R.W.S., In Interest of, 89-1826

• Decision Date: 20 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-1826,89-1826
• Citation: 162 Wis.2d 862,471 N.W.2d 16
• Parties: In the Interest of R.W.S., a child under the age of eighteen years. R.W.S., Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 16

471 N.W.2d 16

162 Wis.2d 862

In the Interest of R.W.S., a child under the age of eighteen years.

R.W.S., Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent.

No. 89-1826.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 23, 1991.

Decided June 20, 1991.

Virginia A. Pomeroy, Asst. State Public Defender, for appellant-petitioner.

Gregory M. Posner-Weber, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief, was Donald J. Hanaway, for respondent.

CALLOW, Justice.

This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals, In Interest of R.W.S., 156 Wis.2d 526, 457 N.W.2d 498 (Ct.App.1990). The court of appeals affirmed a dispositional order of the Waukesha county circuit court, Judge Kathryn W. Foster, requiring in part that R.W.S. pay $900 restitution as a result of a charge that was "read-in" ¹ and dismissed.

Two issues are before this court: (1) Can a circuit court order restitution in a juvenile proceeding for delinquency petitions which have been dismissed and read-in?, and (2) If so, can a circuit court in a juvenile proceeding order such restitution to be made directly to an insurance company?

We first conclude that the circuit court has the authority to order a juvenile to pay restitution as a result of an offense which forms the basis of a delinquency petition, when the juvenile has admitted that offense and the delinquency petition is dismissed under the read-in procedure. Such an order is consistent with the purposes of the Children's Code (ch. 48, Stats.) generally, and with the specific language of sec. 48.34, Stats. ² We next conclude that the circuit court has the authority to order the juvenile to pay restitution directly to an insurance company which has reimbursed the victim for the loss. We find no reason to limit restitution payments by requiring direct payment to the victim of the crime in cases such as this.

The relevant facts follow. The State filed two "Petitions for Determination of Status" (delinquency petitions) in the circuit court against R.W.S. in July 1988. Each petition related to an incident of alleged burglary, contrary to sec. 943.10(1)(a), Stats. The first petition ("G") alleged that R.W.S. had burglarized the home of his parents on July 1, 1988, taking several bottles of liquor and some stereo equipment. The second petition ("H") alleged that R.W.S. had burglarized his parents' home on June 29 or 30, 1988, taking, among other things, $900 in cash from a safe in the home.

At the dispositional hearing on January 6, 1989, R.W.S. admitted the allegations in petition G. He also admitted that he burglarized his parents' home as alleged in petition H, but denied taking $900 from the safe. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court advised R.W.S. that in exchange for his admission to the allegations in petition G, petition H would be dismissed and "read-in" for purposes of disposition. The circuit court set the restitution amount for stolen and damaged property at $140, pending a hearing on the remaining $900.

After a restitution hearing on February 17, 1989, the circuit court found that the State had proven that R.W.S. took the $900 by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. On February 21, 1989, the court amended the restitution order to $1,040, $940 of which was to be paid to the victims' insurer, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company. On September 11, 1989, the circuit court denied R.W.S.'s motion for reconsideration. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's dispositional order on May 2, 1990. We have accepted R.W.S.'s petition for review pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.62, Stats., and affirm the decision of the lower court.

I.

R.W.S. first argues that the circuit court did not have authority under the Children's Code, ch. 48, Stats., or under the common law to order him to make restitution based on delinquency petitions which were dismissed and read-in. ³ The question of judicial authority is an issue of law and we decide this issue without deference to the lower courts. In Interest of E.C., 130 Wis.2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986).

R.W.S. claims that the circuit court cannot order restitution based upon delinquent acts that have not been adjudicated, because ch. 48, Stats., does not expressly provide for this as a dispositional alternative. R.W.S. argues that there is no statutory authority for "read-ins" in juvenile cases. R.W.S. cites E.C., 130 Wis.2d 376, 390, 387 N.W.2d 72, for the proposition that a circuit court may not order a particular dispositional alternative unless ch. 48 expressly provides for that disposition. R.W.S. contends that the language of sec. 48.34(5)(a), by contrast, clearly limits restitution to damage or injury caused by the act for which the child has been adjudged delinquent.

Subchapter VI of ch. 48, Stats., discusses the disposition of cases in which a child is adjudged to be delinquent. Section 48.335(1) and (5), Stats., provides: "(1) The court shall conduct a hearing to determine the disposition of a case in which a child is adjudged to be delinquent.... (5) At the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall make a dispositional order in accordance with s. 48.355." Section 48.34 further provides: "If the judge adjudges a child delinquent, he or she shall enter an order deciding one or more of the dispositions of the case as provided in this section...." R.W.S. contends that the language of sections 48.335 and 48.34 clearly prohibit an order of restitution unless the child has been adjudged delinquent of the act for which restitution is ordered.

The sections do not explicitly prohibit such an order, however. Both sections refer to dispositions after the child is adjudged to be delinquent, ⁴ without specifically requiring that the restitution be limited to adjudicated acts of delinquency. As the court of appeals concluded, secs. 48.335 and 48.34 are ambiguous because reasonable minds could differ over whether an adjudication of delinquency on each specific offense is a prerequisite for the disposition of that offense. R.W.S., 156 Wis.2d[162 Wis.2d 871] at 529, 457 N.W.2d 498. See also Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis.2d 552, 561, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981).

Because the language of these sections does not explicitly permit or prohibit an order of restitution for read-in delinquent acts, we resort to rules of statutory construction in order to discern the intent of the legislature. This court will examine the scope, subject matter and object of the statute to discern this intent. Pulsfus Poultry Farms v. Town of Leeds, 149 Wis.2d 797, 806, 440 N.W.2d 329 (1989). Additionally, in construing ch. 48, Stats., the entire section and related sections are to be considered. Pulsfus Poultry Farms, 149 Wis.2d at 804, 440 N.W.2d 329. When multiple statutes are contained in the same chapter and assist in implementing the chapter's goals and policy, the statutes should be read in pari materia and harmonized if possible. State v. Amato, 126 Wis.2d 212, 216, 376 N.W.2d 75 (Ct.App.1985). With these principles in mind, we examine the statutes in question.

The legislative purpose of ch. 48, Stats., is provided in sec. 48.01. Section 48.01(2) provides:

This chapter shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives contained in this section. The best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consideration, but the court shall also consider the interest of the parents or guardian of the child, the interest of the person or persons with whom the child has been placed for adoption and the interests of the public.

The term "liberal" is often used to signify an interpretation which produces broader coverage or more inclusive application of statutory concepts. What is called a liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes a statute apply to more things or in more situations than would be the case under a strict construction. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 58.02 (4th ed. 1984). Applying a liberal construction to sec. 48.34 indicates that a child need not be adjudicated delinquent on a specific offense before restitution can be read-in on that offense as a result of a plea agreement. This is because under this interpretation, the statute applies more expansively, and permits the more frequent use of the read-in procedure for restitution. Neither sec. 48.335 nor sec. 48.34 explicitly requires an adjudication of delinquency on the particular offense for which the restitution is ordered before a read-in is permitted. In this case, the circuit court had adjudicated R.W.S. as delinquent on the charge reflected in petition G. R.W.S. admitted to a related offense (the charge reflected in petition H), and agreed that it would be read-in in return for the State's promise not to prosecute based on that offense.

Section 48.34, Stats., provides for several dispositional alternatives available to a judge after he or she adjudges a child delinquent. ("He or she shall enter an order deciding one or more of the dispositions.") Sections 48.34(2) and (5)(a) are both applicable in this instance. R.W.S.'s contention that the circuit court does not have statutory authority to order restitution fails in light of these sections.

The circuit court exercised its authority under sec. 48.34(2), Stats., finding that R.W.S. would benefit from a period of supervision under the Waukesha County Community Human Services Department and placement at Lad Lake. In addition to other conditions and rules of conduct, the court ordered restitution in the amount of $1,040. Section 48.34(2), Stats., authorizes the court to prescribe conditions, "including reasonable rules for the child's conduct ... designed for the physical, mental and moral well-being and behavior of the child." The court of appeals concluded that allowing restitution on a dismissed and read-in charge was a "reasonable rule designed for a child's moral well-being." R.W.S., 156 Wis.2d at 532, 457 N.W.2d 498. While R.W.S. argues that a "reasonable rule" does not include the requirement to pay...