R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Babbitt
| Decision Date | 14 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-15732,96-15732 |
| Parties | 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3617, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6147 R.T. VANDERBILT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce BABBITT, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; Bureau Of Land Management; United States Department Of The Interior, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Gary D. Babbitt, Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, Boise, Idaho, for plaintiff-appellant.
Lisa E. Jones, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Steven P. Quarels and R. Timothy McCrum, Crowell & Moring, Washington, D.C., for amicus.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, David W. Hagen, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-95-00286-DWH.
Before: WIGGINS, TROTT, Circuit Judges, and ZAPATA, * District Judge.
R.T. Vanderbilt Company ("Vanderbilt") sought an order from the district court directing the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") to continue processing Vanderbilt's mining patent applications. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We AFFIRM, although for somewhat different reasons than those stated by the district court. 1
Under the General Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54, citizens can enter and use public lands for mining exploration. If valuable mineral deposits are found, a mining claim may be filed for a lode or placer claim, as well as a nearby mill-site. Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir.1993). Possessory interest in a claim can be held indefinitely upon discovery of valuable mineral deposits provided that annual assessment work is performed, all necessary filings and fee payments are made, and the valuable mineral deposit continues to exist. Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 506 (9th Cir.1997).
A claimholder may apply to the Interior Department to obtain a patent which, if obtained, conveys fee title. Id. After the claimholder files the application and pays the purchase price, the Secretary signs a "first half of mineral final certificate," or FHFC. Id. We have described the FHFC as the Secretary's "administrative recording of an applicant's compliance with the initial paperwork requirement of the Mining Law." Id. The patent does not issue until the claim is determined to be valid; before the determination, a mineral examiner must complete a mineral report and the Secretary must review the entire application. Id.
As part of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1995 ("Appropriations Act"), Congress imposed a moratorium on processing mining patent applications unless revisions were made to the General Mining Act of 1872 by the time Congress adjourned sine die. 2 Pub.L. No. 103-332 § 112, 108 Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994). The moratorium was set forth in Section 112 of Appropriations Act:
If the House-Senate Conference Committee on H.R. 322 fails to report legislation which is enacted prior to the adjournment of the 103d Congress sine die, none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to accept or process applications for a patent for any mining or mill site claim located under the general mining laws or to issue a patent for any mining or mill site claim located under the general mining laws.
In section 113 of the Appropriations Act, Congress enacted a grandfather clause for certain patent applications already filed:
The provisions of section 112 shall not apply if the Secretary of the Interior determines that, for the claim concerned: (1) a patent application was filed with the Secretary on or before the date of enactment of this Act, and (2) all requirements established under ... (30 U.S.C. 29 and 30) for vein and lode claims and ... (30 U.S.C. 35, 36, and 37) for placer claims, and ... (30 U.S.C. 42) for mill site claims, as the case may be, were fully complied with by the applicant by that date.
Appropriations Act § 113, 108 Stat. at 2519. It is undisputed that the date of enactment, and thus the effective date for the grandfather clause, was September 30, 1994.
Congress adjourned sine die on December 1, 1994, 3 without having enacted legislation from the Conference Committee on H.R. 322. Indeed, Congress has not yet enacted any revisions. Instead, Congress has extended the moratorium and the accompanying grandfather clause through the present in subsequent appropriations acts, employing language with no differences relevant to this case. E.g., Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
In 1993, Vanderbilt filed patent applications for a placer and two mill-site claims in Peshing County, Nevada. 4 The Secretary authorized notice publication of Vanderbilt's applications on June 27, 1994. On September 29, 1994, the day before Congress enacted the Appropriations Act, the Secretary issued a decision requiring Vanderbilt to file within 30 days additional information and to remit payment of the purchase price on both claims.
Vanderbilt mailed the additional materials and checks for the purchase price to the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior ("BLM") Nevada State Office on October 20, 1994. The Secretary received the checks October 24, 1994, but returned them on the grounds that the moratorium suspended all further processing of Vanderbilt's applications. Following unsuccessful appeals within the BLM, Vanderbilt sought a writ of mandamus in district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 or alternatively an order compelling the Secretary to process its applications pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and former District of Nevada Local Rule 500-5.
The magistrate judge concluded that Vanderbilt's applications did not qualify for treatment under the grandfather clause to the moratorium. Thus, she concluded that the Secretary reasonably refrained from processing Vanderbilt's patent applications, even though she concluded that the Appropriation Act's moratorium began on December 1, 1994, not on October 1, 1994. She also held that equitable title had not vested in Vanderbilt. She therefore recommended the district court enter summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, and this appeal followed.
Vanderbilt appeals the district court's refusal to order the Secretary to process Vanderbilt's patent applications pursuant to the grandfather clause of the moratorium and to recognize that Vanderbilt has equitable title to the claims. In a mandamus action, district courts may "compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally within a district court's discretion. Independence, 105 F.3d at 505. Nonetheless, whether the elements of the mandamus test 5 are satisfied is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. In Independence, we recognized that mandamus relief and relief under the APA are "in essence" the same, id. at 507 & n. 6; as a result we elected to analyze the claim under the APA where there is an adequate remedy under the APA. In this case, we will follow Independence in analyzing the claims under the APA.
The APA provides that a court may compel "agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Under the APA, we review agency actions to ensure they are not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). "A court should accept the 'reasonable' interpretation of a statute chosen by an administrative agency except when it is clearly contrary to the intent of Congress." Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). However, where the statute's language is unambiguous, the agency, like the courts, must follow Congress's express will. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82; Swanson, 3 F.3d at 1352.
Vanderbilt contends that because its applications fall within the moratorium's grandfather clause, the Secretary should not have stopped processing them. The district court held that Vanderbilt had not "fully complied" with the enumerated statutory requirements for the grandfather clause by its effective date.
Vanderbilt contends that it satisfied the second prong of section 113 because it had already filed a "complete" application, as evidenced by the BLM's allowance of publication of Vanderbilt's applications in June 1994. See Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Manual H-3860-1, Processing Mineral Patent Applications IV-1 ("[P]ublication ... should be ordered at such time as the application is complete.") (1991). It argues that Congress would not have placed the application at the mercy of affirmative actions of the Secretary; thus, "fully complied" in the second prong of section 113 refers only to those requirements that can be independently complied with by the applicant-i.e., only the pre-publication steps.
The fact that Vanderbilt's application was "complete" when filed does not necessarily mean it "fully complied" with all the statutory requirements referred to in the second prong of section 113. See Appropriations Act § 113, 108 Stat. at 2519. The language of section 113 does not expressly limit the...
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