Quirk v. Data Terminal Systems, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 February 1980
• Citation: Quirk v. Data Terminal Systems, Inc., 379 Mass. 762, 400 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 1980)
• Parties: , 11 A.L.R.4th 767 Robert D. QUIRK et al. v. DATA TERMINAL SYSTEMS, INC.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 858

400 N.E.2d 858

379 Mass. 762, 11 A.L.R.4th 767

Robert D. QUIRK et al. v.DATA TERMINAL SYSTEMS, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Dec. 6, 1979.

Decided Feb. 6, 1980.

Robert S. Frank, Jr., Boston, for defendant.

Douglas G. Moxham, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

This court confronts here for the first time the issue whether a contract in which the parties undertake to arbitrate any dispute "arising out of, or relating to" that contract requires that the parties arbitrate claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract.More specifically, should the courts enforce such an agreement to arbitrate when neither party claims that there was fraud in the inducement of the specific arbitration agreement, but one party alleges that there was fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole?We conclude that in the circumstances of this case the agreement to arbitrate should be enforced.Consequently, certain orders entered in the Superior Court as to this case were in error.

The plaintiffs, Bruce T. Quirk, trustee of the Robert Quirk Realty Trust, and Robert D. Quirk(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Trust"), commenced an arbitration proceeding on November 4, 1977, against the defendantData Terminal Systems, Inc.(Data), pursuant to a provision for arbitration contained in a written agreement between the parties.In the arbitration proceeding the Trust alleged certain breaches by Data of the written agreement between Data and the Trust.

On February 6, 1978, the Trust filed a complaint in the Superior Court in which it alleged that it was induced by fraud to enter, and thereafter to modify, the written agreement containing the arbitration provision.The Trust alleged that it was not aware of the facts supporting its allegations of fraud when it commenced the arbitration proceeding, but it made no allegation in its complaint that there was fraud in the inducement of the arbitration provision itself.The Trust asked that the entire agreement be rescinded and that damages be awarded to it.

Subsequently, the Trust moved in this action for an order staying the arbitration proceedings which it had commenced, and thereafter a Superior Court judge entered an order denying the Trust's motion for a stay of the arbitration.Later, pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118, the Trust petitioned for interlocutory relief from that order, and its petition was denied by a single justice of the Appeals Court.

Data then moved for summary judgment on the ground that this action was barred by res judicata, and requested, in the alternative, an order staying all proceedings in this action on the ground that the parties had agreed to arbitrate all disputes relating to their contract.Later Data filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings.After both these motions were denied, Data filed a petition for relief from interlocutory order, pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118, and a notice of appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 251, § 18.In its petition, Data asked the Appeals Court to (a) reverse the orders of the Superior Court denying Data's motions to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration, (b) determine that the plaintiffs' claims in this case are subject to arbitration under an agreement to arbitrate between the parties, (c) order the Trust to proceed to arbitration, and (d) stay further proceedings in this case pending arbitration.After a hearing, a single justice of the Appeals Court granted immediate appellate review of the Superior Court order denying Data's motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings, and ordered that proceedings in the Superior Court be stayed pending the prosecution of this appeal.We transferred the case here on our own motion for direct appellate review.

This controversy was generated by a written contract which was entered into by the parties in 1976 and amended in 1977, with the principal purpose of expanding an earlier leasing agreement between the Trust as landlord and Data as tenant.The contract provided that the Trust would convey certain land to Data; that the Trust would construct a certain building on the land; and that, if the construction was completed by a specified date, the Trust would have the option to purchase the property at a price to be determined by a formula in the contract.The contract also contained an arbitration provision which stated: "All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof . . . shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise."¹

Failing seasonable completion of the construction by the Trust, Data could require the Trust to cease all work on the premises, and in that event the Trust's only recourse would be for money damages, the amount to be determined by arbitration.The construction was not completed within the required time, and Data required the Trust to cease work.In the meantime, the Trust instituted arbitration proceedings but later commenced the present litigation in the Superior Court, alleging that, after filing for arbitration, it learned that Data from the beginning never intended to reconvey the land to the Trust and that this scheme constituted fraud in the inducement of the contract.

The controversy here centers on the effect of certain Massachusetts statutes.Statutes aside, we should have no difficulty in concluding that the contract required submission of this dispute to arbitration.The language chosen by the parties, particularly that which required arbitration for all claims and disputes "arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof," clearly encompasses a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract.Dealing with similar language in an arbitration clause, we have said that "(t)he clause should be construed as broadly as the parties obviously intended."Glenn Acres, Inc. v. Cliffwood Corp., 353 Mass. 150, 154, 228 N.E.2d 835, 838(1967).

The Trust argues that, despite the language chosen by the parties, Massachusetts common law requires that a contract will be rescinded by the courts in its entirety or not at all, and therefore the arbitration clause is not severable as a vehicle for resolving the issue as to rescission for fraud in the inducement.The only cases on which the Trust relies for this proposition are Carchidi v. Kalayjian, 260 Mass. 120, 156 N.E. 835(1927), andGirouard v. Jasper, 219 Mass. 318, 106 N.E. 849(1914).Its reliance on these cases must fail.First of all, the cases predate the arbitration statute, G.L. c. 251.Secondly, these cases deal only with the situation of a party who is trying to enforce certain provisions of a contract while disclaiming other provisions on the basis of fraud.Even if we were to assume that the proposition put forth by the Trust could be invoked against a party who, like Data, is not seeking but rather is defending against a claim of rescission, more recent cases have established that the arbitration clause may remain operative despite a rescission dispute if...