E.R.B. v. J.H.F., 83-1199.

• Decision Date: 12 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-1244.,No. 83-1199.,83-1199.,83-1244.
• Citation: 496 A.2d 607
• Parties: E.R.B., Appellant, v. J.H.F., Appellee. J.H.F., Appellant, v. E.R.B., Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

496 A.2d 607

E.R.B., Appellant, v. J.H.F., Appellee.

J.H.F., Appellant, v. E.R.B., Appellee.

No. 83-1199.

No. 83-1244.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 8, 1985.

Decided August 12, 1985.

Irena I. Karpinski, Washington, D.C., for E.R.B.

R. Kenneth Mundy, Washington, D.C., for J.H.F.

Inez Smith Reid, Corp. Counsel, and John H. Suda, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., filed a brief on behalf of District of Columbia.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and FERREN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

PRYOR, Chief Judge:

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in a proceeding to establish parentage. We hold that the right to a jury trial does not attach in such an action.

In July 1981, Ms. B filed a petition on behalf of herself and her son to establish paternity and provide support, naming Mr. F as respondent. Mr. F made a timely demand for a jury trial in his answer. Ms. B then filed a motion to strike the request for a jury, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, the case was heard by the trial court on February 9 and 10,1983. By order dated August 30,1983, the trial court found that Mr. F is the father of Ms. B's child and directed him to make monthly child support payments. These cross-appeals followed.¹ Since the trial court properly struck Mr. Fs' jury demand, we affirm the trial court's order.

I

Paternity proceedings in the District of Columbia are governed by D.C.Code § 11-1101(11),² and §§ 16-2341 ³-2348⁴ (1981). These sections omit any reference to a jury trial right. Mr. F argues that notwithstanding the Code's silence on the question of jury trial by right, it is still possible to interpret the relevant sections as providing for a right to jury trial. He contends that a contrary interpretation would make the statute unconstitutional. This court generally will not decide a question on constitutional grounds if it may be satisfactorily resolved on statutory grounds which avoid the constitutional issue. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 1724, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974). Thus, we first examine the statutory posture of this case.

As a threshold matter, we acknowledge the often stated axiom that "the words of [a] statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them." Davis v. United States, 397 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C. 1979); see Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en bane). However, because the statutory provisions applicable here are silent on a jury trial right, we proceed to examine the legislative history of these sections. See Sanker v. United States, 374 A.2d 304, 307 (D.C.1977).

Prior to 1970, the Code provided that a defendant in a paternity proceeding was entitled to trial by jury. D.C.Code § 16-2346 (1967). Under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (the Act), however, the jury trial provisions in this section were removed. See Pub.L. No. 91-358, tit. I, § 121 (1970).

The legislative history of the Act does not explain why the jury trial provisions were deleted. The underlying reasons for the deletion, however, become apparent upon examination of the Act's restructuring of the entire section on paternity.

Under the old Code, paternity proceedings were quasi-criminal in nature. For example, under the old Code, only the Corporation Counsel could initiate a paternity proceeding. D.C.Code § 16-2342 (1967). Such an action was brought as a prosecution upon information. Id. Moreover, upon the filing of a complaint, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, directed to the United States Marshal or the Metropolitan Police Department, could be issued if necessary. Id. § 16-2345. In contrast, under the present Code, a mother or child may be represented by the Corporation Counsel only where "a public support burden has been incurred or is threatened." Id. § 16-2341(a). The present Code specifically permits an "individual to file a civil action" to establish parentage. Id. § 16-2341(c). The provision allowing for issuance of an arrest warrant has been deleted.

These revisions were intended to remove all criminal trappings from the section and make these proceedings expressly civil in nature. See Cupo v. District of Columbia, 285 A.2d 696, 698 (D.C.1972); District of Columbia v. Faison, 278 A.2d 688 (D.C. 1971); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 271 A.2d 563, 564 & n. 1 (D.C.1970); 125 CONG.REC. S11995 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 164 (1968). Indeed, Congress indicated that a "most important change" in the new law was "the provision that such proceedings shall be civil rather than quasicriminal as is the case under existing law." H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 160 (1970). We may infer from this shift that the jury trial provision, which represented a procedural safeguard for an action quasi-criminal in nature, was no longer viewed as necessary once the action became strictly civil in character.

We observe that the amendments to the section governing paternity actions were part of a comprehensive reorganization of the domestic relations and juvenile branches of the District of Columbia court system and the laws governing proceedings on family matters. Under the Act, the newly created Family Division was given exclusive jurisdiction over matters, including paternity proceedings, previously tried in the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia and the Domestic Relations Branch of the General Sessions Court. See S.REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1969); Williams, District of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEo.L.J. 477, 506-07, 559 (1971). Significantly, Super.Ct. Dom.Rel.R. 38, which had expressly established a jury trial right in all domestic relations cases, was deleted from the Rules. Thus, the Act apparently contemplated that all actions in the newly created Family Division would be tried to the court and not to a jury.

In sum, the Act was intended to delete the previously existing statutory right to a jury trial in paternity actions and to provide for such actions to be decided by the court. Accordingly, we must determine whether the statutory elimination of jury trials in paternity actions is violative of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.

II

The Seventh Amendment⁵ provides:

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . .[⁶]

Proceedings to determine paternity were generally unknown to the common law. See S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 15.01, at 15-2 (1984). Thus, Ms. P argues that Mr. F's claims must fail because the Seventh Amendment only preserves the right to jury trial where it existed at common law, when the Constitution was adopted. Under such a literal interpretation, the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to new causes of action, based on legislative enactments, which did not exist at common law.⁷ In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1007-08, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), however the Supreme Court expressly rejected such a narrow approach. According to the Court, the Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights unheard of at common law, and requires a jury trial upon demand, "if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action." Id., see also Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, 416 U.S. at 374-75, 94 S.Ct. at 1729-30; Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. New London Enterprises, 619 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.1980). The better approach for resolving a Seventh Amendment question is to determine "the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538, 90 S.Ct. 733, 738, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1971) (footnote omitted); see Carithers v. District of Columbia, 326 A.2d 798, 800 (D.C.1974). The Court has suggested that the nature of an issue is determined by considering "first the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Ross v. Bernhard, supra, 396 U.S. at 538 n. 10, 90 S.Ct. at 738 n. 10; see also Dawson v. Contractor Transport Corp., 151 U.S. App.D.C. 401, 405, 467 F.2d 727, 731-32 (1972). It is helpful to examine the issue's nearest historical analogue. See Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove, & Dobeson, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830).

In sum, where the issue in dispute is legal in nature a constitutional right to trial by jury attaches; where the issue, however, is equitable in nature there is no constitutional right to a jury trial. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302, at 15 (1978). We, thus, must determine whether paternity actions are legal or equitable in nature, bearing in mind that the line distinguishing legal from equitable issues is often difficult to "define with precision." Ross v. Bernhard, supra, 396 U.S. at 533, 90 S.Ct. at 735.

III

As stated previously, the common law generally afforded no remedy to compel a putative father to acknowledge parenthood or contribute to the support of his children born out of wedlock. See Comish v. Smith, supra, 97 Idaho at 92, 540 P.2d at 277; S. SCHATKIN, supra, § 15.01, at 15-2. Early laws concerning paternity proceedings were passed in order to force fathers to support their offspring born out of wedlock, and thus relieve the community from its burden of supporting the children. See H. CLARK, supra, at 162; S. SCHATKIN, supra, § 15.03, at 15-6; see also Department of Social Services v. Thomas JS., 100 A.D.2d 119, 129-131, 474 N.Y.S.2d 322, 330 (1984).

Today, paternity proceedings are designed to protect the welfare of the child. Their primary purpose, however, is still to provide...