R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr.

Decision Date17 July 2007
Docket NumberA-5 September Term 2006.
Citation192 N.J. 81,927 A.2d 97
PartiesR.A.C., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. P.J.S., JR., Defendant-Appellant, and B.E.C., Defendant.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Melvyn H. Bergstein, argued the cause for appellant (Walder, Hayden & Brogan, Roseland and Andrew W. Rubin, Montclair, attorneys; Mr. Bergstein and Mr. Rubin, on the briefs).

Anthony J. Marchetta, Florham Park, argued the cause for respondent (Pitney Hardin, attorneys; Mr. Marchetta and Brian E. Moffitt, on the brief).

Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the New Jersey Parentage Act of 1983 (Parentage Act), N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59, a person determined to be the biological father of a child can be compelled to pay child support. The Parentage Act's statute of repose, N.J.S.A. 9:17-45b, requires that a support claim be filed before the child turns twenty-three years old. A number of years after the expiration of the period of repose, plaintiff in this case learned that he was not the biological father of the child he had raised as his son. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a child-support-reimbursement claim, and other related claims, against the biological father. In this appeal, we must determine whether N.J.S.A. 9:17-45b can be equitably tolled to allow the filing of a child-support-reimbursement complaint against the biological father, eight years after the repose period had elapsed.

I.
A.

Plaintiff R.A.C. (Roy)1 and B.E.C. (Bonnie) were married in 1957, and during the next four years had two children.2 In the mid-1960s, they became social friends with defendant P.J.S., Jr. (Patrick) and his wife. Between 1968 and 1969, while Roy traveled on business, Bonnie and Patrick engaged in an extra-marital affair. In early 1969, Bonnie became pregnant and aware of the strong possibility that Patrick might be the father of her expected child. Although Bonnie shared her suspicions with Patrick, she never breathed a word to her husband, who remained ignorant about the affair. Bonnie had no intention of upending her life and family over her indiscretion. When D.C. (Darren) was born in October 1969, Roy had no reason to doubt that he was the child's biological father. Indeed, Roy, along with his wife, chose Patrick to be Darren's godfather.

Bonnie and Patrick never discussed whether they should attempt to verify Darren's parentage. In 1970, Patrick moved to Florida, where his wife and two children had relocated earlier. At the time, both of his children were afflicted with muscular dystrophy, from which they would unfortunately die years later. Even after the move, Bonnie and Patrick continued to have romantic trysts on the few occasions she would travel to Florida and he to New Jersey.

As the years passed, Roy and Darren enjoyed a typical loving and warm father-son relationship. For reasons apparently unrelated to the affair, Roy and Bonnie's marriage foundered, and, in 1980, they divorced. During the divorce proceedings, Bonnie did not inform Roy or the court about her doubts concerning Darren's parentage. After the divorce, as part of a property settlement agreement, Roy provided child and educational support for all three children, including Darren. Roy generously fulfilled his parental duties, not only paying all of Darren's college expenses pursuant to a modification of the divorce decree,3 but also providing financial support to Darren beyond the court-ordered obligations. For example, Roy gave financial assistance to Darren to attend an art school between 1992 and 1994 and a post-graduate program at the University of Montana between 1996 and 1998. During all those years, they maintained a strong father-son relationship.

As Darren matured into adolescence, Bonnie noticed that he did not resemble his siblings, which caused her to believe more strongly that Patrick was Darren's biological father. In 1986, Bonnie met with Patrick and told him about her supposition and in the same conversation, asked for "some money" to help her out. He declined her request for financial assistance.

In July 1996, Darren, then twenty-six years old, was planning to get married, and his mother feared that he might be a carrier of the muscular dystrophy gene. At that time, she felt it necessary to tell her son of his probable biological background so that he could make informed decisions about having a family. During a visit with her son in Washington State, she told him that she thought that Patrick might in fact be his father. Expectedly, he reacted with shock to the announcement.

After that revelation, Darren spoke by telephone with Patrick and told him what he had learned from his mother. Patrick later said that he was not just surprised but "dumbfounded by [the] news." Thereafter, the two met in Seattle, along with Bonnie. According to Darren, at the meeting, Patrick admitted that he was his biological father and afterwards agreed to assist him with a loan. In March 1997, Darren borrowed additional monies from Patrick. Finally, in July 1997, Darren visited with Patrick in Florida. That meeting did not go well because, as recalled by Patrick, Darren badgered him for more money. After this encounter, Patrick concluded that Darren was only interested in extracting money from him and therefore he "cut off all relations with [Darren]."

Bonnie had told Darren that she would break the news to Roy about Darren's suspected paternity. She waited three years to follow through. In August 1999, following a dinner out with Roy and one of their other children, she invited Roy back to her home. During dessert, with the simple introduction, "I have something to tell you," Bonnie disclosed that Patrick was Darren's father. Roy was left "speechless;" the disclosure "hit [him] like a bolt." Bonnie explained that she had been unsure for a long time about Darren's paternity, but became convinced as Darren matured into adulthood.

Thereafter, Roy grew increasingly angry that Bonnie and Patrick had hidden the truth from him for more than thirty years. Nevertheless, Roy and Darren's relationship with each other remained unaffected, and Darren reaffirmed his love and respect for Roy, the person he considered to be his true father. Darren felt that the ordeal brought them even closer together.

B.

In September 2000, Roy filed a verified complaint in the Family Part against Patrick seeking a judgment under the Parentage Act that Patrick was Darren's biological father and reimbursement for child support provided to Darren. He also alleged fraudulent concealment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking an award of compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Bonnie was named in the complaint as a necessary party.

After voluntary DNA testing of Roy, Bonnie, and Darren conclusively determined that Roy was not Darren's biological father, Roy moved to compel Patrick to undergo DNA testing. The Family Part rejected Patrick's motion to dismiss the action as time-barred and ordered him to submit to the testing, which revealed that he was indeed Darren's father. Based on those results, the court declared Patrick to be Darren's biological father.

Roy and Patrick filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For purposes of his motion only, Patrick stipulated that he knew from the beginning that he was Darren's biological father.4 He stated, however, that his knowledge was irrelevant because the ultimate decision concerning disclosure rested with Bonnie, who was entitled "not to jeopardize or harm her marriage and family by raising any question of paternity with her husband." Patrick also stipulated that the court-ordered child support provided to Darren through his twenty-second year equaled $109,696.82 and that continued financial assistance thereafter amounted to $23,819.00.

C.

The motion court dismissed Roy's fraud and emotional distress claims as well as his claim for treble damages, attorneys' fees, and prejudgment interest. The court concluded that the Parentage Act exclusively "establishe[d] the types of permitted damages" in parentage cases and limited those damages to such things as child support and medical expenses. It found that Roy was entitled to reimbursement for the court-ordered child support he paid until Darren's emancipation, which totaled $109,696.82, but not to reimbursement for any voluntary post-emancipation financial assistance.

The court determined that the Parentage Act's statute of limitations5 did not apply to the reimbursement claim. The court reasoned that the Parentage Act was not intended to shield Patrick from legitimate claims, but rather to protect the child and his family. It also noted that the "Statute of Limitations should not frustrate [the son's] right to know his own potential genetic make-up," particularly in light of the "serious medical condition" he may have inherited from his biological father.

The court also denied Patrick's motion to file a cross-claim against Bonnie for contribution and Roy's motion to amend his complaint to add an unjust enrichment claim. Both sides appealed.

D.

The Appellate Division affirmed all of the motion court's determinations, except its conclusion that the Parentage Act did not authorize an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr., 380 N.J.Super. 94, 119, 880 A.2d 1179 (App.Div.2005). Thus, in upholding Roy's right to reimbursement for all court-ordered pre-emancipation child support expenses, the panel remanded to the motion court the decision whether to grant attorneys' fees to Roy as the prevailing party pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:17-54.6 Id. at 114, 880 A.2d 1179.

We will discuss only that part of the Appellate Division opinion that is relevant to the issue before us. The panel addressed the novel question of "whether [Roy's] claim under the Parentage Act is time-barred." Id. at 102, 880 A.2d 1179. The panel found the discovery rule inapplicable because N.J.S.A. 9:17-45b is not an...

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