R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: Victor Marrero
• Citation: R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F.Supp.2d 506 (S.D. N.Y. 2009)
• Decision Date: 05 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06 Civ. 13114(VM).,06 Civ. 13114(VM).
• Parties: R.F.M.A.S., INC., Plaintiff, v. MIMI SO et al., Defendants.

Page 506

640 F.Supp.2d 506

R.F.M.A.S., INC., Plaintiff, v. MIMI SO et al., Defendants.

No. 06 Civ. 13114(VM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

August 5, 2009.

Kenneth S. Feldman, Law Offices of Stephen E. Feldman, P.C., Stephen Edward Feldman, Paul J. Burgo, Steven Michael Crosby, Feldman Law Group, New York, NY, Kevin P. Crosby, Brinkley Morgan, Solomon, Tatum, Stanley, Lunny & Crosby, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Theodore C. Anderson, Kilgore & Kilgore, PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Deepro R. Mukerjee, Victoria Elizabeth Spataro, Alston & Bird, LLP, Barry George Magidoff, Sutton Magidoff, LLP, Evan Gourvitz, Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu, P.C., New York, NY, Martin J. Elgison, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

By Decision and Order dated May 13, 2009 (the "Order"),¹ the Court denied the motion of plaintiff R.F.M.A.S., Inc. ("RFMAS") for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ("Rule 56"); granted in part and denied in part the motion of defendants Mimi So and Mimi So International, Inc., (collectively, the "So Defendants") for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56; and granted in part and denied in part the motion of defendants Richemont SA, Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA, Richemont North America, Richemont Holdings I, and Richemont International, Ltd. (collectively, the "Richemont Defendants") for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In the underlying action, RFMAS alleges, among other things, that the So Defendants and the Richemont Defendants (collectively, "Defendants") infringed RFMAS's copyright in nine pieces of its "Stella" jewelry line (the "Stella Pieces").

In the Order, the Court determined that RFMAS was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of ownership of a valid copyright with respect to Copyright Registration No. VA-1-260-162 (the "Registration"), but that RFMAS was not entitled to a presumption of the validity of the facts stated in the certificate of registration as to Copyright Registration No. VA 1-429-069 (the "Supplementary Registration"), which purported to correct certain factual errors present in the Registration. RFMAS now moves for an order pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60 ("Rule 59" and "Rule 60," respectively) granting reconsideration or relief from the Order as to the limited issue of whether RFMAS is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of validity in respect of the facts stated in the Supplementary Registration.

RFMAS argues that reconsideration is warranted because (1) "newly produced evidence" demonstrates that RFMAS obtained the Supplementary Registration promptly, but did not have sufficient notice or opportunity to be heard on the issue of timing; and (2) the Court "overlooked law" concerning its determination that RFMAS was not entitled to a statutory presumption of validity as to the corrected facts contained in the Supplementary Registration. (Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 29, 2009 ("RFMAS Mem."), at 1.) For the reasons discussed below, RFMAS's motion is DENIED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

RFMAS requests "reconsideration" under Rules 59 and 60, (RFMAS Mem. at 1.), but makes no reference to Local Civil Rule 6.3 ("Rule 6.3"), which governs motions for reconsideration in this District. The standards for relief under Rule 6.3 and Rule 59, however, are identical. See Farez-Espinoza v. Napolitano, No. 08 Civ. 11060, 2009 WL 1118098, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27 2009) ("The standards governing motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) and motions for reconsideration or reargument under Local Rule 6.3 are identical.").

Reconsideration of a previous order by the Court is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sees. Litig., 113 F.Supp.2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "A motion for reconsideration may not be used to advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court, nor may it be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues already decided by the Court." Davidson v. Scully, 172 F.Supp.2d 458, 461 (S.D.N.Y.2001). "The major grounds justifying reconsideration are `an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 at 790). To these ends, a request for reconsideration under Rule 6.3 must demonstrate controlling law or factual matters put before the Court in its decision on the underlying matter that the movant believes the Court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the Court. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995).

Rule 6.3 is intended to "`ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party ... plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters.'" S.E.C. v. Ashbury Capital Partners, L.P., No. 00 Civ. 7898, 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001) (quoting Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F.Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y.1988)). A court must narrowly construe and strictly apply Rule 6.3 so as to avoid duplicative rulings on previously considered issues and to prevent Rule 6.3 from being used to advance different theories not previously argued, or as a substitute for appealing a final judgment. See Montanile v. National Broad. Co., 216 F.Supp.2d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y.2002); Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y.1999).

Similarly, Rule 60(b) is not intended as a means of relitigating matters decided in a final order or raising issues that should be argued on appeal. See Batac Dev. Corp. v. B & R Consultants, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 721, 2000 WL 307400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000). Because Rule 60(b) "allows extraordinary relief, it is invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir.2003) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

RFMAS's motion cites no controlling law or factual matters the Court overlooked in connection with the Order that might reasonably be expected to alter the outcome of its decision. The Court addresses each of RFMAS's arguments in turn.

A. AVAILABILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE

RFMAS first argues that "newly produced evidence" demonstrates that RFMAS obtained the Supplementary Registration in a timely fashion. (RFMAS Mem. at 1.) As support, RFMAS offers two affidavits purporting to demonstrate that RFMAS's counsel undertook "extraordinary efforts" to promptly obtain the Supplementary Registration. (Id.)

RFMAS does not present the Court with any newly available evidence or newly discovered evidence warranting the Court's reconsideration of the Order. As a threshold matter, Rule 6.3 states that "[n]o affidavits shall be filed by any party unless directed by the court." RFMAS never sought permission to file affidavits in connection with its motion, and the Court never directed RFMAS to file such affidavits. The Court therefore must disregard RFMAS's affidavits and the information they contain.

In addition, regardless of the amount of time that passed between when RFMAS was on notice that the Registration might have contained errors and when RFMAS received the Supplementary Registration on June 26, 2008, RFMAS does not dispute that (1) it obtained the Supplementary Registration after the close of discovery; (2) it never produced the Supplementary Registration to Defendants prior to briefing of the motions for summary judgment; and (3) it never disclosed the existence of the Supplementary Registration to Defendants prior to briefing. The first notice RFMAS provided of the possible existence of the Supplementary Registration arguably came in RFMAS's opening summary judgment memorandum, where RFMAS stated that, in order to challenge the copyright's validity, "Defendants may try to point to permissible corrections to the copyright registration facts." (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, undated ("RFMAS SJ Mem."), at 5.) That statement is supported by a footnote stating that "Plaintiff can correct information in the copyright application by amending the registration. This does not affect the presumption of validity." (Id. at 5 n.1 (citing Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 98-99 (2d Cir.1999)).) Despite making such representations, RFMAS did not provide Defendants with a copy of the Supplementary Registration until RFMAS filed its briefs in opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (See Declaration of Steven M. Crosby, filed September 19, 2008, Ex. 63.)

As the Court stated in the Order:

By not filing the Supplementary Registration until after the close of fact discovery, ... RFMAS deprived the So Defendants of the ability to conduct discovery related to the Supplementary Registration (and there is no indication that RFMAS voluntarily provided discovery or disclosed this filing to the So Defendants in order to afford them an opportunity to reopen discovery for that limited purpose).

RFMAS, Inc., 619 F.Supp.2d at 55. RFMAS has not come forward with any newly available or newly discovered evidence that changes this assessment. The Supplementary Registration was not filed until after the close of fact discovery, and Defendants never had an opportunity to conduct discovery related to the Supplementary Registration.

RFMAS argues that Defendants were not prejudiced by its failure to disclose the Supplementary Registration because Defendants had the opportunity to explore any errors contained in the Registration during the depositions of RFMAS's principals. (See RFMAS Mem. at 2.) The Court disagrees. Defendants never had the...