R.A.T. v. Greene Cnty. Juvenile Office (In re Interest of A.R.T.)

• Decision Date: 17 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. SD 34196,SD 34196
• Parties: In the Interest of: A.R.T., R.A.T., Respondent–Appellant, v. Greene County Juvenile Office, Petitioner–Respondent, and Missouri Department of Social Services, Children's Division, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

496 S.W.3d 610

In the Interest of: A.R.T.,

R.A.T., Respondent–Appellant,

v.Greene County Juvenile Office, Petitioner–Respondent,andMissouri Department of Social Services, Children's Division, Respondent.

No. SD 34196

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One .

Filed: May 17, 2016

Attorneys for Appellant: Kristoffer R. Barefield and James R. Hayes of Springfield, MO.

Attorney for Respondent, Greene Cty. Juv. Off.: R. Paul Shackelford of Springfield, MO.

Attorney for Respondent, Children's Division: Jon T. Wagner of Springfield, MO.

Attorney for Minor: Marsha D. Jackson of Springfield, MO.

JEFFREY W. BATES

, J.

R.A.T. (Appellant) appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights to daughter, A.R.T. (Child). Appellant is listed as Child's father on her birth certificate, but Appellant is not Child's biological father.¹ The trial court terminated Appellant's parental rights on the statutory grounds of: (1) neglect; and (2) failure to rectify potentially harmful conditions. See § 211.447.5(2); § 211.447.5(3).² The court also found that termination of Appellant's parental rights was in Child's best interest. See § 211.447.6.

Appellant presents five points on appeal. He contends the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because: (1) “the court lacked jurisdiction to do so, in that Appellant was not a parent”; (2) the petition to terminate parental rights on the ground that Appellant neglected Child “did not contain facts on which the termination was sought”; (3) the finding that Appellant had neglected Child is against the weight of the evidence; (4) the finding that Appellant failed to rectify harmful conditions is against the weight of the evidence; (5) the finding that termination was in Child's best interest is an abuse of discretion. Finding no merit in any of these points, we affirm.

Standard of Review

A trial court's judgment terminating parental rights “will be affirmed if the record supports at least one ground and supports that termination is in the best interest of the children.” J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Mo. banc 2014)

. This Court reviews a statutory ground for termination by determining whether the ruling is supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or involves an erroneous application or declaration of the law. Id . ; In re Adoption of C.M.B.R. , 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. banc 2011). We will not reverse the trial court's decision unless we are left with the firm belief that the decision was wrong. C.M.B.R. , 332 S.W.3d at 815. We view “the evidence and permissible inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.” Id. at 801. We defer to the trial court's assessment of credibility. Id. at 815. An abuse-of-discretion standard is used to review a trial court's decision that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. Id. at 816 ; see

J.A.R., 426 S.W.3d at 626.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Greene County deputy juvenile officer filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Appellant in October 2014. The trial was conducted in May 2015. Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the following evidence was adduced.

Child was born in September 2012. When Child was a year old, she was taken into protective custody due to concerns about her mother's drug use, homelessness and domestic-violence issues with her then boyfriend, Appellant.³ Appellant testified that, when Child was taken into protective custody, he knew he was not the biological father.⁴ Nevertheless, he viewed himself as Child's father. Appellant signed an affidavit acknowledging paternity of Child because the mother was incarcerated, the biological father was also incarcerated, and no one else would “step up” and take care of Child. Appellant was named as Child's father on an amended birth certificate issued in October 2013.

A treatment plan for Appellant was ordered by the court to rectify the issues that brought Child into protective custody. The plan addressed Appellant's issues, which included: (1) substance abuse; (2) his mental health; (3) lack of stable housing; (4) lack of employment; and (5) significant involvement with law enforcement regarding substance abuse and various assaults. Among the services offered, Appellant agreed to obtain a drug assessment, follow all recommendations of that assessment and submit to random drug testing. Appellant also agreed to complete a psychological evaluation, attend therapy and address his domestic violence and anger issues. Appellant further agreed to provide proof of completion of all programs and services provided. Appellant's responsibilities included an obligation to provide a safe living environment for Child and a legal means for her support.

Lisa Lowrance (Lowrance) was the Children's Division case manager who worked on Child's case from September 2013 through December 2014. Lowrance created Appellant's treatment plan. She testified that Appellant did not achieve and maintain sobriety. She never received a report that Appellant had been in treatment or had completed treatment. Appellant did not make any significant progress on rectifying the issues addressed in his treatment plan. Lowrance testified that, when Child's case opened, Appellant had two visits with Child. Appellant's last visit with Child occurred on October 28, 2013. He did not show up for a scheduled visit with Child one week later. Appellant did not have any contact with Child for about a year until he asked for visitation in the fall of 2014. Lowrance recommended that termination of Appellant's parental rights would be in Child's best interest.

Lindsay Crosswhite (Crosswhite) was the case manager from December 2014 to the time of trial. Crosswhite testified that Appellant tested positive on a hair follicle drug test in April 2015 for amphetamines and methamphetamine. Appellant had not been able to achieve and maintain sobriety for any extended period of time. Since Crosswhite had been the case manager, Appellant had not had a stable, suitable, safe home for Child. Appellant had not paid any money for the cost of the care and maintenance of Child while she had been in foster care. Appellant similarly did not provide any in-kind items for the support of Child. Crosswhite did not know of any additional services which could be offered to Appellant to bring about a lasting parental adjustment so Child could be returned to him within an ascertainable period of time. In March 2015, Crosswhite and other members of the family support team encouraged Appellant to get help for his mental health issues. Crosswhite was aware at that time that Appellant recently started to participate in the Greene County Mental Health Court, pursuant to court orders in criminal cases. Appellant was previously diagnosed as bipolar schizoaffective in 2006 while in the Department of Corrections. Crosswhite also recommended that Appellant's parental rights be terminated due to lack of progress on his treatment plan.

Appellant testified that he completed six substance abuse treatment programs back to back. Upon completion, however, he told each treatment center that he was not ready to be released back to the streets because he continued to be a victim of his substance abuse. Appellant admitted that he and Child's mother stopped speaking to each other at one time because they disagreed on issues of where and how to live. Appellant wanted to be a drug dealer, and the mother wanted to be a mother. Appellant also admitted that, since Child had been in care, he had neither been employed nor had a stable home. Appellant receives monthly social security disability benefits.

The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) likewise recommended that Appellant's parental rights be terminated because Child had been in care for a long time. The GAL opined that termination of Appellant's parental rights would be in Child's best interest.

Thereafter, the trial court entered its judgment terminating Appellant's parental rights. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be included below as we discuss Appellant's five points of error.

Discussion and Decision

Point 1

Appellant's first point contends the trial court misapplied the law in terminating his parental rights “because the court lacked jurisdiction to do so, in that Appellant was not a parent.” This argument, which is being raised for the first time on appeal, has no merit.

“Missouri courts recognize two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.” J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. banc 2009)

. Article V of the Missouri Constitution governs subject matter jurisdiction and grants circuit courts “original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.” MO. CONST. art. V, § 14 (emphasis added); J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252. Because this is a civil case, the trial court had constitutionally vested subject matter jurisdiction over the matters of paternity and child custody. Hightower v. Myers, 304 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Mo. banc 2010) ; DeWitt v. Lechuga, 393 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Mo.App. 2013). Appellant did not challenge the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, and he appeared at trial. See

C.J.G. v. Missouri Dept. of Soc. Services, 219 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Mo. banc 2007) (personal jurisdiction may be waived when a party makes no mention or pleading on the issue of personal jurisdiction, but otherwise subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court). Consequently, the trial court did not lack either subject matter or personal jurisdiction in this matter.

What Appellant is essentially arguing is that the court lacked authority to terminate his parental rights because he was not a “parent” as defined in § 211.442, which provides:

“Parent” , a biological parent or parents of a child, as well as, the husband of a natural mother at the time the child was conceived, or a parent or parents of a child by adoption, including both

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