Rabiner v. Bacon

Decision Date06 March 1967
Docket NumberNo. 18440.,18440.
PartiesLouis RABINER and Lena Rabiner, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. Ernest W. BACON, Director of Internal Revenue, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Donald L. Sturm, Omaha, Neb., for petitioners; John H. Mitchell and John J. Murray, Fort Dodge, Iowa, on the brief.

Thomas L. Stapleton, Attorney, Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee; Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Melva M. Graney, Attorneys, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Donald M. Statton, U. S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief.

Before BLACKMUN, MEHAFFY and LAY, Circuit Judges.

MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, taxpayer, brought suit in the District Court seeking refund of a portion of income taxes paid for the fiscal years 1960, 1961 and 1962.1 Taxpayer contends that income derived from receipts of rents under a contract whereby Davis Brothers Construction Company could excavate sand, gravel and dirt from his property was treated as ordinary income, subject to depletion allowance, when said income should have been treated as capital gains. The document ran for five years and taxpayer's income from that property was solely dependent upon production during that period.

The District Court, The Honorable Roy L. Stephenson, in a memorandum opinion reported at 252 F.Supp. 825, held that taxpayer's income was derived from a lease agreement calling for removal of minerals rather than a sale of same, and that taxpayer thereby retained an economic interest in the mineral deposits; thus income derived therefrom constituted ordinary income.2 The District Court also held that the taxpayer was holding the minerals primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and for that additional reason his income therefrom was properly taxed as ordinary income.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291. We affirm.

This case was tried to the District Court upon the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, stipulations and exhibits. There is no dispute concerning the facts.

In 1938 taxpayer bought a two hundred eighty acre farm, including forty-five acres containing sand and gravel deposits, from which taxpayer and Richard Paul began selling sand and gravel. This operation continued until 1942. Thereafter, taxpayer leased the property to various lessees for the purpose of removing sand, gravel and dirt by documents similar to the one with Davis Brothers Construction Company. Taxpayer first leased the property to Davis Brothers Construction Company in 1954 and then again in 1957 for a period extending through 1962. The contract was designated by the parties as a "Lease Contract" and referred to throughout as a lease. The contract is couched in simple language and is unambiguous. It described taxpayer's entire real property and the portion thereof leased to Davis Brothers "for the purpose of removing sand, gravel and dirt therefrom." It obligated Davis Brothers to pay "rent" at a fixed price per ton for the material removed. Aside from not requiring any minimum operation, it is a usual and simple form of mining lease designating the royalty as "rent"; the method of determining the tonnage; the requirement for keeping records; the place and time for payments; and the rights of entry and Davis Brothers' agreement not to interfere with farming operations. The agreement restricted Davis Brothers' rights in the premises to the removal of sand, gravel and dirt.

In our view, the sole issue here is controlled by the teachings of the Supreme Court commencing with the cases of Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 74, 77 L.Ed. 199 (1932) and Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L.Sd. 489 (1933).3 In Burnet, supra, the Supreme Court held that income of a lessor from a mineral lease was taxable as ordinary income and not as a gain from "sale" of capital assets. The opinion in Burnet, supra, described the purpose of the capital gains statute as affording relief to a taxpayer from the impact of taxation on a transaction involving sales of property usually held over a period of years. The Supreme Court pointed out that payments to lessors under mining leases were not a conversion of capital but constituted income like the payment of rent. It is singular to note that the document involved here describes the taxpayer's income as rent.

Palmer v. Bender, supra, first articulated the "economic interest" concept which doctrine has been recognized by the Supreme Court to the present time. Since Palmer, supra, it appears to be settled law that in any mining agreement where a taxpayer retains an economic interest in minerals owned, the transaction should not be considered a sale entitling the owner to capital gains treatment, but as ordinary income subject to the statutory depletion allowance. For a later discussion by the Supreme Court on the "economic interest" concept, see Paragon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 85 S.Ct. 1207, 14 L.Ed.2d 116 (1965). This case also approved the Treasury Regulation on the subject which provides:

"* * * An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place or standing timber and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the mineral or severance of the timber, to which he must look for a return of his capital. * * *" Treas.Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1).

There has been much litigation on this subject and a reading of the many cases indicates that it is not always easy to draw a distinction between a transaction constituting a sale of minerals and one which retains an economic interest in the minerals. We do not perceive any such difficult problem here, as certainly there is nothing in the "Lease Contract" between taxpayer and Davis Brothers to remotely suggest a sale of capital assets. We realize that the descriptive language of the document will not...

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22 cases
  • Rutledge v. United States, 28432.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • June 22, 1970
    ...F.2d 769; Belknap v. United States, 6 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 737; Schreiber v. United States, 7 Cir., 1967, 382 F.2d 553; Rabiner v. Bacon, 8 Cir., 1967, 373 F.2d 537; Alkire v. Riddell, 9 Cir., 1968, 397 F.2d 779, United States v. White, 10 Cir., 1968, 401 F.2d 610 (en II. The concept of "ec......
  • Lesher v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • November 26, 1979
    ...other cases, taxpayers had an ongoing stake in the extraction. Pleasanton Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 510 (1975); Rabiner v. Bacon, 373 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1967). Petitioners further argue that they must have intended to dispose of their entire interest in the gravel deposits because......
  • Wood v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • May 11, 1967
    ...appeals. The two most recent decisions that deal with the issue at hand lend strong support to the government's position. Rabiner v. Bacon, 8th Cir. 1967, 373 F.2d 537, the Eighth Circuit dealt with a "Lease Contract" for the removal of sand and gravel. Aside from the fact that it stipulate......
  • Estate of Walker v. CIR
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • July 12, 1972
    ...the material by the New Jersey Highway Authority. 9 See also, Schreiber v. United States, 382 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1967); Rabiner v. Bacon, 373 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1967); Freund v. United States, 367 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1966); Samuel L. Green v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 35 T.C. 1065 ...
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