R.I. Seekonk Holdings, LLC v. Hines

• Decision Date: 21 November 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 19-cv-10230-DJC
• Citation: 425 F.Supp.3d 37
• Parties: R.I. SEEKONK HOLDINGS, LLC and H. Charles Tapalian, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. Michelle A. HINES, individually, and in her capacity as a Member of the Town of Seekonk Board of Selectmen, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

425 F.Supp.3d 37

R.I. SEEKONK HOLDINGS, LLC and H. Charles Tapalian, Sr., Plaintiffs,

v.Michelle A. HINES, individually, and in her capacity as a Member of the Town of Seekonk Board of Selectmen, Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-10230-DJC

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed November 21, 2019

Eric S. Brainsky, Michael E. Levinson, Brainsky Levinson, LLC, Seekonk, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Deborah I. Ecker, KP Law, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CASPER, United States District Judge

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs R.I. Seekonk Holdings, LLC ("RISH") and H. Charles Tapalian, Sr., ("Tapalian") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") have filed this lawsuit against Defendant Michelle A. Hines ("Hines"), a member of the Town of Seekonk Board of Selectman, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 12 § 11H - 11I and defamation. D. 1-3. Hines has moved for judgment on the pleadings. D. 17. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment on the pleadings at any time "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is "ordinarily accorded much the same treatment" as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2006). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, therefore, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings "calls for an assessment of the merits of the case at an embryonic stage," the Court "view[s] the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[s] all reasonable inferences therefrom" in their favor. Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

On a Rule 12(c) motion, unlike a Rule 12(b) motion, the Court considers the pleadings as a whole, including the answer. See Aponte-Torres, 445 F.3d at 54-55. Those assertions in the answer that have not been denied and do not conflict with the assertions in the complaint are taken as true. See Santiago v. Bloise, 741 F. Supp. 2d 357, 360 (D. Mass. 2010). In addition, "[t]he court may supplement the facts contained in the pleadings by considering documents fairly incorporated therein and facts susceptible to judicial notice." R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). Still, "[l]ike Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c) does not allow for any resolution of contested facts; rather, a court may enter judgment on the pleadings only if the uncontested and properly considered facts conclusively establish the movant's entitlement to a favorable judgment." Aponte-Torres, 445 F.3d at 54.

III. Factual Background

Unless otherwise indicated, the following summary is based on the facts as alleged in the complaint and the exhibits referenced therein, D. 1-3, and, to the extent they are not disputed, the facts contained in Hines's answer, D. 5. RISH owns and operates a development of luxury apartments known as Greenbrier Village Luxury Apartments ("Greenbrier Village") in Seekonk, MA. D. 1-3 ¶¶ 8-11. Tapalian is a majority member and manager of RISH. Id. ¶ 2. An approximately twenty-two acre parcel of land known as the Showcase Property abuts Greenbrier Village. Id. ¶ 24. The Showcase Property sits in a split zoning district where a portion of the property is zoned "Highway Business" and the remainder of the property is zoned "Rural Residential." Id. ¶ 26. In 2017, the Town of Seekonk—through its Board of Selectmen and Planning Department—considered rezoning the entire Showcase Property to "Highway Business." Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiffs, through Tapalian, attended various meetings discussing the proposed rezoning of the Showcase Property. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. At these meetings, Plaintiffs expressed significant concerns that the rezoning would permit the opening of a used car lot or auto auction which would impact the abutting Greenbrier Village. Id. ¶ 30. The proposal to change the Showcase Property's zoning failed to pass during the Town's 2017 Annual Fall Meeting. Id. ¶¶ 32-37. In January 2018, the Town considered renewing its effort to rezone the Showcase Property as Highway Business. Id. ¶¶ 38-43. At one meeting considering the Showcase Property's rezoning, Hines, one member of the Seekonk Board of Selectman, expressed concern that statements made by members of the public about used car lots were "insulting" and "defamatory." Id. ¶ 40.

To protect the Showcase Property from being rezoned, Plaintiffs purchased the Showcase Property and created a plan to develop the portion abutting Greenbrier Village into additional residential units. Id. ¶¶ 44-46. Pursuant to this plan, Plaintiffs submitted to the town a petition which sought to incorporate the rear portion of the Showcase Property currently zoned Rural Residential into the adjacent Multifamily Development Overlay District ("Plaintiffs' Rezoning Proposal"). Id. ¶¶ 47-48. On December 27, 2018, the Seekonk Board of Selectmen met to discuss Plaintiffs' Rezoning Proposal. Id. ¶ 51.

The December 2018 meeting was open to the public and televised live on local access channels. Id. ¶¶ 70-71. RISH's legal representative, Tapalian, town officials and Seekonk residents attended the meeting. Id. ¶¶ 52, 70. During this December 2018 meeting, Hines questioned Plaintiffs' counsel about their proposal. D. 1-3 Exh. 1 at 4:21-26:45. As part of her questioning, Hines said that Plaintiffs should not have "maligned used car dealers in town" and expressed concern that Seekonk lost an auto auction business. D. 1-3 ¶¶ 63-64. Hines further expressed concern that Plaintiffs had not kept up with promises to its purchasers. Id. ¶ 57. Hines explained that she would oppose Plaintiffs' effort to rezone in addition to any further efforts by Plaintiffs to construct condominiums in town. Id. ¶¶ 66-67. Hines was the only member of the Seekonk Board of Selectman to vote against establishing Plaintiffs' proposed zoning change as a warrant article, scheduling a special town meeting on the petition and referring it to the Planning Board for consideration and public hearing. Id. ¶ 68.

IV. Procedural History

Plaintiffs instituted this action on January 11, 2019, in Bristol Superior Court, D. 1-3, and on February 4, 2019, Hines removed the case to this Court, D. 1. Hines has now moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all claims. D. 17. The Court heard the parties on the pending motion and took these matters under advisement. D. 24.

V. Discussion

A. Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs bring federal constitutional claims against Hines in both her individual and professional capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. D. 1-3 ¶¶ 82-93. To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements: first, that the defendant acted under the color of law; and second, that her conduct deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law. See Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Rodríguez-Cirilo v. García, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997) ).

1. Acting Under Color of Law

It appears that Hines is challenging the Section 1983 claim brought against her in her individual capacity by asserting that only the government can violate the First Amendment and that Plaintiffs will not be able to show the requisite state action against her in her individual capacity. D. 18 at 10. Section 1983 claims first require a showing that the defendant acted under the color of law. See Gagliardi, 513 F.3d at 306. While Section 1983 does not apply to private individuals acting in a purely personal capacity, see Destek Grp., Inc. v. N. H. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that "[o]nly when a private individual's conduct can be deemed ‘fairly attributable to the State’ will a [ Section] 1983 cause of action exist against that individual"), " Section 1983 supplies a private right of action against a person, who, under the color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law," Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Hines relies on McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2004) to support her proposition that a Section 1983 action does not lie against her in her individual capacity, but that case is distinguishable. In McGuire, a group of women challenged Massachusetts' buffer zone laws by arguing, in part, that their First Amendment rights were violated by private individuals without any government affiliation. See id. The court rejected these arguments by explaining that these individuals were "private[ly] jousting in the speech marketplace" and First Amendment violations require state action. Id. By contrast here, Plaintiffs contend that Hines violated their constitutional rights through her course of action as an elected official performing her official duties in her role of town selectman at a public hearing. D. 1-3 ¶¶ 53-68. Public employees act under the color of law when they act in their official capacity. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (noting that "generally, a public employee acts under the color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law"). As alleged, Hines acted under the color of law when, pursuant to her duties as a town selectman, she publicly debated and voted on issues. See Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 53 n.4 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that "it is beyond dispute that defendant, a local zoning board, acted under color of state law"). Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the Section 1983 claim brought against Hines in her...