R.D. v. Shohola, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:16-CV-01056 |
| Parties | "R.D.," Plaintiff, v. SHOHOLA, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 202), filed by the defendant, Shohola, Inc. This motion arises out of allegations that R.D., a camper entrusted to the defendant's care in 2007 suffered sexual abuse at the hands of a fellow camper.
Shohola is a corporation which is organized and exists under the laws of Maryland, and operates a summer camp in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, R.D., brought several claims against Shohola arising out of an alleged sexual assault he suffered at the hands of another camper on a trip to Cape Cod organized by Shohola in 2007. R.D. asserts claims of direct negligence, negligent supervision, battery, and negligence per se against Shohola, alleging that Shohola is liable for the harm R.D. suffered when he was sexually assaulted. For the reasons set forth below, we will deny the motion for summary judgment with respect to the direct negligence claim, and grant the motion in all other respects.
In July 2007, R.D., who was a minor at the time, attended an overnight camping trip to Cape Cod, Massachusetts, which was organized by Shohola. (Doc. 27, ¶ 12). R.D. alleges that Shohola marketed the camp as being a safe and encouraging environment for campers and having one of the best supervision ratios in the camping industry with a nearly two-to-one camper to counselor ratio. (Doc. 27, ¶ 9(a)-(d)). Despite these assurances, only four counselors accompanied the twenty-two campers who attended the Cape Cod trip in 2007. (Doc. 202-1, at 4).
R.D. was placed in a tent with three other campers, one of whom was a few years older than the rest of the boys. (Doc. 27, ¶ 13). This was different than the camp's ordinary procedure of sorting the boys into tents based on their ages. (Doc. 208, at 3). It is alleged that the boys were almost completely unsupervised in their tents, and that none of the staff members checked in on the boys before or after "lights out." (Id.) On the second night of the trip, the oldest camper in the tent, N.S., allegedly initiated a game of "truth or dare," during which he dared the younger boys to perform sex acts. (Id., at 4). R.D. claims that N.S. anally penetrated him and another boy, E.J., and fellated the third boy, G.M. (Id., at 1).N.S. instructed the other boys to turn their flashlights off while he performed the sexual dares. (Id., at 4). R.D. alleges that he was able to scream, which caused N.S. to stop assaulting him. (Id.) Despite the yelling and the flickering of the flashlights, no staff member checked on the boys in the tent that night. (Id.)
R.D. filed the instant suit against Shohola on June 3, 2016. (Doc. 1). The second amended complaint (Doc. 27) asserts four claims against Shohola arising from the alleged sexual assault that occurred on the Cape Cod trip: Count I alleges that Shohola was directly negligent because it breached a duty of care to its campers, specifically R.D., to supervise and protect them; Count II alleges a state law battery claim; Count III alleges that Shohola was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining its employees; and Count IV alleges negligence per se, based on a duty to report sexual abuse under the Child Protective Services Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6311. The parties have engaged in extensive discovery, and after roughly two years of somewhat contentious discovery disputes, Shohola filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 202).
In its motion, Shohola asserts that it is not liable to R.D. in negligence because it did not have a duty to protect him. (Doc. 202-1, at 7). Shohola argues that, to state a claim for negligence, R.D. must show that the camp knew of N.S.'s dangerous propensities for sexual violence. (Id.) Further, Shohola claims that it cannot be liable on the negligent supervision and battery claims because N.S. was acamper, not an employee of the camp. (Id., at 17). Lastly, Shohola contends that it had no duty to report abuse under the Child Protective Services Act ("CPS Act") because it did not know of the alleged abuse until the filing of the instant lawsuit, and thus it cannot be liable under a negligence per se theory. (Id., at 18). The motion has been fully briefed (Docs. 202-1, 208, 221), and the court heard oral argument on November 2, 2018.1 Thus, the motion is ripe for resolution.2
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine "whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is therefore entitled tojudgment as a matter of law." Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). A disputed issue is only "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable factfinder could find for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is "material" only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Gray v. York Papers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Court is not tasked with resolving disputed issues of fact, but only with determining whether there exist any factual issues that must be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 271; Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009). Where there exist factual issues that cannot be resolved without a credibility determination, the court must credit the non-moving party's evidence over that presented by the moving party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. However, if there is no factual issue presented, and if only one reasonable conclusion could arise from the record with respect to the potential outcome under the governing law, the court must award summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Id. at 250.
The court must review the entire record, but in doing so must take care to "disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). The task for the court is to examine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52. In considering this evidence, we note that "a single, non-conclusory affidavit or witness's testimony, when based on personal knowledge and directed at a material issue, is sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 n. 34 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2014)). This principle of the rules governing summary judgment holds true "even where . . . the information is self-serving." Id. (citing Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 321 n.2).
Initially, the defendant brings to our attention a potential conflict of laws issue, as the alleged assault occurred in Massachusetts and Shohola does business in Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania's choice-of-law rules, a court must initially determine whether there is an actual conflict between the competing States' laws. Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2007). To make thisdetermination, the court must analyze the substance of the potentially applicable laws to identify "whether these states would actually treat this issue any differently." Id. at 230. If the application of the competing laws would not lead to different outcomes, no conflict exists, and the court need only apply the forum State's law. Id.; see also High v. Balun, 943 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1991) (). Both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 Thus, it appears that no meaningful conflict exists, as the application of either Pennsylvania or Massachusetts law would not lead to a materially different outcome, and Pennsylvania law will therefore govern the instant action.
Accordingly, we will rely upon Pennsylvania law in addressing the four claims advanced by R.D. against Shohola. As we have noted, the plaintiff has asserted four claims against Shohola. First, R.D. claims that Shohola is liable to him in negligence for the injuries he sustained during the sexual assault, due to a breach of Shohola's duty to protect and supervise the then-minor plaintiff on theCape Cod Trip. It is further alleged that Shohola negligently hired, supervised, and retained its employees because the camp should have known that N.S., as well as the camp's supervising counselors, presented a danger to the plaintiff. R.D. also asserts that Shohola is liable for the battery allegedly committed by N.S. Finally, R.D. brings a claim of negligence per se based on Shohola's failure to report the alleged abuse pursuant to the CPS Act. We will address each of the plaintiff's claims in turn.
At the outset, R.D. asserts that Shohola was negligent because the camp breached its duty to protect and supervise him on the Cape Cod trip, which led to him being sexually...
To continue reading
Request your trial