R.S. v. State, 97-1396

Decision Date09 April 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-1396,97-1396
Citation710 So.2d 640
Parties23 Fla. L. Weekly D938 R.S., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Maximillian J. Changus, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

COBB, Judge.

This appeal concerns a conviction for loitering and prowling. Around 1:17 a.m. a police helicopter detected a car parked in the parking lot of a closed business, and alerted an investigating deputy, Wilkinson, who responded to the scene. When he arrived Wilkinson saw a vehicle pull out of the parking lot without the headlights on. He stopped the vehicle, which was operated by R.S. with one passenger. Wilkinson arrested R.S. for loitering or prowling pursuant to section 856.021, Florida Statutes (1995) and the latter was subsequently convicted in juvenile court. That statute provides in pertinent part:

(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of person or property in the vicinity.

(2) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refused to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section if the law enforcement officer did not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the person is true and, if believed by the officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern.

At trial the state established that at the time R.S. was stopped by Wilkinson that the latter complied with the statutory requirement of affording both R.S. and his passenger the opportunity to identify themselves and explain their presence and conduct. Wilkinson, however, did not Mirandize 1 the suspects, and at...

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