R.A. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 07 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-1972, No. 21-1973
• Parties: R.A., Individually, and as lawful guardian ad litem of Minor Child G.A., Plaintiff – Appellee, v. Brady JOHNSON, Defendant – Appellant, and Iredell-Statesville School District Board of Education; Alvera Lesane; Rhonda McClenahan; Alisha Cloer; Andrew Mehall; Robin Johnson, Defendants. R.A., Individually, and as lawful guardian ad litem of Minor Child G.A., Plaintiff – Appellee, v. Alvera Lesane; Rhonda McClenahan; Alisha Cloer, Defendants – Appellants, and Iredell-Statesville School District Board of Education; Brady Johnson; Andrew Mehall; Robin Johnson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

36 F.4th 537

R.A., Individually, and as lawful guardian ad litem of Minor Child G.A., Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.Brady JOHNSON, Defendant – Appellant,andIredell-Statesville School District Board of Education; Alvera Lesane; Rhonda McClenahan; Alisha Cloer; Andrew Mehall; Robin Johnson, Defendants.

R.A., Individually, and as lawful guardian ad litem of Minor Child G.A., Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.Alvera Lesane; Rhonda McClenahan; Alisha Cloer, Defendants – Appellants,andIredell-Statesville School District Board of Education; Brady Johnson; Andrew Mehall; Robin Johnson, Defendants.

No. 21-1972

No. 21-1973

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: May 3, 2022

Decided: June 7, 2022

ARGUED: Sarah Margaret Saint, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellants. Stacey Marlise Gahagan, GAHAGAN PARADIS PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gary S. Parsons, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant Brady Johnson. Virginia M. Wooten, Steven A. Bader, CRANFILL SUMNER LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants Rhonda McClenahan, Alisha Cloer, and Alvera Lesane.

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Judge Motz wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

R.A., the mother of a child in North Carolina's Iredell-Statesville School District, brought various claims against several school employees and administrators for mistreatment her son G.A. experienced at the hands of his teacher. The district court dismissed all claims against the school officials except two on state law negligence grounds. As to those two claims, the school officials filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting that they are entitled to public official immunity under North Carolina law. We agree, and hold that their immunity requires that the state law claims against them be dismissed.

I.

G.A. is a child with autism

spectrum disorder that left him with limited functional communication. R.A. is his mother. In 2017, G.A. began first grade at Cloverleaf Elementary School, part of the Iredell-Statesville School District (ISSD). He was in a special education classroom, and Robin Johnson was his teacher. At that time, appellants were all ISSD and Cloverleaf Elementary administrators: Brady Johnson was ISSD Superintendent, Alvera Lesane was Associate Superintendent for Human Resources, Rhonda McClenahan was Executive Director of Exceptional Children, and Alisha Cloer was principal of Cloverleaf Elementary.¹

In the amended complaint, R.A. alleges that Ms. Johnson repeatedly mistreated G.A. while he was in her class, beginning in the first grade. In one of the most egregious episodes, Ms. Johnson placed G.A. in a trash can and prevented him from getting out for some period of time, telling him that "if he acted like trash, [she] would treat him like trash." J.A. 24. Sometime during that school year, another ISSD employee, Jennifer Bender, observed this behavior and reported what she saw to Cloer, who in turn reported to Mr. Johnson, Lesane, and McClenahan. That report was never forwarded to or investigated by the North Carolina Department of Social Services.

Ms. Johnson remained G.A.'s teacher for second grade the following school year (2018–2019). During that year, according to the complaint, Ms. Johnson continued to mistreat G.A., including by refusing to replace his broken desk so that he had to stand for a prolonged period, spilling hot grease from her lunch on his head, and putting her hands over his mouth to stop him from disturbing other students. R.A. alleges generally that the school officials knew of these ongoing incidents; the school officials assert that these incidents were not reported to them.

When G.A. entered third grade the following year (2019–2020), his special education class was moved to a different school and Ms. Johnson was no longer his teacher. During that year, G.A. told his mother R.A. about Ms. Johnson's actions, including the trash can incident. Another parent, whose child reported similar experiences in Ms. Johnson's classroom, consulted with a therapist, and that therapist questioned other students to confirm the incidents occurred. The therapist then filed a report with the Iredell County Sheriff's Office and the police opened an investigation. Ms. Johnson was placed on administrative leave and later pleaded guilty to two counts of misdemeanor assault on a disabled person.

In December 2020, G.A. and R.A. filed suit against the ISSD Board of Education and several individual defendants, alleging federal constitutional and statutory claims, as well as state law claims for negligence and negligent inflection of emotional distress. Mr. Johnson, Lesane, McClenahan, and Cloer timely moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, asserting, inter alia, that the state law negligence claims against them in their individual capacities were barred by public official immunity under North Carolina law. Upon the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court granted their motion in part and dismissed all federal claims against the appellants.² But as for the state law negligence claims, it denied the school officials' motion to dismiss. It concluded that the school officials were not entitled to public official immunity for a breach of a ministerial duty to report child abuse. The school officials promptly appealed the denial of immunity.

II.

We have jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal. An order denying immunity is immediately appealable when, "under state law, the immunity is an immunity from suit," not merely from liability. Bailey v. Kennedy , 349 F.3d 731, 738 (4th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). That is the case here: in North Carolina, the "essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action," Epps v. Duke Univ., Inc. , 122 N.C. App. 198, 201, 468 S.E.2d 846 (1996) (quotation marks omitted), and so "public official immunity is effectively lost when that public official is forced to go to trial," Wilcox v. City of Asheville , 222 N.C. App. 285, 730 S.E.2d 226 (2012) (quotation marks omitted). We review the denial of state law immunity de novo. Bailey , 349 F.3d at 739.

The public officials here are presumptively entitled to public official immunity for their exercise of discretion in overseeing their school district. And R.A. did not adequately plead any exception that would pierce their immunity. Accordingly, R.A. has failed to state a claim of negligence against the school officials in their individual capacities.

A.

Under North Carolina law, "a public official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto." Smith v. State , 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976) (quoting Smith v. Hefner , 235 N.C. 1, 7, 68 S.E.2d 783 (1952) ). North Carolina courts have recognized this doctrine at common law for over a century. See Epps , 122 N.C. App. at 202, 468 S.E.2d 846. The immunity serves to stem the tide of litigation that might arise if public officers were liable for every arguably negligent discretionary decision they make in the course of their official duties.

North Carolina courts have identified several rationales for a strong immunity defense. For one, the immunity encourages public service, as "it would be difficult to find those who would accept public office or engage in the administration of public affairs if they were to be held personally liable for acts or omissions involved in the exercise of discretion and sound judgment which they had performed to the best of their ability, and without any malevolent intention toward any one who might be affected thereby." Miller v. Jones , 224 N.C. 783, 787, 32 S.E.2d 594 (1945). The immunity also protects a public official in the "honest exercise of his judgment within his jurisdiction, however erroneous or misguided his judgment may be." Templeton v. Beard , 159 N.C. 63, 63, 74 S.E. 735 (1912) (citation omitted). The aim is to enable officials to exercise that judgment free from undue constraint in the innumerable decisions they must make every day. See Epps , 122 N.C. App. at 203, 468 S.E.2d 846. For if officials "were constantly exposed to the threat of personal liability at the hands of disgruntled or damaged citizens," the basis of democratic authority "might well be jeopardized." Id. In sum, North Carolina has chosen to tolerate inevitable mistakes in order to promote "fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government." Wilcox , 222 N.C. App. at 290, 730 S.E.2d 226 (quoting Pangburn v. Saad , 73 N.C. App. 336, 344, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985) ).

In practice, the immunity "precludes suits against public officials in their individual capacities and protects them from liability ‘as long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption.’ " Hart v. Brienza , 246 N.C. App. 426, 431, 784 S.E.2d 211 (2016) (quoting Smith , 289 N.C. at 331, 222 S.E.2d 412 (alterations adopted)). The immunity applies only to public officials, not public employees—a distinction which turns on whether the position is created by statute, exercises sovereign power, and requires discretion. Hare v. Butler , 99 N.C. App. 693, 699–700, 394 S.E.2d 231 (1990) ; Farrell v. Transylvania Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 199 N.C. App. 173, 177, 682 S.E.2d 224 (2009). North Carolina courts have "recognized that school officials such as superintendents and principals" are public officials, in part because they "perform discretionary acts requiring...