A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16

• Decision Date: 20 February 1908
• Citation: 232 Ill. 402,83 N.E. 932
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: A. R. BARNES & CO. et al. .v CHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16.

232 Ill. 402

83 N.E. 932

A. R. BARNES & CO. et al..vCHICAGO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 16.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1908.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Jesse Holdom, Judge.

Suit by A. R. Barnes & Co. and others against the Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming a judgment imposing a fine upon certain defendants for contempt of the court in violating an injunction, said defendant Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 appeals. Affirmed.

Scott and Farmer, JJ., dissenting.

William H. Barnum, for appellant.

Tenney, Coffeen, Harding & Wilkerson (Horace Kent Tenney and James H. Wilkerson, of counsel), for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The appellees, a number of printing firms in Chicago, who are members of the voluntary association known as the Chicago Typothetae, organized for the promotion of their business interests, filed their bill of complaint in the superior court of Cook county against Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, the appellant, and certain individuals who were officers of the union, praying for an injunction restraining the defendants from picketing the premises of complainants, interfering with their employés, congregating about their premises for the purpose of compelling, inducing, or soliciting said employés to leave their service, or doing other acts of that nature specified in the prayer of the bill. On October 11, 1905, a preliminary injunction was ordered as prayed for, and a writ was issued and served. The defendants appeared and demurred to the bill, and, their demurrer being overruled, elected to stand by it. The court thereupon entered a final decree in the cause, enjoiningand restraining the defendants, their agents, and servants from doing any of the acts set forth in the prayer of the bill and the preliminary injunction. From that decree the appellant and other defendants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District. On October 28, 1905, an appeal bond was filed and approved, in accordance with the order granting the appeal. The defendants continued to do the same acts from which they were enjoined after the entry of the decree, and on December 9, 1905, the appellees filed their petition in said superior court against the appellant, and Edward R. Wright and Edward E. Bessett, two of its officers, praying for a rule against them to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court for violating the injunction. Appellant and said officers appeared and made defense, and upon a hearing the court fined appellant $1,000 for contempt of the court in violating the injunction. From the judgment imposing the fine the appellant again appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District and the branch of that court affirmed the judgment. This appeal was then prosecuted from the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The first point made by counsel for the appellant in his argument is that it is neither a natural nor an artificial person, and therefore it could not be made a defendant in this proceeding. The bill of complaint in the suit for an injunction in which the decree was entered alleged that appellant was a labor union organized and existing in the city of Chicago; that it had presented to appellees a contract to be executed by them in which appellant agreed to do certain things; that it had an executive committee, issued circulars, published a directory, exercised control over its members, furnished money to induce employés of appellees' to leave their service, and as an association interfered with their business, and did various acts charged in the bill. The appellant came into court and demurred to the bill and appealed from the decree to the Appellate Court, giving its bond, and not raising any question as to its legal capacity to be sued or as to its legal status. In this proceeding the appellant came into court and answered as an organization having a legal existence, with a constitution, by-laws, and officers, and doing business to carry out the objects of the organization. The time and place to raise the question by what name and in what manner the association, or the aggregation of individuals of which it was composed, might be made defendant in a suit in equity, was in the original suit. Whether it was no more than a mere partnership, with the rights and liabilities incident to that relation, or whether it had any definite legal status, was a question to be considered then. Joined with appellant were various officers in their capacity as representing appellant, and it does not appear that any objection was made that the association was not properly before the court. If it would not be regarded as a legal entity in an action at law, it does not follow that the decree was a nullity, or that the association could violate the injunction with impunity. It is wholly immaterial in this proceeding whether the decree was erroneous or not, and the association is amenable to the court and the law for any violation of it.

The important question in the case, and the one to which the argument is almost wholly devoted, relates to the jurisdiction of the superior court to entertain this proceeding and punish appellant for violating the injunction after an appeal had been taken from the decree. The law is that an appeal enjoining a defendant from doing an act does not suspend the operation of the injunction, stay it in any manner, or disturb its operative force. The appeal does not have the effect of dissolving or suspending the injunction and the defendant acquires no right to disregard it by the execution of an appeal bond. The doing of the act enjoined may be punished as a contempt notwithstanding the appeal, and the contempt is a contempt of the court which granted the injunction. There is no controversy between counsel on this question, and a reference to the works where the numerous authorities are collated will be sufficient. 2 High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) § 1698a; Elliott on Appellate Procedure, § 391; 2 Cyc. 913; 22 Cyc. 1010; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 55; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 436; 20 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 1231. An appeal which operates as a supersedeas creates no affirmative right, and does not annul the decree of the lower court. Before there was any statute providing that no appeal from a decree dissolving an injunction should have the effect to continue in force the injunction unless it should be continued by the lower court or the court to which the appeal is taken, this court held in Bressler v. McCune, 56 Ill. 475, that in cases where the court below had awarded a temporary injunction, which was dissolved on final hearing, the injunction would remain in force pending an appeal. Counsel for appellant says: ‘It is no part of our contention that a prohibitory or any other injunction can be violated with impunity pending an appeal, nor that, pending such appeal, the law allows or permits the defendant to do the prohibited act, nor that the law allows the defendant, by filing a bond, to procure, even temporarily, the right to do such act.’ His position is made clear by these statements: ‘The question is not whether a violation of a pending injunction decree during an appeal therefrom is contempt of court; that is not denied. The question is: When and by what court can such a contempt, if any, be punished?’ His claim is that the trial court's jurisdiction is suspended during the appeal, and that, when the cause is reinstated therein after affirmance of its decree, it can fine or imprison for contempts committed pending the appeal; and he says: ‘We have conceded all along that until reversed on appeal an injunction decree remains in force, and for that very reason that violation of it after appeal may be punished as contempts, but not so punished by the trial court during the pendency of the appeal.’ The question being by what court the contempt can be punished, the natural answer would be by the court whose order is disobeyed, and whose dignity and authority are defied. And, indeed, it does not seem to be disputed that if the proceeding is in the name of the people, for the purpose of maintaining the dignity and authority of the court, an appeal would present no obstacle to it. Such a proceeding is wholly independent of the appeal or any question to be considered by the appellate tribunal, and we see no substantial distinction between a prosecution for contempt instituted for the purpose of punishing a person for disobeying an order of the court on the ground that its authority or dignity is in question and one which is instituted to enforce the authority of the court in the administration of justice between litigants. The question whether the injunction was properly awarded or whether the decree was erroneous is not involved in either. A defendant cannot refuse to obey an injunction, however improvidently or erroneously granted, but he is bound, at his peril, to obey it while it remains in force. Tolman v. Jones, 114 Ill. 147, 28 N. E. 464;Leopold v. People, 140 Ill. 552, 30 N. E. 348;...