R.S. v. Starkville Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 19 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-00088-SA-DAS |
| Parties | R.S. (A MINOR BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIEND, GEORGIA SMITH) AND GEORGIA SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY PLAINTIFFS v. STARKVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT; JAMES MITCHELL, INDIVIDUALLY; CHRIS WALTERS, INDIVIDUALLY; TATE FISCHER, INDIVIDUALLY; KEITH FENNELL, INDIVIDUALLY; SEAN MCDONNALL, INDIVIDUALLY DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Defendants have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [42]. Additionally, the Individual Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity [44]. Upon due consideration of the motions, responses, rules, and authorities, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be granted in part and denied in part, and that Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
R.S., a Caucasian minor, suffers from SLD (Specific Learning Disability) and Irritable Bowel Syndrome. While a student in the Starkville School District, Plaintiffs allege R.S. was bullied, harassed, assaulted, and otherwise mistreated by both fellow students and Starkville High School teachers and coaches because of his race and disability. Plaintiffs allege school personnel largely ignored, and at times actively encouraged and participated in, the mistreatment of R.S. Defendants request a judgment on the pleadings asserting Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Plaintiffs' second amended complaint [28] alleges Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause and Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, First Amendment freedom of speech, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Plaintiffs' complaint also alleges that Defendants' conduct constitutes negligence under state law and common law infliction of emotional distress.
"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). The Court's inquiry on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is necessarily limited to the pleadings themselves. See Ark. River Co. v. U.S., 840 F.Supp. 1103, 1104 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (). As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may treat a motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment when "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
A Rule 12(c) motion is governed by the same standards as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—that is, that the Court must determine upon a review of the pleadings whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 472 F. App'x 302, 303 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 440 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000)). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id., 129 S. Ct. 1937.
The Fifth Circuit has further explained that this standard requires that "factual allegations must be 'enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Oceanic Exploration Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ZOC, 352 F. App'x 945, 950 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). In evaluating the validity of a plaintiff's claims, the Court "will accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2002). However, the Court will not "accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact." Id. at 313; Brown, 472 F. App'x at 303.
The Court first addresses Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to set forth a prima facie case under § 1981. Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiffs failed to allege intentional discrimination by Defendants on the basis of race. They also argue Plaintiffs failed to allege discriminatory conduct based on any activity enumerated in § 1981. Plaintiffs fail to address or even reference the § 1981 claim in their response.
Arguello v.Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003). Section 1981(a) provides, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege any facts that would allow the Court to reasonably infer Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs with regard to an activity enumerated by § 1981. Plaintiffs generally allege in their complaint that R.S. was the victim of bullying based upon his "status as a white disabled person and a special education student." Plaintiffs additionally allege that, on separate occasions, two teachers not named as parties to this suit harassed R.S. because of his race. First, Plaintiffs allege a black teacher made "racial comments about R.S.'s skin color" during a class discussion. Second, Plaintiffs contend another black teacher "harassed R.S. during Black History Month programs." While Plaintiffs' complaint alleges many instances of racially motivated bullying and harassment by other students, it makes no other allegations of Defendants acting or failing to act because of his race. Whereas Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to suggest that Defendants discriminated against R.S. with regard to any particular enumerated activity under § 1981, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1981.
As to Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' complaint failed to identify any similarly situated person who was treated differently than R.S. Relying on Plyler v. Doe, Defendants maintain that by failing to identify such a person, Plaintiffs have failed to state avalid claim for relief arising under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1982) (). Plaintiffs argue in their response memorandum that they have stated a valid claim because all other students and football players were treated differently that R.S.
Plaintiffs' complaint, however, does not make any allegations regarding similarly situated persons treated differently by Defendants. In fact, Plaintiffs' allegations are solely limited to actions committed against R.S. without reference or comparison to any individual or group of individuals in similar circumstances who received different treatment. While Plaintiffs assert in their response to Defendants' motion that they will be able to prove through the discovery process that other students who complained of bullying and harassment saw their attackers reprimanded and punished, no such allegation, however vague, may be found in their complaint.
"Under federal law, the Equal Protection Clause essentially directs that all persons similarly situated be treated alike." Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241, 252 (5th Cir. 1999). "To state an equal protection claim, ... [p]laintiffs must allege, inter alia, that similarly situated individuals have been treated differently." Yates v. Stalder, 217 F.3d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendants treated R.S. differently than any similarly situated individuals. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a valid claim for a violation of Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
Turning next to Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, the Court is again placed in the position of reading between the lines of Plaintiffs' complaint. Though the Second Amended Complaint alleges only a violation of R.S.'s "right to safety at school," Plaintiffs in their responsememorandum argue that their substantive due process claim is based on a right to bodily integrity, that a special relationship existed between R.S. and Defendants, and that Defendants created a dangerous environment that ultimately led to the foreseeable violations of R.S.'s constitutional rights.
Essentially, all of Plaintiffs' allegations against Defendants may properly be classified as either the failure to prevent and/or the encouragement of harassing and bullying conduct toward R.S. by other students or the direct participation in bullying and harassing conduct toward R.S. by school personnel. The Court will first address Plaintiffs' claims in relation to harm R.S. allegedly suffered as a result of the actions of other students.
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