Rabalais v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 77-1272
| Decision Date | 19 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1272,77-1272 |
| Citation | 566 F.2d 518 |
| Parties | 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2579, 83 Lab.Cas. P 10,320 Paul G. RABALAIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Summary Calendar. * |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Alfred B. Shapiro, Alexandria, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard B. Sadler, Jr., Alexandria, La., Andrew M. Kramer, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before THORNBERRY, RONEY and HILL, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Paul Rabalais began work for Dresser Industries in January 1975 but resigned under pressure some six months later when it was discovered that he had omitted from his employment application the fact that his military discharge was less than honorable. 1 However, his union, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local 2518, convinced Dresser to rehire him as a new employee, subject to a 90-day probationary period. He was rehired on this basis in August but was fired, for reasons not disclosed in the record, in November, just within the 90-day period.
Rabalais then invoked the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement, contending that the agreement provided for a 60-day probationary period, but met with no success. Neither the union nor Dresser took the matter to arbitration as provided for in the agreement, and Rabalais then brought this suit against the company. He did not sue the union, and the district court granted Dresser's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Rabalais failed to exhaust contractual remedies and failed to allege a breach by the union of its duty of fair representation. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
An employee who claims a violation by his employer of the collective bargaining agreement is bound by the terms of that agreement as to the method of enforcing his claim. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1971). Ordinarily, he must exhaust the remedies provided in that agreement, but he may bring suit without exhaustion if he can fit within one of three exceptions to this general rule. No exhaustion is necessary if: (1) the union wrongfully refuses to process the employee's grievance, thus violating its duty of fair representation, Vaca v. Sipes, supra ; (2) the employer's conduct amounts to a repudiation of the remedial procedures specified in the contract, id.; Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1967); or (3) exhaustion of contractual remedies would be futile because the aggrieved employee would have to submit his claim to a group "which is in large part chosen by the (employer and union) against whom (his) real complaint is made." Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 330, 89 S.Ct. 548, 551, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). See generally Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1972).
There is no doubt that plaintiff failed to exhaust his contractual remedies. His claim was processed through three stages of the grievance procedure, and at that point either the union or the employer could have taken the matter to arbitration, the final contractual remedy. Our inquiry, then, is whether any of the three exceptions apply.
The first is inapplicable because Rabalais failed to allege that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Lomax v. Armstrong Cork Co., 433 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1970). Similarly, the third exception does not apply, for plaintiff did not allege futility in his complaint. Moreover, under the collective bargaining agreement, the final decision was to be made by an independent arbitrator, thus removing any possibility of the futility problem present in Glover.
Rabalais did allege, however, that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n ex rel. Elliott v. Nat'l Football League
...to a group which is in large part chosen by the employer and union against whom his real complaint is made." Rabalais v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 566 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted).6 The NFLPA only argues the repudiation exception to the exhaustion requirements app......
-
Jefferson County School Dist. No. R-1 v. Shorey
...of the grievance procedure and a refusal to accept an employee's position with respect to a grievance." Rabalais v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir.1978). "An employer can obviously take a stance contrary to that of the employee during the grievance process without being de......
-
Britt v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc.
...Hamilton instead argues that, because Grocers repudiated the remedial procedures specified in the contract, Rabalais v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir.1978), requires that there was no need to exhaust the arbitration rights. We disagree. Grocers alleged misconduct is i......
-
Evans v. Central of Georgia R. Co.
...method of enforcement of his claims. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). See also Rabalais v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 566 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.1979). However, as previously indicated, traditional exceptions to this rule exist. No exhaustion is necessary if (1) t......