After some argument upon this proposition the opinion continued:
"The court is of the opinion, therefore, that this contract cannot be enforced; that it is not uncertain or ambiguous, and that it cannot be contradicted or varied by parol testimony."
This is an action upon an optional contract to sell and convey certain land for a definite price. It is alleged that the option had been accepted and a conveyance tendered by the plaintiff. The case of Johnson v. Furnish, 29 Kan 523, is quite similar to this, except it was not upon an optional contract, and was to compel the conveyance of land instead of the payment of the contract price. In that case Johnson contracted, through an agent, to sell a tract of land to Furnish, who, by an arrangement with Sperry, directed the deed to be made to the latter, Johnson not knowing the name of the purchaser. Sperry, before the transaction was closed, refused to carry out his arrangement with Furnish, and the latter thereupon tendered the purchase-price and demanded a deed from Johnson to himself. Johnson, suspecting fraud, refused to convey to Furnish, who then brought suit. Mr. Justice Brewer, delivering the opinion of the...
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In re Hodge
...and although it was "impossible to determine whether the terms were fair and reasonable to the client"); see also Quinton v. Mulvane, 71 Kan. 687, 690-91, 81 P. 486 (1905). This argument has no merit.Hodge's next assertion is that he could not have violated KRPC 1.8(a) because there was tim......
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