Rabenberg v. Rigney, No. 20500.

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Writing for the Court: MILLER, Chief Justice.
• Citation: 597 N.W.2d 424,1999 SD 71
• Parties: Joni RABENBERG, Acting Administrator, of the South Dakota Human Services Center, a/k/a George Mickelson Center for the Neurosciences, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Bernard RIGNEY, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 16 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 20500.

597 N.W.2d 424
1999 SD 71

Joni RABENBERG, Acting Administrator, of the South Dakota Human Services Center, a/k/a George Mickelson Center for the Neurosciences, Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Bernard RIGNEY, Appellant

No. 20500.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 24, 1999.

Decided June 16, 1999.

597 N.W.2d 425

Michael D. Stevens of Blackburn, Stevens & Fox, Yankton, for petitioner and appellee

David M. Hosmer and Tamara D. Lee, Yankton, for appellant.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] A patient appeals the trial court's order granting the George S. Mickelson Center for Neurosciences (Center)¹ authority to administer psychotropic medication to him. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Bernard Rigney, who has been diagnosed as chronic paranoid schizophrenic, was involuntarily committed by court order to the Center on February 8, 1996. He remained involuntarily committed until January 6, 1997, at which time he left the Center. On May 23, 1997, he was again involuntarily committed to the Center and at each of his subsequent review hearings was recommitted. On February 3, 1998, Joni Rabenberg, acting director of the Center, petitioned the circuit court for the authority to administer psychotropic medications to Rigney. The court granted the order and Rigney appeals.²

[¶ 3.] On appeal, Rigney raises the following issues:

1. Whether Rabenburg met the burden of production for expert testimony.

2. Whether the criteria required by the statute was met for purposes of imposing the court-ordered psychotropic medication.

3. Whether the order to medicate is unconstitutional because it is overly broad.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 4.] We review the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. In re Estate of O'Keefe, 1998 SD 92, ¶ 7, 583 N.W.2d 138, 139. "Clear error is shown only when, after review of all the evidence, `we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Cleveland v. Tinaglia, 1998 SD 91, ¶ 16, 582 N.W.2d 720, 724 (citations omitted). "Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." Id. "Statutes are interpreted `under a de novo standard of review without deference to the decision of the trial court.'" Id. (quoting In re Estate of Jetter, 1997 SD 125, ¶ 10, 570 N.W.2d 26, 28 (citations omitted)).

DECISION

[¶ 5.] 1. Rabenburg met the requirements of SDCL 27A-12-3.13.

[¶ 6.] SDCL 27A-12-3.13 sets forth the requirements that must be met before a court may issue an order to medicate. It provides as follows:

The administrator or attending psychiatrist or facility director may petition the circuit court for the authority to administer psychotropic medication to an involuntarily committed patient if, in the opinion of the administrator or facility

597 N.W.2d 426

director or attending psychiatrist and the person's treating physician, psychotropic medication will be medically beneficial to the person and is necessary because:

(1) The person presents a danger to himself or others;

(2) The person cannot improve or his condition may deteriorate without the medication; or

(3) The person may improve without the medication but only at a significantly slower rate.

[¶ 7.] Rigney claims that the language of SDCL 27A-12-3.13, specifically the word "and" in the phrase "and the person's treating physician," clearly requires two individuals to testify as to the need for psychotropic medication. He argues that Rabenburg did not meet the statutorily required criteria, because only his treating physician testified at the hearing as to his need for such medication. We find his argument to be without merit.

[¶ 8.] In determining the intent of SDCL 27A-12-3.13, we must look to the statute as a whole and to other statutes relating to the same subject. Maynard v. Heeren, 1997 SD 60, ¶ 13, 563 N.W.2d 830, 835. The "[w]ords and phrases in [the] statute must be given their plain meaning and effect." Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539 (citations omitted). "When a statute's language is clear, certain and unambiguous, our interpretation is confined to declaring its meaning as clearly expressed." Id. (citations omitted).

[¶ 9.] We find the language of SDCL 27A-12-3.13 to be clear, certain, and unambiguous. It clearly sets forth the criteria that must be met before an administrator, attending psychiatrist or facility director may petition the circuit court for the authority to administer psychotropic medication. It requires that two individuals concur as to the need for medication. It does not, as Rigney claims, require the testimony of two individuals as to that need. The statute cannot be interpreted to set forth a testimonial requirement, and this Court cannot "add modifying words to the statute or change the terms." City of Sioux Falls v. Ewoldt, 1997 SD 106, ¶ 13, 568 N.W.2d 764, 767 (citation omitted).³

[¶ 10.] Considering the foregoing, together with a review of the other statutory enactments relating to the same subject, we find no support for Rigney's claim.

[¶ 11.] 2. The statutory requirements for imposing court-ordered psychotropic medication were met.

[¶ 12.] South Dakota recognizes that individuals who are involuntarily committed have the right to refuse psychotropic medication. See SDCL 27A-12-3.12. However, a court may order the administration of the medication if

[it] finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is incapable of consenting to treatment with psychotropic medication because the person's judgment is so affected by mental illness that the person lacks the capacity to make a competent, voluntary, and knowing decision concerning the medication and the administration of the recommended psychotropic medication is essential under the criteria in § 27A-12-3.13[.]

SDCL 27A-12-3.15.

[¶ 13.] SDCL 27A-12-3.13 sets forth the criteria for determining the necessity of

597 N.W.2d 427

the administration of psychotropic medication. It states the criteria as follows

(1) The person presents a danger to himself or others;

(2) The person cannot improve or his condition may deteriorate without the medication; or

(3) The person may improve without the medication but only at a significantly slower rate.

[¶ 14.] Rigney argues that the trial court erred in issuing its order to medicate, because the statutory criteria had not been met. We disagree.

[¶ 15.] Rabenburg called one witness, Dr. Chung Tuan, to testify as to Rigney's condition and his need for psychotropic medication.⁴ Dr. Tuan, who at the time of the hearing had been employed by the Center for twenty-two years, is a board-certified psychiatrist and Rigney's physician. After reviewing his testimony, we find that it was sufficient to support the court's decision. See generally In re Perona, 294 Ill.App.3d 755, 229 Ill.Dec. 11, 690 N.E.2d 1058, 1066 (Ill.App. 4 Dist.1998) (citation omitted) (stating that the testimony of one uncontested expert witness and the defendant's behavior in court are sufficient to meet burden of proof).

[¶ 16.] First, Dr. Tuan's testimony supported the court's finding that Rigney was unable to make a competent, informed and voluntary...