R.D.B., In Interest of, 970126
Decision Date | 21 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 970126,970126 |
Parties | In the Interest of R.D.B., a child. Jason DELLWO, Petitioner and Appellee, v. R.D.B., a child, and D.B. and M.B., his parents, Respondents and Appellants. Criminal |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Tom M. Henning, Assistant State's Attorney, Dickinson, for petitioner and appellee.
Vince H. Ficek, of Ficek & Buresh, P.C., Dickinson, for respondents and appellants.
¶1R.D.B. and his parents, D.B. and M.B. appeal from a juvenile court order finding R.D.B. had committed aggravated assault and was a delinquent child in need of treatment or rehabilitation. We conclude the juvenile court did not err in failing to sua sponte appoint an attorney or guardian to represent R.D.B., and the evidence supports the court's finding R.D.B. willfully caused serious bodily injury to another youth. We therefore affirm.
¶2On the evening of June 14, 1996, R.D.B. and N.B., schoolmates at Dickinson High School, met in a park in Dickinson to engage in a fight. Numerous witnesses testified R.D.B. hit N.B., knocking him to the ground. While N.B. lay curled up on the ground, R.D.B. punched and kicked him several times in the head, back, and abdomen. R.D.B. continued beating N.B. until R.D.B.'s brother pulled him away. As a result of the beating, N.B. suffered a "blowout" fracture of the orbital bone under his left eye which required surgery. N.B. has diminished vision in his left eye and must now wear corrective lenses.
¶3R.D.B. was 15 years old at the time of the fight. After investigating the incident, a Dickinson police officer filed a juvenile petition alleging R.D.B. had willfully caused serious bodily injury to another, constituting aggravated assault in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-02(1).
¶4At an initial hearing on October 7, 1996, with Judge Hunke presiding, R.D.B. denied the allegations in the petition. The court carefully explained to R.D.B. and his parents they had a right to be represented by an attorney and one would be appointed for them if they could not afford an attorney. R.D.B. and his parents each separately answered they were waiving their right to counsel for this initial proceeding. R.D.B.'s father advised the court they had contacted two attorneys about the matter and anticipated hiring one of these attorneys before the adjudicatory hearing.
¶5R.D.B. submitted an application for court-appointed counsel. Because the application was not signed and did not provide information about R.D.B.'s parents' financial circumstances, the juvenile supervisor returned the application with instructions to provide the required information. See N.D.C.C. § 27-20-26(2). No further application for court-appointed counsel was made.
¶6The adjudicatory hearing was held on November 25, 1996, with Judge Anderson presiding. R.D.B. and his parents again appeared without counsel. The court explained to them their right to be represented by an attorney, and asked each of them on the record if they were waiving their right to counsel. R.D.B. and his parents each individually responded they were waiving their right to counsel and representing themselves. During the hearing, R.D.B. and his father presented evidence, examined witnesses, and presented argument to the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found R.D.B. had committed the offense of aggravated assault and was a child in need of treatment or rehabilitation.
¶7At the dispositional hearing on February 24, 1997, R.D.B. and his parents were represented by counsel. They moved to reopen the adjudicatory phase of the hearing, asserting the court should have sua sponte appointed an attorney or guardian to represent R.D.B. at the prior hearing. The court denied the motion and ordered one year of probation and 100 hours of community service. R.D.B. and his parents appealed.
¶8The juvenile court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. §§ 27-20-02(6) and 27-20-03(1). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 27-20-56(1). The appeal was timely under N.D.C.C. § 27-20-56(1).
¶9Our review of the juvenile court's decision is governed by N.D.C.C. § 27-20-56(1). On appeal, we review "the files, records, and minutes or transcript of the evidence of the juvenile court, giving appreciable weight to the findings of the juvenile court." Although we examine the evidence in a manner comparable to the former procedure of trial de novo, we accord appreciable weight to the findings of the juvenile court, because that court had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses. In Interest C.M., 532 N.W.2d 381, 383 (N.D.1995); In Interest N.W., 510 N.W.2d 580, 581 (N.D.1994).
¶10The appellants assert the court had a duty, in spite of their expressed desire to proceed without counsel, to appoint an attorney or guardian ad litem to represent R.D.B. at the adjudicatory hearing.
¶11N.D.C.C. § 27-20-26(1) governs the right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings:
The statute requires appointment of counsel to represent the child if the parents do not appear and represent him or if the interests of the child and the parents conflict. See Olson v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Dir., 523 N.W.2d 258, 260-61 (N.D.1994); In Interest B.S., 496 N.W.2d 31, 32-33 (N.D.1993); State v. Ellvanger, 453 N.W.2d 810, 813 (N.D.1990); In Interest D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D.1978); see also Ronald J. Knoll, Case Comment, 67 N.D.L.Rev. 527, 534-35 (1991). R.D.B. and his parents do not allege "undue financial hardship," which would have entitled them to appointment of counsel at public expense under N.D.C.C. § 27-20-26(2).
¶12If a child is represented by his parents, the child's right to counsel may be waived. B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 33; Huff v. K.P., 302 N.W.2d 779, 781 (N.D.1981); D.S., 263 N.W.2d at 120. In assessing the validity of a waiver, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if the waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 33; Huff, 302 N.W.2d at 781; D.S., 263 N.W.2d at 120.
¶13The appellants argue his parents did not adequately represent R.D.B. and constituted a "mere presence" at the adjudicatory hearing, relying upon our decision in B.S. In that case, this Court explained:
B.S., 496 N.W.2d at 33-34. The record in this case, however, demonstrates R.D.B.'s parents were far from a "mere presence" at the adjudicatory hearing. R.D.B.'s father in particular took an "active role" in the proceeding by presenting evidence, questioning witnesses, and making closing argument on R.D.B.'s behalf.
¶14At oral argument, the appellants' counsel suggested a waiver of the right to counsel should be valid only when the representation given by the parents is of the same caliber as the child would have received from an attorney. This would require appointment of counsel in virtually every case, and would be wholly inconsistent with the statute and our prior cases.
¶15The relevant facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in Huff, in which we held a waiver of the right to counsel by an eleven-year-old girl and her parents was valid. In Huff, as in this case, the parents consulted attorneys before deciding to proceed without counsel. The juvenile court advised the parties of their right to counsel, and asked each individually if they had decided to proceed without counsel. There was no showing any of the parties were impaired. The parents acted as advocates for their children and attempted to represent their best interests, although, as the Huff Court noted, "rather ineffectively." Huff, 302 N.W.2d at 783.
¶16In Huff, the child was only eleven years old. Here, R.D.B. was sixteen at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. The record demonstrates R.D.B. was an average to above-average student who had several prior experiences in the juvenile justice system. Under these circumstances, we agree with the juvenile court's conclusion R.D.B. and his parents were fully advised of their right to counsel, and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their right to counsel at the adjudicatory hearing.
¶17The appellants assert the juvenile court had a duty to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent R.D.B.'s...
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