R.D.S. v. State, M2005-00213-SC-R11-JV.

Citation245 S.W.3d 356
Decision Date06 February 2008
Docket NumberNo. M2005-00213-SC-R11-JV.,M2005-00213-SC-R11-JV.
PartiesR.D.S. v. STATE of Tennessee.
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee
OPINION

WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, J., and FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, Sp.J., joined. JANICE M. HOLDER, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. CORNELIA A. CLARK and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., not participating.

This appeal arises out of a finding of delinquency following a denial of a motion to suppress incriminating statements and seized evidence. The trial court found that the juvenile defendant was not in custody at the time he made his incriminating statements, thus not triggering Miranda requirements; the Court of Appeals agreed. We affirm that part of the Court of Appeals' holding. However, due to a lack of evidence in the record regarding the law enforcement officer's role as a school resource officer, we remand the case to the trial court for a new trial to determine whether the law enforcement officer was required to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the juvenile defendant's truck.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 25, 2003, G.N., a student at Williamson County's Page High School, was taken to the office of Vice-Principal Tim Brown because of concerns that he was under the influence of some type of intoxicating substance. Mr. Brown summoned Deputy Sharon Lambert, a school resource officer ("SRO"), to his office. Deputy Lambert is a sworn law enforcement officer for Williamson County.

When Deputy Lambert arrived at Mr. Brown's office, she noticed that G.N. appeared to be "very sleepy or groggy, and his eyes were really bloodshot." She asked him what he had taken, and he responded that he had drunk a quarter of a bottle of Robitussin cough syrup before coming to school. Because school had started several hours earlier, she was skeptical that the effects from cough syrup would last that long. It had been reported that G.N. had skipped some of his morning classes, so Deputy Lambert asked him where he had been. He said that he had been out in the parking lot in a truck belonging to the defendant, R.D.S.

Deputy Lambert decided to search R.D.S.'s truck. She and Mr. Brown found R.D.S. in the school commons area. He did not appear to be under the influence of any intoxicants. Deputy Lambert explained to R.D.S. that she was going to search his truck based on G.N.'s apparent intoxicated condition and statements he made regarding his earlier whereabouts. She requested that R.D.S. accompany her because it was his vehicle.

As Deputy Lambert, Mr. Brown, and R.D.S. walked out to the parking lot together, the deputy asked R.D.S. if there was anything in his vehicle that should not be there. He stated that there was not. She told him that he was responsible for anything that was in the truck and again asked him it there was anything there that should not be. He again answered no and referenced the sign in front of the school that cited the Tennessee Code provision1 that any vehicle on school property was subject to search.

The truck was unlocked. When Deputy Lambert opened the driver's side door, she immediately found a plastic bag containing green leafy material in a compartment of that door. She held it up and said, "[o]h, except for this marijuana." R.D.S. admitted that it was his. The deputy continued to search the truck and found a glass pipe containing a tarry residue.

While they were walking back to the school building, Deputy Lambert asked R.D.S. where he had been that morning. He stated that he and G.N. had left school at about 9:30 a.m., smoked marijuana from a pipe, went to the bank, and then returned to school about an hour later. Tapes from the video surveillance cameras located in the parking lot confirmed that the two students left around 9:30 a.m. and returned around 10:30 a.m.

When they arrived back at the school offices, Deputy Lambert transported G.N. to the juvenile detention center while R.D.S. remained at the school pending a special education hearing. After that hearing, Deputy Lambert took R.D.S. to the juvenile detention facility. She filed a petition in juvenile court charging R.D.S. with the delinquent acts of simple possession or casual exchange of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. R.D.S. filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements on the ground that he was not informed of his Miranda rights prior to "his interrogation by Deputy Lambert and Assistant Principal Tim Brown." He also moved to suppress the evidence seized from the truck as being "fruits of the poisonous tree." The court denied the motion. Following a hearing, the court found R.D.S. delinquent.

R.D.S. appealed to the circuit court, where he renewed his motion to suppress his statements and the seized evidence. The court denied his motion, finding that Miranda warnings were not required because R.D.S. was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. The trial court also held that the statements were voluntary and not in response to any specific questions.

At the final trial, Deputy Lambert testified to the aforementioned sequence of events that occurred on the day R.D.S. was arrested.2 R.D.S.'s mother testified as to her activities on the morning of the arrest. Her testimony was supplemented by a showing of the surveillance video tapes of that day taken from the parking lot at the high school. She testified that she arrived at the school for a meeting at about 10:30 a.m. and saw several students around her son's truck. They left as soon as she approached, except for G.N., who was inside the truck. She testified that before she opened the door, she saw G.N. reach into the front pocket of his hooded sweatshirt, take something out, and place it under the front seat. She asked him what he was doing, and he said that he was tired and that R.D.S. had given him permission to take a nap in the truck. The mother suggested that the marijuana found in her son's truck was not his, but had been left there by G.N., and that R.D.S. had said it was his in order to protect his friend.

The circuit court found R.D.S. to be delinquent. The court ordered him to serve forty-eight hours of juvenile detention and to remain on probation until the age of nineteen. His driver's license was revoked for one year, with the proviso that he could apply to have it returned in ninety days. R.D.S. filed a timely appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court as to the admission of the incriminating statements, finding that R.D.S. was not in custody when he made his statements. The intermediate court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the statements were voluntary and not in response to any interrogation by Deputy Lambert. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court with respect to the admission of the evidence, holding that because the search was conducted by a school resource officer, the reasonable suspicion standard should apply, and Deputy Lambert had reasonable suspicion to search the truck. The Court of Appeals also relied in part on Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-6-4204 which allows a school principal to order the search of a vehicle when he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe that there are either drugs or weapons present.

On appeal to this Court, R.D.S. argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his incriminating statements because he was in "custody" at the time he was questioned by Deputy Lambert in violation of his right against self-incrimination; and that the court erred in allowing the admission of the marijuana and pipe into evidence because the search was illegal due to a lack of probable cause, which was the appropriate standard to apply to the search by Deputy Lambert.

Analysis

This case involves a review of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying a motion to suppress evidence. Issues of whether a defendant was placed in custody and interrogated are primarily issues of fact, and we review these factual determinations by the trial court according to the standard set forth in State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn.1996). See State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn.2001). Under the Odom standard, "a trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise." Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see State v. Damron, 151 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tenn.2004); State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tenn.2001). Questions surrounding the credibility of witnesses and the "resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23; see Munn, 56 S.W.3d at 493. Notwithstanding this deference to the trial court's findings of fact, our review of a trial court's application of law to the facts is conducted under a de novo standard of review. Damron, 151 S.W.3d at 515; Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 81; State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn.1999).

I. Custodial Interrogation

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This privilege against self-incrimination applies to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). Our state constitution contains a similar provision in article I, section 9, which guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against...

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