Rabin v. Fivzar Associates, 90 Civ. 4869 (RWS).
Citation | 801 F. Supp. 1045 |
Decision Date | 10 July 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90 Civ. 4869 (RWS).,90 Civ. 4869 (RWS). |
Parties | Sheldon RABIN, on his own and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FIVZAR ASSOCIATES, BPSC Corporation, Integrated Resources Equity Corporation, First Nationwide Bank (c/o FNS Corporate Funding, Inc.), Gaincred II Corp., Gaincred III Corp. and Bach Associates, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Beigel & Sandler, Ltd., New York City (Bijan Amini, Elizabeth M. Toll, of counsel), for plaintiff Sheldon Rabin.
Anderson Kill Olick & Oshinsky, P.C., 666 Third Avenue, New York City (Steven M. Pesner, Robert H. Pees, of counsel), for defendant Fivzar Associates.
Rogers & Wells, New York City (Jonathan M. Herman, of counsel), for defendants BPSC Corp., Integrated Resources Equity Corp., Gaincred II Corp. and Gaincred III Corp.
Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & Laboon, Dallas, Tex. (David Brown, of counsel), for defendant Bach & Associates, Inc.
Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York City (James L. Stengel, of counsel), for First Nationwide Bank.
Plaintiff Sheldon Rabin ("Rabin") has moved for an order pursuant to § 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 ( ), reinstating his claims under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("§ 10(b)") against the defendants in this action.1 For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
Rabin, a resident of Great Neck, New York filed this suit on July 23, 1990, alleging claims under § 10(b) and state law (the "Complaint"). Rabin's claims arose out of his investment in a limited partnership known as BP Associates Limited Partnership ("BP Associates"), which was organized in 1985 to acquire, improve, own, operate and eventually sell the BP Shopping Center. Rabin purchased his limited partnership interests in BP Associates some time in 1986, allegedly in reliance on certain allegedly fraudulent Offering Materials prepared, issued, distributed and communicated by the defendants. The complaint was subsequently amended and served on October 24, 1990 (the "Amended Complaint").
In December of 1990 the defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint contending, among other things, that the § 10(b) claims were time-barred under Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.1990). In light of the Supreme Court's June 20, 1991 decision in Lampf, Plevis, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321, reh. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 27, 115 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1991), on July 2, 1991, this court denied the motion to dismiss as well as Rabin's motion for class certification with leave to renew based on Lampf. On July 10 and 12, 1991, the Defendants renewed their motion. By request of the parties, decision on the motion was deferred pending rehearing of the Lampf decision, and, on October 3, 1991, this court dismissed the § 10(b) claims as time-barred under Lampf's one-year/three-year uniform federal statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions, which was made retroactive by James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (hereinafter "Beam"). Final judgment was entered on January 15, 1992.
On December 19, 1991, President Bush signed into law § 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 ( ), which proscribed pro forma retroactive application of the Lampf rule. New section 27A provides that:
Rabin now moves pursuant to § 27A(b) for reinstatement of his § 10(b) claims. The Defendants oppose the motion on the grounds that (1) Rabin's claims are untimely even under the law as it existed in this Circuit on June 19, 1991 and (2) § 27A is unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers principles and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Oral argument was heard on April 15, 1992. The parties made further submissions, the last of which was received on June 2, 1992. On June 24, 1992, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2304, the court notified the United States Attorney General that the constitutionality of § 27A was under challenge advised it of its right to intervene.2
A federal court is not to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 2997, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) . Thus, before reaching the defendants' constitutional challenge, it must first be determined whether Rabin's § 10(b) claims were timely filed under the statute of limitations applicable under § 27A(b).
There is no dispute that Rabin has established three of the four elements necessary for reinstatement pursuant to § 27A(b): he filed this action prior to June 19, 1991; his claims were dismissed as time-barred subsequent to June 19, 1991; and he brought his motion to reinstate on February 3, 1991, within 60 days of the enactment of § 27A on December 19, 1991.
The defendants contend, however, that Rabin's § 10(b) claims would not have been timely under "the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991." There is no dispute that "the jurisdiction" to which the court must look for the applicable law in this case is the Second Circuit.
On June 19, 1991, the statute of limitations for § 10(b) claims within this jurisdiction was the one-year/three-year period established in Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.1990) "applied sparingly in light of the retroactivity principles enunciated in Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.1991) ("Welch I"), vacated and remanded sub nom., Northwest Savs. Bank PaSa v. Welch, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2882, 115 L.Ed.2d 1048 aff'd, 946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.1991) ("Welch II")." Henley v. Slone, 961 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir.1992).
In Ceres, the Second Circuit followed the Third and Seventh Circuits in adopting a uniform statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions of one year after the discovery of the alleged fraud and three years after the occurrence of the alleged conduct. Ceres, 918 F.2d at 359 (following Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir.1990); In re Data Access Sys. Secs. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S.Ct. 131, 102 L.Ed.2d 103 (1988)). The court thereby broke from its longstanding practice of applying the forum state's most analogous state statute of limitations, including so-called "borrowing statutes," to claims under § 10(b). See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir.1983); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 769, 54 L.Ed.2d 783 (1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.1977). Although the Ceres court left for the future the question of whether its rule was to have retroactive effect, see id. at 364, the Second Circuit soon dispelled any suspense about the matter in Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.) ("Welch I"), vacated and remanded sub nom., Northwest Savs. Bank, PaSa v. Welch, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2882, 115 L.Ed.2d 1048 aff'd, 946 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.1991). After conducting the three-part test set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Welch I court held that the limitations period established in Ceres did not apply retroactively to the case before it.
The effect of Welch I, therefore, was to establish that the retroactive application of Ceres must be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the Chevron test. See Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 751-52 (2d Cir.1992); Grondahl v. Merritt & Harriss, Inc., 964 F.2d 1290, 1292 (2d Cir.1992); Henley, 961 F.2d at 25-26.3 If retroactive application is denied, the court returns to the Second Circuit's prior practice of applying the most analogous state statute of limitations.
Because Rabin commenced this action prior to Ceres, a determination of the retroactivity question is necessary. To qualify for purely prospective application under the Chevron/Welch I test, Ceres Welch I, 923 F.2d at 993 (quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355). Satisfaction of only the first element is mandatory. "If the proponent of nonretroactivity clears the...
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