Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 68
| Decision Date | 21 February 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 68,68 |
| Citation | 273 U.S. 352,71 L.Ed. 680,47 S.Ct. 346 |
| Parties | QUON QUON POY v. JOHNSON. U. S. Commissioner of Immigration |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Warren Ozro Kyle, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.
The Attorney General and Mr. W. D. Mitchell, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Quon Quon Poy, a Chinese boy fifteen years of age, arrived at the port of Boston in June, 1924, and applied for admission to the United States, claiming to be a foreign-born son of Quon Mee Sing, a native-born citizen-whose citizenship was conceded-and, hence under R. S. § 19931 (U. S. C. tit. 8, § 6 being Comp. St. § 3947), to be himself a citizen of the United States. After a preliminary investigation by an inspector, his claim was heard, under the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917,2 by a Board of Special Inquiry, which decided, on the evidence, that he was not shown to be the son of Quon Mee Sing, and should be excluded as a Chinese alien not a member of any of the exempt classes entitled to enter the United States. On an appeal to the Secretary of Labor-this finding having been approved by the Board of Review-the Secretary sustained the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry; and a deportation warrant was issued to the Commissioner of Immigration.
The applicant then presented to the District Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was the son of Quon Mee Sing and a citizen of the United States; that he had been denied a fair hearing and opportunity to establish his citizenship by the Department of Labor; that the procedure in the Department by which he had been declared an alien denied him the due process of law to which he was entitled under the Constitution; and that under his claim to citizenship he was entitled to an adjudication by the court as to such procedure and as to his relationship to Quon Mee Sing. The writ was granted. Upon a hearing on the petition and return, in which the record of the Departmental proceedings was introduced, the court, finding that the Departmental decision was conclusive as to the petitioner's citizenship declined to hear witnesses offered by him for the purpose of independently establishing his citizenship; and entered judgment discharging the writ and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration. This direct appeal was then allowed under section 238 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215), prior to the Jurisdictional Act of 1925 (43 Stat. 938).
1. The contention that the petitioner was denied a fair hearing as to his citizenship by the Department of Labor, cannot be sustained. The record shows that in September the inspector to whom the case was referred in its preliminary stage, separately examined, under oath and at length, the petitioner, and his alleged father and an alleged brother who offered themselves as witnesses. Their examination, which was by question and answer, was taken down and is in the record. It was conducted in an entirely fair and impartial manner. Each of them stated at the conclusion of his examination that he had nothing further to say; and no other witnesses offered themselves or were produced. The petitioner was intelligent, had attended school, and stated that he thoroughly understood the interpreter. At the close of this preliminary investigation the case was immediately referred to the Board of Special Inquiry, consisting of the same inspector, and two others. At the commencement of the hearing before the Board the petitioner was informed of his right to have a relative or friend present, and stated that he did not desire to avail himself of this right and was willing to proceed with the hearing. He was also informed that the previous testimony given by himself and his alleged father and brother would be made a part of the proceedings before the Board; to which he made no objection. The petitioner was then further examined by the Board. After a postponement for the purpose of obtaining a report as to the physical condition of the petitioner, the Board resumed its hearing, the petitioner being again present; and after consideration of the entire testimony, being of opinion that his relation- ship to Quon Mee Sing had not been reasonably established, voted to accord him five days in which to submit additional evidence. Notice of this was sent to the attorney representing the petitioner-who had not been present at any of the proceedings-and he replied that the petitioner had no further testimony to offer. The Board then recalled the petitioner for further examination-after which he stated that he had nothing further to say-and again decided that his claimed relationship to Quon Mee Sing had not been reasonably established and that he should be excluded; and informed him of his right to appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
This appeal having been taken, the Board of Review, after hearing the attorney for the petitioner, made a report in which it reviewed the entire testimony, found that the record was 'exceptionally unfavorable' to the petitioner, and-after referring to his lack of knowledge of matters which clearly should have been within his memory, his unsatisfactory explanations, the discrepancies between his statements and those of his alleged father and brother, and to a previous statement by his alleged father to the effect that he had no such son-concluded that the petitioner had fallen 'far short' of establishing that he was in truth and fact the son of Quon Mee Sing; and accordingly recommended that the exclusion decision be affirmed.
The entire record discloses a painstaking and impartial effort to ascertain the merits of the petitioner's claim. There is no contention here that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry had no adequate support in the evidence. The arguments made as to the unfairness of the hearing-in so far as they are based upon anything properly appearing in the record before...
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