Quiring v. Quiring

Decision Date02 September 1997
Docket NumberNo. 23353,23353
PartiesLeRono Dee QUIRING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lynn Ann QUIRING, Defendant-Respondent. Boise, May 1997 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Ismael Chavez, Caldwell, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard L. Harris, Caldwell, for Defendant-Respondent.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This dispute involves whether an agreement and quitclaim deed entered into by a husband and wife in contemplation of divorce is valid and enforceable, whether the magistrate erred in his findings and conclusions, and whether the magistrate abused his discretion by allowing testimony to contradict untimely denied requests for admissions.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

LeRono Quiring (Ron) and Lynn Ann Quiring (Lynn) were married August 4, 1985, in Reno, Nevada. The couple divorced in August of 1995. Prior to their divorce the When Ron arrived at home on July 11, 1994, the locks had been changed. That evening, Lynn confronted him with the allegations of sexual improprieties. She presented a quitclaim deed for him to sign to the couple's community real property consisting of the family residence on Robinson Road (Robinson Property). The Robinson Property was originally Ron's separate property, but in May of 1990 he had quitclaimed the property to Lynn and him as their community property. The Robinson Property was assessed in 1995 as having a fair market value of $139,275.00. The indebtedness owing against the property on August 17, 1994, was $45,253.78. To obtain refinancing, the property was reappraised at $204,100.00 some time after the couple separated. Ron claims that Lynn threatened she would inform the police and Ron's employer of the allegations if he refused to sign the quitclaim deed. Lynn denies that she made such a threat. Ron also claims that Lynn threatened that her father and her daughter's biological father would "get" Ron. Lynn also denies that she made this threat.

couple experienced marital discord and on two occasions separated. The final event precipitating their divorce occurred on July 11, 1994, when the couple's daughter (Lynn's natural daughter and Ron's adopted daughter) allegedly reported to Lynn that Ron had committed sexual improprieties with her five years prior. The record does not reveal the nature of these alleged improprieties. These events gave rise to a criminal indictment and charge which was later dismissed.

Ron denied the allegations of sexual impropriety and left to spend the evening elsewhere without signing the quitclaim deed. The next day, Ron went to his job with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare where he taught juveniles committed to secure confinement. He telephoned Lynn from work. According to Ron, Lynn told him that if he did not sign the quitclaim deed she would have him arrested at his place of work. During breaks at work, Ron drafted a handwritten agreement (Agreement) with the following provisions:

I do hereby relinquish interest in my residence located at 1009 N. Robinson, Nampa, Idaho 83687 for the following considerations:

1) That any and all past differences be forgotten and not brought up by Lynn or either of the two children, [daughter], age 15 and [son], age 17.

2) That we part amicably with no further contact other than details of the divorce.

3) There is to be, as agreed, no other compensation to be given by me in any form including support for the children or my wife as the amount of equity in the house shall be considered to be quite sufficient to more than compensate for any deficiency of support until the children reach the age where no further support is required.

4) It is agreed between Ron Quiring and Lynn Quiring, husband and wife, that a divorce is pending and details of personal items within the house will be agreed upon separately.

Ron telephoned his attorney and read the Agreement to him. His attorney advised him not to sign anything. Ron then called Lynn and arranged to meet her to discuss their community debt and child support. They met and talked for approximately one-half hour about the division of property and debts. Then they went to Stewart Title Company in Nampa. Ron presented Lynn with the Agreement and told her that she would have to sign the Agreement before he would sign the quitclaim deed. The parties read and signed the Agreement in the presence of a Stewart Title notary public and closing officer. Ron also signed and had notarized the quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the Robinson Property to Lynn. The quitclaim deed was recorded the next day. The deed listed $800.00 as the value received by Ron.

Ron filed for divorce on July 28, 1994, praying for a decree of divorce and that Lynn be awarded physical and legal custody of their daughter. Although Ron and Lynn had executed the Agreement and Ron had signed the quitclaim deed setting forth a settlement of property and support rights, Ron's complaint prayed for "child support as provided by the Idaho Child Support Guidelines or as the Court may otherwise deem At the time of trial, Lynn had quit her job at Micron, which had paid approximately $1,200 per month and had remarried. Ron had been fired as a teacher and was working on commission for Squat Down Manufacturing Corporation out of Anadarko, Oklahoma, but had yet to make a first sale.

                appropriate," and stated that "[t]he parties hereto have agreed to and will execute a Property Settlement Agreement and the same should be incorporated into the Court's decree.  In the event either party fails to execute the Agreement, then the community property and community debts should be equitably distributed."   Lynn answered, denying that the parties had agreed to execute a Property Settlement Agreement.  Despite the Agreement and quitclaim deed, Lynn prayed "[t]hat the Court make an equitable distribution of the parties [sic] community property and community debts" and that Ron be ordered to "pay for [child] support ... as provided by the Idaho Child Support Guidelines or as the Court may otherwise deem appropriate."
                

Prior to determining property distribution, custody and support, the trial court granted the divorce. Subsequently, the magistrate determined that the real property contained in the quitclaim deed was Lynn's sole and separate property and that no support was to be ordered, though Lynn could seek a modification to secure support if the equity in the home was inadequate.

Ron appealed to the district court, alleging that the magistrate erred by allowing Lynn to present trial testimony contradicting allegations contained in requests for admissions which were denied untimely and by failing to make certain factual findings. Ron also appealed the magistrate's legal conclusion that the quitclaim deed and Agreement were valid and binding, asserting that they were entered into upon undue influence, coercion and duress. The district court affirmed the magistrate's decision and awarded Lynn costs and attorney fees on appeal, finding that Ron's appeal was frivolous.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where, as here, the issue presented was first decided in the magistrate division of the district court and was appealed to the district court, this Court reviews the magistrate's decision independent of, but with due regard for, the district court's appellate decision. Toyama v. Toyama, 129 Idaho 142, 144, 922 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1996). When reviewing decisions of the trial court, the Court will uphold findings of fact which are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 140, 911 P.2d 133, 136 (1996). The trial court's discretionary decisions will be upheld absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. Id.; Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 P.2d 118, 121 (1995). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the Court inquires: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by exercise of reason. Noble, 126 Idaho at 888, 894 P.2d at 121; Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, this Court exercises free review. Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 279, 923 P.2d 981, 986 (1996).

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT UNTIMELY DENIED REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION BECAUSE RON FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED.

On February 1, 1996, Ron submitted Requests for Admissions asking that the following statements be admitted or denied: (1) that on July 11, 1994, Lynn alleged that Ron had committed sexual improprieties with their daughter, (2) that on that date Lynn changed the locks to the residence, (3) that on that date Lynn informed Ron that if he did not sign the quitclaim deed she had prepared and presented to him, he would be THE COURT: All right, I'm going to order that they will be admitted at this point in time.

arrested, and (4) that on that date Lynn informed Ron that her father and the childrens' biological father were going to "get" Ron. These Requests were denied in a response filed on February 28, 1996, which was untimely. At trial the magistrate ruled that the requests were admitted but that Lynn could present contradictory testimony, stating the following:

Obviously, Mr. Harris, you're not precluded from presenting any testimony to the contrary.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides:

Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within 15 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter....

I.R.C.P....

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