R.I. Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Serv. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 09 May 1935
• Docket Number: No. 623.,623.
• Citation: 179 A. 139
• Parties: RHODE ISLAND BAR ASS'N et al. v. AUTOMOBILE SERVICE ASS'N et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

179 A. 139

RHODE ISLAND BAR ASS'N et al.

v. AUTOMOBILE SERVICE ASS'N et al.

No. 623.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 9, 1935.

Petition by Judah C. Semonoff and others, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Rhode Island Bar Association, against Francis J. Loughlin and others, doing business under the name and style of the Automobile Service Association, otherwise known as "A. S. A.," and another, to adjudge respondents in contempt of court for illegal practice of law.

Decree to be entered in accordance with opinion.

Clarence N. Woolley, of Pawtucket, and Judah C. Semonoff, Patrick H. Quinn, Paul %%%R. McIntyre, and Henry B. Gardner, Jr., all of Providence, for petitioners.

Edward W. Morris, of Providence, for respondents.

CONDON, Justice.

This is a petition brought by Judah C. Semonoff, James A. Higgins, and Eugene L. Jalbert, members of the bar of this state and duly qualified members of the committee on the Illegal Practice of the Law of the Rhode Island Bar Association, on their own behalf and on behalf of said bar association, a voluntary association, against Francis J. Loughlin, John F. Phillips, and James Conaty, doing business under the name and style of Automobile Service Association, otherwise known as "A. S. A.," and Edward W. Morris, Esq., a member of the bar of this state, to adjudge said respondents in contempt of the authority of this court for illegal practice of the law.

It appears from the allegations in the petition and the testimony given before us that the respondents have performed and hold themselves out to perform the following services:

"Manslaughter.

"(1) The Association will furnish Counsel free of charge to represent and defend in a lawful manner the said Member against Criminal Prosecutions for criminal negligence, or Manslaughter, which may be alleged while in the operation of a motor vehicle covered herein, in accordance with law in the said operation; or his agent, servant, employee or member of his family, while operating the motor vehicle covered by the Member and covered by this covenant.

"State Laws, City Ordinances. "(2) The Association will furnish Counsel free of charge to represent and defend the said Member, members of his family, his agents and servants as aforesaid, in all other Criminal Proceedings arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle which is covered herein, in the event of being charged with the violation of a State Law, or City or Town Ordinance concerning the operation of motor vehicles on the public highway or the regulation of traffic or the rules of the road.

"Damage Suits Against Others.

"(4) The Association will furnish Counsel to bring suit free of charge to collect the damages caused to the machine covered by this contract by another machine, trolley car or other vehicle if no settlement or adjustment can be effected, and if in the opinion of Counsel for the Association the member has a meritorious claim.

"Defense.

"(5) The Association will furnish Counsel free of charge to represent and defend the said Member against all Civil Suits arising from a collision of the car covered by this covenant with that of another person which result in claims or actions for personal injury or property damage.

"Legal Advice.

"(7) The Association's attorneys will furnish consultation and legal advice free of charge to the Member or members of his family on any legal matter pertaining to the use, operation, ownership and transfer of an automobile.

"Hearings.

"(8) The Association will furnish free of charge consultation and legal advice to the Member, members of his family, his agent, servant or employee, in all matters relating to his or her driver's license or registration, and will furnish Counsel to represent and defend such person at all hearings held by the State Official relating to the suspension or reinstatement of driving licenses or registrations which may have been affected through the operation of the motor vehicle covered herein."

The lay respondents admit they have performed such services, but deny that the manner in which they have been performed through their attorney, respondent Morris, constitutes the practice of law by them, and pray that this court define by its decree what is the practice of law.

The practice of law is difficult to define. Perhaps it does not admit of exact definition. Whether or not it can be reduced to definition is not important to the decision of the matter before us at this time. "Definition, simple, positive, hard and fast as it is, never tells the whole truth about a conception," said the American philosopher, Josiah Royce, and we adopt that view in refraining from any attempt at definition here. That the practice of the law is a special field reserved to lawyers duly licensed by the court, no one denies. The lay respondents admit this, but claim that the acts performed by them lie without the boundaries of that field. They support this contention by citing section 44 of chapter 401 "Of Offenses Against Public Policy," G. L. 1923, which reads as follows: "Sec. 44. Whoever, not having been admitted to practice as an attorney at law or counsellor at law in any state of the United States, holds himself out, or who represents or advertises himself as an attorney or counsellor at law, by means of signs, business cards, letter heads, printing, words, acts, or any other representations, or, not having been admitted to practice as an attorney at law or counsellor at law in accordance with the statutes and in accordance with the provisions and regulations of the supreme court of this state, holds himself out or represents himself to be lawfully qualified to practice law in the courts of this state, by means of signs, business cards, letter heads, printing, words, acts, or any other representations, shall upon a first conviction be punished by a fine of not exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both, and, upon any subsequent conviction, by a fine of not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or both."

They say they have not violated this statute, but if they have, then there is a remedy for their offense in the criminal court and, therefore, there is no need for this contempt proceeding. They assume that the act of the General Assembly defines for all purposes the practice of the law and takes the matter out of the control and supervision of this court. That is not so. The section cited does not comprehend all the many and varied acts which may be done within the practice of the law, nor do sections 45, 46, and 47 of the same chapter which set out other acts constituting, in the opinion of the Legislature, illegal and unauthorized practice of the law, and make them punishable by fine or imprisonment. They merely enumerate some of them and prescribe a penalty for the performance of any of them by unauthorized persons. If, however, they did include all possible acts, it would not impair or restrict the power of this court over the practice of the law. Indeed all of these sections, since the bringing of these proceedings, have been extensively and somewhat comprehensively amended and amplified by the General Assembly at its January session by chapter 2190 of the Public Laws 1935. Yet the power of the court to regulate and control the practice of the law remains where it has always been, notwithstanding the exercise by the General Assembly of its undoubted power to declare acts of unauthorized practice of the law illegal and punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. We hold that the enactment of chapter 401, section 44, and also sections 45, 46, and 47, was in aid of the authority of this court in the regulation and control of the practice of the law, and not subversive of it.

It may be pointed out here that the same act of a person may constitute a violation of the criminal law and also may constitute such a violation of his equitable duties towards others as to justify the use of the equity powers of the court, notwithstanding the punishability of his conduct as a crime. It has been urged that this would be using the equity powers of the court to punish crime, but this objection has been held untenable. The rule is now well established that the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct, but may apply to the same conduct. In like manner, unauthorized practice of the law may constitute a violation of the criminal law and be punishable as such, and yet may constitute at the same time a contempt of the authority of the court which may be forbidden by injunction. "Ordinarily, injunction does not lie merely to prevent commission of crime. But the criminality of an act or series of them does not bar injunctive relief if otherwise there is ground for it. 32 C. J. 277." Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N. W. 910, 911, 94 A. L. R. 356, and note at page 363. We think the same reasoning is applicable in this contempt proceeding in which petitioners were granted a restraining order during the pendency of the petition.

It is not necessary, in order to sustain the power of the court, to hold that the Legislature cannot also act to prevent the evils to the public that inevitably arise from unauthorized practice of the law. In the exercise of the police power it undoubtedly can legislate in this matter. The statute, therefore, cannot avail these respondents if their admitted acts are within the field of practice of the law. Stripped of all extraneous issues, that is the real question before us in this proceeding. If the acts complained of by the petitioners, and admitted by the respondents, are found to amount to the practice of law, then summary action will be in order as prayed for by the petitioners.

While a proceeding to adjudge in contempt for unauthorized practice of the law does not appear to have been brought heretofore in this state, we are nevertheless satisfied that it is a proper proceeding. It has...