Rabel v. New Glarus Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-821-bbc |
| Parties | JOSHUA RABEL, ANDREA RABEL AND N.R., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. NEW GLARUS SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Plaintiffs Joshua and Andrea Rabel and their daughter N.R. filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant New Glarus School District and its employees violated their civil rights by using excessive force against N.R., unlawfully restraining N.R., and retaliating against all of the plaintiffs when N.R.'s parents complained about a lack of supervision during the 2018-19 school year. Now before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims for plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies under federal education law. Dkt. #5. In the alternative, defendant moves for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Plaintiffs argue that they were not required to exhaust their remedies under federal education law, but they do not oppose defendant's alternative motions for a more definite statement or for dismissal of their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
For the reasons below, I am granting defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust with respect to plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claim and denying the motion with respect to plaintiff's excessive force and unlawful seizure claims. In addition, I am granting defendant's alternative motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendant's motion for a more definite statement will be denied as moot.
Plaintiffs allege the following facts in their complaint.
Plaintiffs Joshua and Andrea Rabel are the parents of plaintiff N.R., a 14-year old child diagnosed with down syndrome and autism spectrum disorder. N.R. is enrolled in defendant New Glarus School District. Her education within the district is governed by an individualized education plan (IEP) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).
By the fall of 2018, plaintiffs believed that the services provided to N.R. pursuant to her IEP were not keeping up with her needs. Plaintiffs requested behavioral therapy, which was denied by defendant's special education director, Jennifer Krantz. Even though the denial of behavioral therapy led to increasing struggles for N.R., Krantz remained indifferent to N.R.'s problems and refused to take timely action to provide needed services. As a result of the denial of behavioral therapy, N.R. began having more behavioral outbursts. Defendant used physical force and seclusion to control these outbursts.
Between October 17, 2018 and May 30, 2019, defendant's staff forcibly restrained N.R. at least 74 times on at least 32 separate school days. Krantz reported only 27 of thoseincidents. Many instances of restraint and seclusion were concealed or were not reported. On October 24, 2018, Krantz and another special education teacher removed N.R. from a bathroom. When N.R. resisted, N.R. was placed in a "time out room" with her head down against a desk and made to apologize for her actions. On February 8, 2019, principal Mark Stateler pinned N.R. to the floor twice after N.R. refused to comply with verbal orders, even though she had already been placed in seclusion. On other occasions, Stateler threatened N.R. with physical force if she did not comply with teachers' commands, physically assaulting N.R. when the threats were not successful. All of this occurred even though defendant's staff knew that N.R. was mentally incapable of appreciating and responding favorably to the use of threats and pain to modify her behavior.
On or about March 29, 2019, defendant lost N.R. during the school day. Plaintiffs filed a special education complaint against defendant with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. After plaintiffs filed the complaint, Krantz suspended N.R. on April 15, 17, and 18, 2019, changed N.R.'s school routine to include things known to trigger behavioral outbursts, modified N.R.'s IEP to provide that defendant would contact law enforcement if N.R. struck any staff member three times with intent, failed to provide notice and accommodation to allow N.R. to attend class field trips, and changed N.R.'s school placement to a specialized disability education school outside of New Glarus where she would not interact with her peers who did not have disabilities. From April 23 to June 3, 2019, New Glarus staff called police about N.R. seven times, but none of the calls were made because of weapons, criminal acts, or perceived imminent danger to life or safety.
By the end of the spring semester of 2019, N.R. had experienced significant trauma, which led to her diagnosis and treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder and required trauma-informed care. N.R. has since attended Common Threads in McFarland, Wisconsin, and has been receiving some services through the Center for Behavioral Intervention in New Glarus. Plaintiffs would like to reintroduce N.R. in the local school when it is safe to do so. They seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
OPINIONPlaintiffs assert in their complaint that they are bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the "deprivation of civil rights." Dkt. #1 at ¶ 58. Defendant has filed a motion for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), saying that the complaint does not clearly identify defendant's conduct or the constitutional rights that defendant allegedly violated. Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop., 875 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted) (more definite statement required if pleading "so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response").
Although plaintiffs agree that their claims for relief do not identify the specific constitutional provisions under which they are suing, they point out that the complaint clearly alleges that district officials and staff used "excessive restraint, seclusion, and gratuitous or unnecessary physical force on" N.R. and retaliated against plaintiffs for complaining about it. Dkt. #1 at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs further allege in their complaint thatdefendant has a legal responsibility for these violations as an employer, and knowingly authorized the violations, or at least failed to adequately supervise and train those who committed them. Id. at ¶ 59. These allegations are sufficient to allow defendant to prepare a response. Plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories or identify the applicable law. Chapman, 875 F.3d at 848-49 ().
In any event, plaintiffs have clarified their claims in their response to defendant's motion to dismiss, alleging that (1) defendant's staff violated N.R.'s rights under the Fourth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by using excessive force and improperly seizing her when they restrained and secluded her at school; and (2) defendant's staff (particularly Krantz) retaliated against Joshua and Andrea Rabel for filing a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, in violation of their rights under the First Amendment. Therefore, defendant's motion for a more define statement will be denied as moot.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because they have not satisfied the exhaustion requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82. That Act guarantees children with disabilities a "free, appropriate public education," and requires a public school to provide a disabled student special education and related services in conformity with the student's individualizededucation program. Id. §§ 1401(9)(D), 1412.
To bring a civil action for a violation of the IDEA, a plaintiff must first follow the administrative exhaustion requirements created by the statute. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The exhaustion requirements apply to all claims brought under the IDEA, as well as all claims that could have been brought under the IDEA but are brought under a different statute. Id. § 1415(l). For example, if a student brings a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, or § 1983, contesting the adequacy of a special education program, it is likely that the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA would apply. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743, 755 (2017). However, the only "relief" available under the IDEA is a "free, appropriate public education." Id. at 748 (citing § 1412(a)(1)(A)). Thus, claims requesting relief unrelated to the denial of a free, appropriate public education do not require the plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies. Id. at 754 ().
To determine whether a suit seeks relief available under the IDEA, for denial of a free, appropriate public education, courts must look to the "substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff's complaint." Id. at 752. This does not mean the court should look solely at labels or terms listed in the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 755 (). Rather, the question is whether the essence of the complaint seeksredress for a school's failure to provide a free, appropriate public education. Id. If it does, then exhaustion of administrative remedies is required. Id.
In this instance, plaintiffs bring their claims under § 1983, not the IDEA. They did not attempt to exhaust their claims using IDEA...
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