Quirk v. Bedal
| Decision Date | 29 May 1926 |
| Citation | 42 Idaho 567,248 P. 447 |
| Parties | MARY QUIRK, Respondent, v. KATE CECELIA BEDAL, JAMES BEDAL, NELLIE PAYNE JOHNSON et al., Appellants |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-ESTOPPEL-PLEADING-QUIETING TITLE-APPEAL AND ERROR-EXECUTION SALE.
1. Plaintiff, in action to quiet title, was properly permitted to testify to statements as to title, made to her by defendant's attorney, to whom she was referred by defendant.
2. Where one person refers another on some disputed fact to a third person to answer for him, he is bound by answer made.
3. Technical deficiency in pleading of estoppel is not fatal, if necessary facts are pleaded, and no objection is made to form.
4. Complaint, in action to quiet title, alleging defendant represented and caused to be represented certain facts as to title, is sufficient, in absence of special demurrer, to admit testimony of representations of title made by defendant's attorney.
5. Evidence, in action to quiet title, held to support finding that plaintiff was induced to purchase property at execution sale under defendant's judgment on defendant's misrepresentation that title was good.
6. Findings of fact on conflicting testimony, supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed.
7. Where purchaser was induced to purchase property at execution sale on misrepresentations of judgment creditor that title was good, rule of caveat emptor does not apply.
8. Owner of real estate, who disclaims title therein to prospective purchaser, is estopped to assert his title against latter, who afterward purchased from third person assuming to be owner.
9. Judgment creditor, who misrepresented title to purchaser of property at execution sale, is estopped to claim interest therein as against such purchaser.
10. Decision of supreme court as to ownership of property in suit cannot be considered in determining appeal from case tried prior to such decision, though based on facts determined on such previous appeal.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Ada County. Hon. Raymond L. Givens, Judge.
Action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.
Johnson & Nixon, for Appellant.
The testimony of respondent as to the statements she claimed Mr Johnson made to her was inadmissible, because not pleaded in the complaint as a ground for estoppel. (Seat v Quarles, 31 Idaho 212, 216, 169 P. 1167; Kemmerer v Pollard, 15 Idaho 34, 38, 96 P. 206; Davis v Davis, 26 Cal. 23, 39, 85 Am. Dec. 157; Neitzel v. Lawrence, 40 Idaho 26, 231 P. 423.)
It is the established rule that in an estoppel affecting the legal title to land, the following are essential requisites: It must appear (1) that the party making the admission, by his declaration or conduct, was apprised of the true state of his own title; (2) that he made the admission with the express intention to deceive, or with such careless and culpable negligence as to amount to constructive fraud; (3) that the other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true state of the title, but also of any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge: (4) that he relied directly upon such admission and will be injured by allowing its truth to be disproved. (Biddle Boggs v. Merced Min. Co., 14 Cal. 279, 367, 368; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, p. 1427, secs. 805, 806, 807, and cases cited; Davis v. Davis, supra; Morgan v. Lones, 78 Cal. 58, 61, 20 P. 248; Dean v. Parker, 88 Cal. 283, 287, 26 P. 91; Hicks v. Post, 154 Cal. 22, 96 P. 878, 880; Stein v. Leeman, 161 Cal. 502, 119 P. 663, 665; Central Pacific Ry. Co. v. Droge, 171 Cal. 32, 42, 151 P. 663, 667; Crary v. Dye, 208 U.S. 515, 28 S.Ct. 360, 52 L.Ed. 595; Brandt v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326, 336, 23 L.Ed. 927; Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 255, 271, 21 L.Ed. 835; Staniford v. Trombly, 181 Cal. 372, 186 P. 599; Webber v. Axtell, 94 Minn. 375, 102 N.W. 915, 6 L. R. A., N. S., 194; Reutzel v. McKinney, 54 Ark. 465, 16 S.W. 265; Winslow v. Cooper, 104 Ill. 235; Danforth v. Adams, 29 Conn. 107, 111; Eaton v. Wilkins, 163 Cal. 742, 127 P. 71, 73; Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell, 9 N.D. 268, 81 Am. St. 575, 83 N.W. 230; Cahoon v. Seger, 31 Idaho 101, 107, 168 P. 441; Johansen v. Looney, 31 Idaho 754, 764, 176 P. 778; Brown v. Bledsoe, 1 Idaho 746; Eastwood v. Standard Mines Co., 11 Idaho 195, 202, 203, 81 P. 382.
Estoppel is a protective, not an offensive, weapon, and its operation should be limited to saving harmless or making whole the person in whose favor it arises and should not be made an instrument of gain or profit. (McLemore v. Bickerstaff (Tex. Civ. App.), 179 S.W. 536, 538; Ramsey v. Chilsen, 57 Cal.App. 785, 208 P. 319; In re Hills Estate, 79 N.J. Eq. 521, 82 A. 338; Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co., 41 Mich. 453, 2 N.W. 639; Townsend Sav. Bank v. Todd, 47 Conn. 190; Llano Granite Co. v. Hollinger (Tex.), 212 S.W. 151; Green v. Stevenson (Tenn. Ch. App.), 54 S.W. 1011; Adler v. Pin, 80 Ala. 351.)
There must be certainty about the facts to create an estoppel. It never arises from ambiguous facts or those susceptible of two constructions. The alleged fraudulent misrepresentations must be plain, not doubtful or matters of mere inference or opinion. (Fredenburg v. Lyon Lake M. E. Church, 37 Mich. 476; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263, 10 Am. St. 307, 10 S.W. 891; Brown v. Bledsoe, 1 Idaho 746; Breshears v. Callender, 23 Idaho 366, 131 P. 15; Nelson v. Hudgel, 23 Idaho 327, 130 P. 85; Parker v. Herron, 30 Idaho 327, 164 P. 1013.)
In the absence of a sufficient showing to create an estoppel, the rule of caveat emptor applied to the respondent, as a purchaser at a judicial sale. (Glover v. Brown, 32 Idaho 426, 440, 441, 184 P. 649; C. S., secs. 5414, 5423, 5425, 6674; Brown v. Bledsoe, supra.)
If the objection that the pleading was insufficient is made at the trial on the introduction of evidence, it is sufficient, but if it is admitted without objection, it will be deemed waived. (31 Cyc. 723, and cases cited; Lamus v. Engwic, 39 Cal.App. 523, 179 P. 435; Chicago R. I. Ry. Co. v. Wertheim, 15 N.M. 505, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 148, 10 P. 573, 30 L. R. A., N. S., 771.)
In order to show damage from fraud the purchaser of property must show that the property he obtained was of less value than the price he paid for it. (Smith v. Neeley, 39 Idaho 812, 818, 231 P. 105, and cases cited. This rule should have equal application to cases where constructive fraud is charged.
J. R. Smead, for Respondent.
Appellant's judgment against Mrs. Johnson was a valid, unreversed and unmodified judgment at the time of the execution sale and at the time of the trial of this case. As such, its terms were not the subject of attack in such trial, as such an attack would have been collateral. She was therefore bound to try this case in accordance with the terms of that judgment, which vested in her the entire beneficial interest in the property in question. Having actively procured such a judgment and issued execution thereon, she was estopped to deny its terms. (O'Neill v. Potvin, 13 Idaho 721, 93 P. 20, 257; Smith v. Kessler, 22 Idaho 589, 127 P. 172; Kolb v. Swann, 68 Md. 516, 13 A. 379.)
Respondent's rights should be determined and adjudged as of the date of her purchase of and payment for the property in question. (Goodman v. Minear Min. & Mill Co., 1 Idaho 131; Athey v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 30 Idaho 318, 165 P. 1124; Teich v. Kaufman, 174 Ill.App. 306; Hinson v. Ralston, 100 Ill.App. 214; Jones v. Mitchell, 83 Ark. 77, 102 S.W. 710; City of Cleveland v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 93 F. 113.)
Under our practice, this court does not try an equity action de novo. If the findings of the trial court are supported by some substantial evidence, this court will not review or disturb them. (Eastwood v. Standard Mines Co., 11 Idaho 195, 81 P. 382; Fritcher v. Kelley, 34 Idaho 471, 480, 201 P. 1037; Neil v. Hyde, 32 Idaho 576, 186 P. 710.)
Equitable estoppel arises when one has made certain statements or claims, or has remained silent when it was his duty to speak, or has in any way actively induced action on the part of another, who has acted on the strength of such statements, claims, activity or silence. Such a one cannot thereafter set up an inconsistent claim to the prejudice of the other.
The deception entailed in false or misleading statements need not be intentional in equity. If the result of afterward setting up a different state of facts than formerly represented expressly or tacitly, will work the same effect as actual, intentional fraud and deceit in the beginning, equitable estoppel will arise. (Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, supra; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 821, 872, 873.)
Constructive notice from a record of title or the like is not imputed to one who has in good faith believed in and relied upon false representations made by another, and who has so been induced to forego an independent investigation of the matter. (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 896 and notes 2 and 3, sec. 810,...
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