Quiroz v. Wal-Mart La., LLC
| Decision Date | 23 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CA-389 |
| Citation | 336 So.3d 1008 |
| Parties | Rosa Tabora QUIROZ v. WAL-MART LOUISIANA, LLC |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ROSA TABORA QUIROZ, John W. Redmann, Edward L. Moreno, Travis J. Causey, Jr., Gretna, Benjamin B. Perkins
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, WAL-MART LOUISIANA, LLC, Isidro R. DeRojas, Christopher James-Lomax, New Orleans
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, and John J. Molaison, Jr.
The plaintiff/appellant in this matter, Mrs. Rosa Quiroz, appeals the trial court's ruling that granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, and dismissed her case with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On September 27, 2019, Mrs. Quiroz filed a petition for damages at the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court which alleged that she had sustained several injuries after she slipped and fell at a Kenner Wal-Mart on June 30, 2019. In her petition, Mrs. Quiroz claimed that the accident took place near the produce aisle, and that she had slipped in what appeared to be "spilled juice."1
On December 5, 2019, Wal-Mart answered the petition and denied any liability. Thereafter, on February 25, 2021, Wal-Mart filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis Mrs. Quiroz could not meet her burden of proof under La. R.S. 9:2800.6, the Louisiana Merchant Liability Statute. Specifically, Wal-Mart argued Mrs. Quiroz could not prove it created or had actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly hazardous condition, an essential element of her claim, because she had failed to demonstrate that the alleged substance on the floor existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if Wal-Mart had exercised reasonable care.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Wal-Mart submitted the deposition testimony of Mrs. Quiroz, wherein she testified that she did not know (1) where the alleged substance upon which she slipped came from; (2) what caused it; (3) how long the substance was present on the floor prior to her fall; or (4) whether anyone at the store had actual knowledge that the alleged substance was present on the floor before she fell. Wal-Mart also included in its motion the deposition of Mrs. Quiroz's husband, Ufemio Rojas, who testified that he did not know what type of liquid was in the spill. Mr. Rojas also did not know where the liquid had come from or how long it had been on the floor before his wife's accident. He estimated that the size of the spill after the accident was a little larger than two legal-sized sheets of paper.
Additionally, Wal-Mart submitted the deposition testimony of three employees: Vincent Robinson, Gina Cotton, and Alcira Mejia.
Mr. Robinson recalled at his deposition that on that date of the accident, he was employed by Wal-Mart as an assistant store manager. He had walked down the aisle in the same area of the fall just minutes before Mrs. Quiroz, and did not see any liquid on the floor. He stated that, at the time of Mrs. Quiroz's accident, he was speaking to a fellow assistant store manager, Gina Cotton, at the end of the same "action alley" where Mrs. Quiroz fell. Mr. Robinson recalled that he first learned of the accident when a male customer insisted on getting Mr. Robinson's attention to tell him that the customer had "just spilled a Gatorade on the floor." Mr. Robinson testified that he was approximately six feet away from the spill. As soon as the customer had provided the information, Mr. Robinson followed the store's policy and began to turn and walk toward the spill in order to stop anyone from stepping into it. Mr. Robinson said that within a couple of seconds of being informed of a spill, or nearly simultaneously, Mrs. Quiroz fell. He did not personally witness Mrs. Quiroz fall. After the accident, Mr. Robinson was brought an iPad by Ms. Cotton and he began to draft an incident report. Mr. Robinson explained that he did not get the name of the male customer, who had walked away from the area after reporting the spill, because he was tending to Mrs. Quiroz and did not want to leave her on the floor. He also did not observe the cause of the spill.
Ms. Cotton, during her deposition testimony, stated that she was employed by Wal-Mart as an assistant manager on the date of Mrs. Quiroz's slip and fall. She recalled that, at approximately 1:00 p.m., she was speaking to Mr. Robinson, and letting him know that she was leaving for the day because she felt ill. Similar to Mr. Robinson's testimony, Ms. Cotton stated that a male customer indicated to her and Mr. Robinson that he had "just spilled" something when, at the same time, she observed Mrs. Quiroz begin to slide on the floor. Aside from obtaining an iPad for Mr. Robinson, she had no involvement in writing the accident report. She did not see any liquid on the floor prior to Mrs. Quiroz's fall. Ms. Cotton recalled that the male customer who had indicated he spilled the Gatorade told Mr. Robinson that he did not want to give a statement. After bringing Mr. Robinson the iPad, Ms. Cotton briefly walked past the area of the liquid and noticed a Gatorade bottle on the floor with a "broken top."
The final deposition included in Wal-Mart's motion was that of Ms. Alcira Mejia, who was employed by Wal-Mart as a cleaner in the strategic maintenance department on the date of the accident. Ms. Mejia could provide no information about how long the liquid may have been on the floor before Mrs. Quiroz slipped and fell, though she did acknowledge that she found a Gatorade bottle on the floor when she was cleaning the area after the fall.
Based on the evidence presented, Wal-Mart argued in its motion for summary judgment that Mrs. Quiroz could not prove that it had constructive notice of a hazardous condition that existed on the floor for some period of time prior to her fall and, thus, could not carry her burden of proof of this element at trial.
In opposing Wal-Mart's motion, Mrs. Quiroz argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact of what exactly the unknown male customer said to Mr. Robinson and Ms. Cotton about when the spill occurred. She also argued that there were credibility issues with the deposition testimony of Mr. Robinson and Ms. Cotton that created issues of material fact. Finally, Mrs. Quiroz asserted that there were issues of fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had exercised care and diligence in inspecting its aisles and proactively looking for hazards. In her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Quiroz attached a copy of Wal-Mart's own internal claim report regarding her accident, Wal-Mart's answers to interrogatories,2 and a store video from the date of the fall.
The trial court granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on May 11, 2021, following a hearing on May 6, 2021. This timely devolutive appeal by Mrs. Quiroz followed.
On appeal, Mrs. Quiroz first contends that the trial court erred in granting Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment based upon its finding that she would be unable to sustain her burden of showing Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spill that allegedly caused her fall. Ms. Quiroz also asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that her evidence was speculative and in failing to recognize "circumstantial evidence" which created a genuine issue of material fact.
After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent's favor. Willis v. Medders , 00-2507 (La. 12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1049, 1050 (per curiam ). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Samaha v. Rau , 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880.
The trial court's reasons for judgment
On appeal, to support her argument that the trial court improperly analyzed the evidence presented, Mrs. Quiroz relies heavily on trial court's written reasons for judgment in which it explained the finding that what Mrs. Quiroz considered to be evidence of how the liquid ended up on the floor was "speculative." Mrs. Quiroz also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that her evidence was speculative, as indicated in its reasons for judgment, because she did but not articulate other scenarios that would explain why the floor was wet at the time of the fall.
As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wooley v. Lucksinger , 09-571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572, while an appellate court is entitled to consider reasons for judgment in order to gain insight into a district court's judgment, the job of the appellate court is to review the district court's judgment, not its reasons for judgment. Similarly, this Court has previously found that the reasons for judgment form no part of the judgment on appeal. See, Wempren v. St. James Par. Sch. Bd., 15-709 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/12/16), 193 So.3d 349, 354. Because an appellate court's standard of review of a judgment granting or denying summary judgment is de novo , we are not restricted to only a review of the reasoning of the trial court. Bertaut v. Corral Gulfsouth, Inc ., 16-93 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/16), 209 So.3d 352, 359.
Merchant liability and the element of notice
Louisiana's Merchant Liability Statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6, which is applicable to this case, provides in relevant part:
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