R. E. W. Const. Co. v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist.
| Decision Date | 26 March 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 9482,9482 |
| Citation | 400 P.2d 390,88 Idaho 426 |
| Parties | R. E. W. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., a California corporation, and Richard E. White and Betty B. White, Plaintiffs, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT of the State of Idaho, and each and every District Judge thereof, both those duly elected and qualified and any other District Court of the third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Vernon K. Smith, Boise, for plaintiffs.
Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., Richard Weston, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for defendants.
This proceeding arises out of litigation commenced by the plaintiffs herein in the District Court of the Third Judicial District against certain individuals and corporations, doing business under the name and style of Mountain Home Contractors. The district court action is based on an alleged breach of contract for which he plaintiffs seek recovery of damages; the action also sought to restrain the sale of certain real property in trust. Certain of the defendants in the lower court answered the complaint, and interposed a cross-claim.
After numerous motions, notices and other procedural steps taken by the respective parties, the defendants by notice took the depositions of the individual plaintiffs, and demanded production of certain books of account, receipts, vouchers and other records and correspondence involved with the building project, which was the subject of the contract in litigation. At the time of the taking of the deposition, the plaintiffs failed to produce the demanded documents, and the defendants thereupon moved for an order to compel the plaintiffs to present such documents.
On the authority of I.R.C.P. 34, the trial court granted defendants' motion in part.
In the proceedings before this court, the plaintiffs seek to prohibit the defendant district judges from proceeding further with the order to produce entered in the lower court action, and to require the defendant district judges to set the cause for trial in the lower court before a jury.
The record in the district court shows: plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 1, 1962; Mountain Home Contractors filed answer and cross-claim April 4, 1962; plaintiffs filed answer to the cross-claim May 29, 1962; and on August 28, 1962, for the first time plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. Plaintiffs, on September 14, 1962, filed their first 'notice of issue', wherein they stated they had demanded a jury trial, and subsequently on July 8, 1963 and January 23, 1964, filed 'notices of issues', requesting trial by jury.
Plaintiffs in their petition aver that their constitutional rights are being denied because of certain allegedly illegally promulgated rules of civil procedure, particularly referring to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Nos. 26(a) through 26(e) relating to discovery, Rule 34 relating to the copying of documents, Rule 16 relating to pretrial conference procedure, and Rule 38(a) through Rule 38(d) and Rule 39(a) through 39(b) relating to the denial of trial by jury. Plaintiffs further assert that Chapter 90 of 1941 Session Laws (I.C. §§ 1-212, 1-215 incl.), is a delegation of legislative power contrary to Idaho Const. Art. 5, Sec. 13. They also claim that there is a deprivation of their rights to trial by jury as guaranteed by Idaho Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7, by reason of the provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. They further assert prejudice by reason of delay in the proceedings, excessive costs and expenses that must be incurred, and the inconvenience and expenses involved by reason of having to travel from California to Idaho.
Defendants herein moved to quash the writs, and the cause is before this court on the questions of law involved.
Plaintiffs seek to place basic and fundamental concepts concerning the relationship between the legislative power and the judicial power of the state government in issue by these proceedings.
The first of these issues is the authority of this court to adopt the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which the plaintiffs herein have so pointedly and generally attacked.
In 1941 the twenty-sixth session of the legislature enacted Chapter 90, as follows:
'Section 1 (I.C. § 1-212). That the inherent power of the Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure in all the Courts of Idaho is hereby recognized and confirmed.
'Sec. 2 (I.C. § 1-213). That the Supreme Court shall prescribe, by general rules, for all the Courts of Idaho, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, the manner of service, time for appearance, and the practice and procedure in all actions and proceedings. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.
'Sec. 3 (I.C. § 1-214). The Supreme Court is hereby authorized to appoint from among the district judges of Idaho and the members of the organized Bar of Idaho such persons as it deems advisable to assist it in the formulation of such rules.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by order of this court of November 1, 1957. By a subsequent order the effective date of the rules was fixed as November 1, 1958. (Bk. 21 Supreme Court Records, pp. 135, 233.)
Plaintiffs contend that there is no inherent power of this court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for lower courts, and further that the legislature was without power or authority to enact Chapter 90, S.L.1941. The fundamental argument by the plaintiffs in this particular is that Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 13, (as it was in effect at the time of enactment of Chapter 90, S.L.1941, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,) wholly consigned the rule making power to the legislature. Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 13, as it existed at the time involved herein, provided:
'The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this Constitution.'
Idaho Const. Art. 2, § 1, provides:
'The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.'
Plaintiffs contend that such provision of the Constitution prohibits the delegation of the legislative function of adoption of rules of procedure, to another department of government, and renders Ch. 90, S.L.1941 unconstitutional. State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358; 1 Cooley's Const. Limitation 8th Ed. p. 224.
Defendants herein have cited cases to the effect that the authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure for the courts is not solely a legislative function, but that it is, at least, a judicial function,--one that is inherent in the court structure. Illustrative of such authorities is the case of State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court (1928) 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770, wherein the Supreme Court of Washington stated:
'The point here in controversy can be decided upon a far more stable foundation. Assuming the right of the Legislature to make rules for the court, and acknowledging its continued action in that respect, it does not follow that such action is a legislative function. Not all acts performed by a Legislature are strictly legislative in character. A failure to recognize this distinction often gives rise to the belief that one of our lawmaking bodies has abdicated its duty, and attempted to transfer its legislative mantle to the shoulders of another body, not legislative, thereby subverting the purpose of its creation and denying the people of the commonwealth the right to have the laws which govern them enacted by their duly chosen representatives. * * *
'* * *
'We think it follows that the Legislature, although formerly functioning in this state as the source of rules of practice and procedure in the courts, did not, in so doing, perform an act exclusively legislative, and may, if it so desires, transfer that power to the courts without such act being a delegation of legislative power.'
In State v. Roy (1936) 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in considering a statutory enactment similar to Idaho S.L.1941, Ch. 90, stated:
'When the legislature enacted chapter 84, it merely withdrew from a field wherein it had theretofore functioned as a co-ordinate branch of our government with the court in the promulgation of rules of pleading, practice, and procedure. Whether the legislative branch of the government was ever rightfully in the rule-making field, or was a mere trespasser or usurper, need not now be determined. Chapter 84 is not a delegation of power. It is a mere abdication or withdrawal from the rule-making field. It is in effect a relinquishment of the rule-making field to the court. The Legislature, in effect, said to the court: 'You make the rules hereafter.'
'* * *
'Being satisfied as we are that chapter 84 is not a grant of power, there is nothing violative of fundamental law or the Constitution in this, the highest judicial body in the state, to prescribe rules for an inferior judicial body.'
In Burney v. Lee (1942), 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P.2d 308, the Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
'* * *
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 11921
... ... No. 11921 ... Supreme Court of Idaho ... March 4, 1977 ... Rehearing ... , plaintiff's counsel had argued to the district court that Taylor v. KTVB, 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d ... Construction Co. v. District Court of Third Judicial[98 Idaho 291] ... Page 794 ... by Federal Legislation, 1 Hastings Const.Law Q. 39; Note, 53 Bost.U.L.Rev. 497; Note, ... ...
-
Commonwealth v. Stultz
...Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 Ill. L.Rev. 163 (1915).10 See e.g. R.E.W. Construction Co. v. District Court, 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965) ; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950) ; Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss.1975) ; Ammerman......
-
SRBA Case No. 39576, In re
...of the Idaho Constitution provides a shared power to enact "methods of proceeding" in the district courts. R.E.W. Constr. Co. v. District Court, 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965). In R.E.W. Construction,, The use of the words "when necessary" in this portion of the section has reference onl......
-
Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn
...court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues." In R.E.W. Constr. Co. v. Dist. Court of the Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 443, 400 P.2d 390, 401 (1965), this Court stated that, "[i]t is essential that, upon a request for a trial of issues by a ju......