R.H. v. State

• Decision Date: 12 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 71A03-1003-JV-206.,71A03-1003-JV-206.
• Citation: 937 N.E.2d 386
• Parties: R.H., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

937 N.E.2d 386

R.H., Appellant-Respondent,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.

No. 71A03-1003-JV-206.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Nov. 12, 2010.

Elizabeth Hardtke, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Wade James Hornbacher, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Chief Judge.

In the instant case, we are asked to determine whether a juvenile court abused its discretion when it awarded guardianship of a juvenile who had been adjudicated a delinquent child to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Although juvenile courts have a variety of placement options for juveniles who have delinquencyproblems, Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 imposes one important restriction, namely, that a juvenile court select the least restrictive placement that is "consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child."

Appellant-respondent R.H. appeals the juvenile court's disposition order awarding guardianship of him to the DOC, arguing that there was a less restrictive alternative available. Concluding that R.H.'s placement with the DOC is justified by the two instant adjudications, his behavior while in detention and on electronic monitoring, his pattern of inappropriate sexual conduct, and his family's inability or refusal to address his inappropriate sexual conduct, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

FACTS ¹

On August 23, 2009, fourteen-year-old R.H. left a K-Mart store in St. Joseph County without paying for a pair a sunglasses and was apprehended by a security officer. On October 16, 2009, the State filed a petition under cause number 71J01-0910-JD-647 (JD-647), alleging that R.H. was a delinquent child for committing an act that would constitute class A misdemeanor conversion if committed by an adult.

On October 27, 2009, R.H. approached I.R. in the school cafeteria and made inappropriate sexual statements. I.R. ignored R.H. and he left; however, after lunch, he walked up to I.R. and grabbed her breast. A hall monitor, who was a few feet away, attempted to stop R.H., but he ran away.

After fleeing the hall monitor, R.H. was observed on the school's security camera harassing another female student. He put his arm around her, and when she tried to push him away, he walked behind her and "began using a pelvic grind on her buttocks and laughing." Appellant's App. p. 48.

R.H.'s parents were ordered to pick up their son from school. R.H.'s father told the school's resource officer that he "could not understand what his son had done wrong" and indicated "that it was not a crime to grab the girl by the breast." Id. He explained that in Gary, where the family was from originally, it is an "accepted" practice. Id. R.H.'s mother became so disruptive that an additional officer had to be summoned to the school and she withdrew her son permanently.

Based on the incident involving I.R., on November 5, 2009, the State filed a petition alleging that R.H. was a delinquent child for committing an act that would have been battery, a class B misdemeanor, if committed by an adult under cause number 71J01-0910-JD-673 (JD-673). R.H. was held in custody until the December 8, 2009, delinquency hearing, during which time he had many disciplinary problems and was placed in administrative segregation.

At the December 8, 2009, delinquency hearing, R.H. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent in JD-673 and was released with electronic monitoring. However, after only nine days, he absconded and was returned to custody.

On December 21, 2009, R.H. admitted the allegations in JD-647 pursuant to an agreement under which the State agreed not to file additional petitions for mischief and disorderly conduct. R.H. was againreleased to electronic monitoring until he was returned to custody on or about January 25, 2010, for continuing to "engage in delinquent behaviors." Id. at 41-42. While in custody, R.H. had a total of twenty-five incident reports.

On February 9, 2010, R.H. submitted to a psychosexual-psychological assessment because of the sexual nature of his actions towards I.H. and the unknown female recorded by the school's security camera. During the assessment, R.H. admitted to engaging in a number of sexual acts with his four-year-old cousin on three separate occasions. Additionally, R.H. disclosed a number of other inappropriate sexual behaviors with different individuals that were "likely forced" and with his brothers. Id. at 64. R.H. also reported being molested around the age of three or four by an older female.

On March 23, 2010, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing and awarded guardianship of R.H. to the DOC for assignment to a Boys' School. The juvenile court relied, in part, on the recommendation of the probation department. R.H. now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

R.H. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it awarded guardianship of him to the DOC when there was a less restrictive disposition available. Specifically, R.H. contends that he should have been placed "in a residential type setting so that he could receive treatment as opposed to punishment." Appellant's Br. p. 8.

As an initial matter, we observe that the purpose of the juvenile process is vastly different from the criminal justice system. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind.1987). Specifically, the goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation so that the youth will not become a criminal as an adult. Id. Accordingly, juvenile courts have a variety of placement choices for juveniles who have delinquency problems, none of which are considered sentences. Id.

The disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition. E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). On review, we may overturn the juvenile court's disposition order if we find that it abused its discretion, which occurs if its actions are clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Id.

Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 provides:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

R.H. directs our attention to D.P. v. State, in which a panel of this Court determinedthat the juvenile court abused its discretion when it awarded guardianship of D.P. to the DOC. 783 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). The D.P. Court based its decision on two factors, namely, D.P.'s special circumstances and Indiana's policy favoring the least harsh disposition. Id. at 769-70.

As for D.P.'s special circumstances, the panel noted that D.P.'s IQ was only sixty-five and that he had been held back in his third and fourth grade school years. Id. at 770. Similarly, although D.P. was beginning the ninth grade, he performed at either a third- or fifth-grade level. Id. Additionally, D.P. was being medicated for ADHD, which is characterized by unusually impulsive behavior. Id.

As for Indiana's policy favoring the least harsh disposition, the D.P. Court acknowledged that placement with the DOC may still be appropriate even if less restrictive alternatives are available. Id. Nevertheless, the D.P. Court concluded that those were not the circumstances with which it was presented because D.P. was not unresponsive to less restrictive alternatives, inasmuch as his only other contact with the juvenile justice system was his successful completion of probation following a battery adjudication. Id. at 770-71. Accordingly, the D.P. Court concluded that juvenile court should have suspended D.P.'s confinement with the DOC. Id. at 771.

R.H. also relies on E.H., in which a panel of this Court vacated a juvenile court's dispositional decree after concluding that there were less restrictive options than a one-year commitment to the DOC. 764 N.E.2d at 686. E.H. had been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that would have constituted class D felony theft if committed by an adult. Id. at 682. The E.H. Court opined that E.H.'s involvement with the juvenile justice system was, in part, because of his parents' abuse and neglect. Id. at 686. Indeed, E.H.'s first contact with the juvenile justice system occurred when he brought a handgun to school that he intended to use on himself because his situation at home had become intolerable to him. Id. at 685.

The E.H. Court concluded that there was a placement alternative that was less restrictive than commitment to the DOC, namely, allowing E.H. to continue in foster care under the Dawn Project, which was a program assisting E.H. and his family with reunification and home-based counseling. Id. at 686. The E.H. Court observed that commitment to the DOC conflicted with the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system, inasmuch as E.H.'s counselor testified that he had made considerable progress and that removing him would cause him to regress. Id.

R.H. argues that his circumstances are similar to those in D.P. and E.H. and that, consequently, this Court should vacate the juvenile court's dispositional decree granting guardianship of him to the DOC. Specifically, R.H. contends that like D.P., he has not engaged in repetitive misconduct and that the juvenile court...