Raab v. City of Ocean City
| Decision Date | 15 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–2147,No. 15–2127,15–2127 |
| Citation | 833 F.3d 286 |
| Parties | Monica Raab, Appellant v. City of Ocean City, New Jersey, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey; Ocean City Police Department ; Officer Jessie Ruch, in his official and individual capacity; John Does (# 1–25), Fictitious Designation ABC Corps. (# 1–25), Fictitious Designation. Monica Raab v. City of Ocean City, New Jersey, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey; Ocean City Police Department ; Officer Jessie Scott Ruch, in his official and individual capacity John Does (1–25), Fictitious Designation ABC Corps, (# 1–25), Fictitious Designation City of Ocean City, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Paul R. Rizzo, Esq. [ARGUED], Nicholas F. Pompelio, Esq., DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, P.C., 15 Mountain Boulevard, Warren, NJ 07059, Attorneys for Appellant/Cross–Appellee Monica Raab
A. Michael Barker, Esq. [ARGUED], Vanessa E. James, Esq., Barker, Gelfand & James, P.C., 210 New Road, Linwood Greene, Suite 12, Linwood, NJ 08221, Attorneys for Appellees/Cross–Appellants City of Ocean City and Ocean City Police Department
Thomas B. Reynolds, Esq. [ARGUED], John J. Bannan, Esq., Reynolds & Horn, P.C., 750 Route 73 South, Suite 202A, Marlton, NJ 08053, Attorneys for Appellee Jessie Ruch
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and VAN ANTWERPEN,* Circuit Judges.
CHAGARES
, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Monica Raab and defendant City of Ocean City, New Jersey (“Ocean City”) both appeal the District Court's denial of their motions for attorney's fees. Raab argues that she is a “prevailing plaintiff,” for purposes of attorney's fee eligibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
, in her civil suit against defendant Ocean City police officer Jessie Ruch. At issue in Raab's appeal is whether a settling plaintiff in a civil rights action can be a “prevailing party” where the district court sua sponte entered a dismissal order incorporating and retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a plaintiff can be a “prevailing party” in such circumstances. Accordingly, we will reverse in part the District Court's order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
At issue in Ocean City's cross-appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, when the District Court had previously granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, and we will affirm the District Court's denial of Ocean City's motion for attorney's fees.
In November 2011, Raab filed a civil complaint against police officer Ruch and his employer, Ocean City. Raab asserted numerous federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
, as well as similar state law causes of action, which all stemmed from an incident in which Ruch detained Raab on May 10, 2010.1 On that day, Ruch stopped his patrol car outside of Raab's residence to investigate a trailer that had been parked on the street for about a month and had no license plate. Ruch believed that the trailer was abandoned and contacted police dispatch to request that it be towed. Shortly thereafter, Raab went outside, spoke with Ruch, and informed him that the trailer belonged to her brother-in-law and that she would move the trailer into her driveway. Ruch told her not to move the trailer, but she still tried. After Raab was unsuccessful in her attempt to move the trailer, she went inside her house to call her husband. She then returned to the driveway and handed the phone to Ruch, who indicated that the trailer would not be towed if it was moved before a tow truck arrived. At that point, another man drove by the house and offered to help move the trailer. With his help, the trailer was moved into the driveway.
Ruch then asked Raab for her name. The parties dispute whether Raab provided her name, and they dispute the resulting physical interaction. Raab alleges that she responded “we are the Raabs,” but that Ruch then grabbed her arm, handcuffed her, and threw her to the ground. Appendix (“App.”) 51–52. She alleges that, while she was on the ground, Ruch repeatedly pulled and twisted the handcuffs, causing her arm to be pulled in different directions and her head to hit the ground several times. Ruch disputes Raab's version of events. He claims that Raab refused to tell him her name, cursed at him, and then pushed him with her forearm. Ruch alleges that he then grabbed Raab by the arm, at which point she started slapping his hand and subsequently fell to the ground on her back. See App. 52. Ruch alleges that Raab, while on the ground, started flailing her legs. Id. Ruch indicated that he believed Raab was having a “psychological episode,” so he decided to detain her and call for his supervisor. Id. When the supervisor arrived, the supervisor called an ambulance for Raab and told Ruch to remove the handcuffs. Later that day, Raab went to her primary care doctor, where she was diagnosed with various injuries.
Notably, approximately one month prior to the May 10 incident, Ruch had received a negative performance notice for failing to detain a suspect in an unrelated incident. The performance notice served as a “training tool” for Ruch, who indicated that this performance notice was “in the back of [his] mind” during the altercation with Raab. App. 7.
Both Ruch and Ocean City filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted in part and denied in part Ruch's motion for summary judgment. The surviving claims against Ruch included federal and state claims for excessive force, a state claim for assault and battery, and a request for punitive damages. The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of Ocean City on all counts, having found that Raab could not establish “ ‘both(1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents; and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate are present’ ” required to succeed on a municipal liability claim. App. 68 (quoting Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)
). Specifically, “[n]o reasonable jury could find that because Officer Ruch was previously told that he should have arrested a domestic violence suspect when probable cause existed to do so, his supervisors communicated a ‘message of approval’ to tackle citizens to the ground every time any suspect is arrested.” App. 70.
Raab and Ruch requested a settlement conference with the Magistrate Judge to whom the case was referred for certain pre-trial proceedings. At a November 25, 2014 settlement conference held by the Magistrate Judge, Raab and Ruch agreed to resolve all outstanding claims for the total sum of $150,000, exclusive of attorney's fees and costs. The parties agreed that the issue of attorney's fees would be determined later by the District Court. Shortly thereafter, Raab filed her motion for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
. Ocean City also filed a fee application with the District Court.
Prior to deciding Raab's and Ocean City's motions for attorney's fees, the District Court entered an Order of Dismissal on January 21, 2015. The order dismissed the action without costs and provided: “The terms of the settlement agreement are incorporated herein by reference and the Court shall retain jurisdiction over such agreement.” App. 230. None of the parties objected to or appealed the District Court's dismissal order. The order did not include the actual terms of the settlement, and the District Court later indicated that it had not seen the settlement terms when it issued the dismissal order. See App. 8. A few days later, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, which simply stated that the parties have “stipulated and agreed that the same be and it is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, exclusive of the pending motions for attorney fees.” App. 231.2
On April 6, 2015, the District Court denied both Raab's and Ocean City's motions for attorney's fees. The District Court held that Raab was not a “prevailing party,” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1988
. As to Ocean City, the District Court held that, although Ocean City was a prevailing defendant, the city had not demonstrated that Raab's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation to justify the awarding of fees. Both Raab and Ocean City timely appealed the denials of their fee applications.
We review a district court's denial of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006)
. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id.(quotation marks omitted). However, if the fee application was denied based on the district court's conclusions on questions of law, our review is plenary. Id.
The first question before us is whether Raab is a “prevailing party” in her action against Ruch. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
, courts may, in their discretion, grant a “reasonable attorney's fee” to a “prevailing party” in certain federal actions, including those proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The District Court held that Raab was not a “prevailing party,” and accordingly did not award attorney's fees. In reaching this holding, the District Court indicated that “a party may only ‘prevail’ by obtaining either a judgment or a court-ordered consent decree.” App. 5. The District Court then determined that Raab had obtained neither:
Plaintiff has not obtained a judgment on the merits; rather, Plaintiff and Officer Ruch entered into a private settlement agreement. Only “enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent...
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