R.F.M. v. Nielsen

Decision Date15 March 2019
Docket Number18-cv-5068 (JGK)
Parties R.F.M. et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Kirstjen NIELSEN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Alexander Richard Delisi, Nicholas Lloyd McQuaid, Latham & Watkins LLP, Robert John Malionek, Latham & Watkins, LLP, Amy Pont, Beth A. T. Krause, Cristina Romero, Julie Ann Dona, Lisa Freeman, Theresa Beth Moser, The Legal Aid Society, Jennifer L. Levy, New York State Attorney General, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Kirti Vaidya Reddy, Tomoko Onozawa, U.S. Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

The plaintiffs, R.F.M., T.D., S.W., D.A.F.A., and O.M.S., are young immigrants who have been determined by the New York State Family Court ("New York Family Court" or "Family Court") to have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by one or both of their parents. Each plaintiff has sought Special Immigrant Juvenile ("SIJ") status -- a form of immigration relief that provides a path to lawful permanent residence in the United States1 -- and received a denial. The plaintiffs allege that in early 2018 the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), and individual officers of those agencies2 (collectively "the defendants") adopted a new policy without notice, and that prior to this policy change, the plaintiffs' SIJ applications would have been granted. The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the agency's reliance on that policy, arguing that the policy violates the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and is based on an erroneous understanding of federal and New York State law. The defendants counter that there is no new policy but merely a centralization of the SIJ adjudication process coupled with a clarification of the SIJ statute and that, in any event, their interpretation of the SIJ statute accords with federal and state law.

The plaintiffs move to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and for leave to proceed with this litigation anonymously. The defendants move to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the parties cross-move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on all of their legal claims. The plaintiffs previously moved for a preliminary injunction but have withdrawn that motion as moot because the Court is promptly deciding the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, which are based on the same issues that were briefed in the preliminary injunction motion. See Dkt. Nos. 7, 105.

It is plain that the defendants, contrary to their prior practice, and in contravention of federal law, are now following a policy whereby the New York Family Court cannot issue the necessary findings to juvenile immigrants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to enable them to obtain SIJ status. That effectively precludes those immigrants in New York State from obtaining SIJ status despite the fact that the immigration statute otherwise provides that relief. If the immigration laws are to be changed in that way, the change must come from Congress and not from the immigration authorities. Therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be granted, and the plaintiffs' motion for class certification should also be granted and they should be allowed to proceed anonymously. The defendants' motions should be denied.

I.

In defending against a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). In considering such a motion, the Court generally must accept the material factual allegations in the complaint as true. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the Court does not draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Id.; Graubart v. Jazz Images, Inc., No. 02cv4645, 2006 WL 1140724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). Indeed, where jurisdictional facts are disputed, the Court has the power and the obligation to consider matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, documents, and testimony, to determine whether jurisdiction exists. See APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003) ; Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998) ; Kamen v. Am. Tel.& Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986). In doing so, the Court is guided by that body of decisional law that has developed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Kamen, 791 F.2d at 1011.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, courts "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). However, where "a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal, and the entire case on review is a question of law." Ass'n of Proprietary Colls. v. Duncan, 107 F.Supp.3d 332, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alteration accepted and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the usual summary judgment standard under Rule 56 does not apply because the Court need only "address legal questions" to decide "whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in some other way that violates 5 U.S.C. § 706." Id. Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate in APA cases because the questions on review are purely legal and are "amenable to summary disposition." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Under the APA, courts review issues of law de novo. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 ("[T]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law...."). Although courts defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency is charged with administering, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), courts must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action[s]" that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," "in excess of statutory jurisdiction," or "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)-(D) ; Ass'n of Proprietary Colls., 107 F.Supp.3d at 344. Deference to the agency is unwarranted "if the agency has misconceived the law," see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), or if "the intent of Congress is clear, ... for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).

II.

Because this case centers on the agency's administration of SIJ status in New York, we begin with an overview of the relevant statutes and regulations.

A.

Congress created SIJ status under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 ("INA").The USCIS is charged with administering the statute.3 SIJ status is a form of immigration relief that provides a path to lawful permanent residence for young immigrants who have been victims of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(J) ("the SIJ statute"), 1255(a), (h); 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42844 (Aug. 12, 1993) ("[SIJ status] alleviates hardships experienced by some dependents of United States juvenile courts by providing qualified aliens with the opportunity to apply for special immigrant classification and lawful permanent resident status, with possibility of becoming citizens of the United States in the future.").

Once an immigrant successfully petitions for SIJ classification, the immigrant becomes eligible for a visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (allocating a certain percentage of visas annually to "special immigrants," including special immigrant juveniles). To qualify for SIJ status, the immigrant must be a person:

(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law;
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and
(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status ...

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).The term "juvenile" as it relates to the SIJ statute includes immigrants up to age twenty-one. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1).

After its passage in 1990, the SIJ statute has been amended a number of times, and accordingly, the criteria for SIJ eligibility have changed over time. In 1990, the INA accorded SIJ status to juveniles who had been "declared dependent on a juvenile court," and "deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care," in cases where the juvenile court also determined "that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence." Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 153, 104 Stat. 1978, 5005-06 (1990) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ).

In 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") adopted implementing...

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