Rachel Canter, Administratrix of David Canter, Deceased Claimant v. the American Insurance Company and Ocean Insurance Company of New York, Appellants

• Decision Date: 01 January 1830
• Citation: 7 L.Ed. 688,3 Pet. 307,28 U.S. 307
• Parties: RACHEL CANTER, ADMINISTRATRIX OF DAVID CANTER, DECEASED, CLAIMANT v. THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND OCEAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, APPELLANTS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

28 U.S. 307

3 Pet. 307

7 L.Ed. 688

RACHEL CANTER, ADMINISTRATRIX OF DAVID CANTER, DECEASED, CLAIMANT v. THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND OCEAN INSURANCE

COMPANY OF NEW YORK, APPELLANTS.

January Term, 1830

THIS case was heard at January term 1828, upon questions submitted to the court, on an appeal from the circuit court of the district of South Carolina. 1 Peters, 511. The court then decided in favour of the claimant, and directed restitution of the cotton, which was the subject of the controversy between the parties; having affirmed the decree of the circuit court of South Carolina. By the mandate to the circuit court it was ordered, 'that such execution and proceedings be had, as according to right and justice, and according to the laws of the United States, ought to be had.' Upon the filing of the mandate the circuit court ordered, 'that the case be put on the docket, and it be referred to the officer of this court to examine into the damages sustained by the claimant, David Canter, in consequence of the proceedings of the libellants, and report thereon at as early a day as possible to this court.

The appellant, David Canter, thereupon filed in the circuit court 'a statement of damages sustained by him, by the illegal seizure of three hundred and fifty-six bales of cotton, by order of the underwriters.'

The statement set forth losses on the sales of the cotton, and expenses and payments connected with the same, amounting to $3639 87. Losses and probable gain on sales of rice purchased by the appellants, and which was sold instead of being shipped, in consequence of the proceedings of the appellees; the cost of protest and damages on a bill of exchange drawn by him, and dishonoured in consequence of the seizure of the cotton; law expenses at Charleston and Columbia, in South Carolina, and in Washington, and travelling expenses to and in Washington; papers from Key West, relative to judicial proceedings there; postages and protests, costs of the supreme court of the United States, and briefs; loss in the value of the cotton during the pendency of the proceedings, $2860.

The counsel for the appellees filed with the register of the court a protest against the order of reference made by the circuit court, to ascertain the damages alleged to have been sustained by the appellant, on the grounds, 1. That the mandate of the supreme court of the United States gives no authority or instructions to the circuit court to inquire into damages. 2. That the decrees of the district, circuit, and supreme court, do not award damages to the appellant. 3 That the appellees were not in any manner liable for damages. 4. That at all events, the inquiry into damages cannot extend beyond the amount of the stipulations entered into by the appellees in the original proceedings, by which alone they are before the court.

The clerk of the circuit court refused all the claims preferred by the appellant, with the exception of the following:

Papers from Key West, to establish legality of proceedings

there, $51, postages and protests, $20. $71 00

Costs of the supreme courts and briefs, $72.02, protest and

damages on bill drawn by claimant, $222. 294 02

This grew out of the cotton speculation, the bill was dishonored

in consequence of the seizure, the claimant not being in

funds to take up the draft.

Connsel fees, at Charleston and Washington. 1150 00

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$1515 02

Also the loss on the sale of the cotton, which was made before the proceedings were instituted against the cotton, and which sale was not completed by reason of the same, with interest on the balance of the sale after deducting the actual proceeds of the cotton, when sold by order of the district court $3991 77; and also the actual loss on the rice purchased, to be paid for out of the proceeds of the cotton, rejecting the claim of probable profits, the sum actually allowed being $2820 67.

These allowances were all excepted to by the appellees, and the appellant also excepted to the refusal of the clerk of the circuit court to admit all of the claims preferred in 'the statement.'

The circuit court refused to allow to the appellant any of the items reported by the clerk, with the exception of some of those comprehended in the 'incidental expenses.' As to those items, the clerk rejected the sum of $222 for protests and damages on a bill of exchange, and ordered the counsel fees of the appellant to be paid under the mandate, upon the authority of the Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, as the costs awarded him by the supreme court $1372 82.

The appellant appealed to this court.

At the last term Mr Cruger moved to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the mandate from this court gave no authority to the circuit court of south Carolina to assess damages to the appellant. This motion was opposed by Mr Coxe, for the appellant; and the court ordered the cause to be argued upon all the questions it involved, when it should be regularly called.

At this term, Mr Coxe for the appellant contended; that the decree of the circuit court from which the former appeal was taken, left the question of damages open. That appeal was taken by the claimants in the circuit court, now the appellees, and it was from a decree, in its nature interlocutory, and not final; and if this was not so, it was the act of those who are now appellees, and cannot prejudice the rights of the appellant.

In the case now before the court, the appeal has been taken by Canter only, and not by those who claimed the cotton. The only question therefore in this court is, whether sufficient damages have been awarded, as no cross appeal was entered, and there can be no inquiry whether damages may be assessed at all; this having been decided in the circuit court. The appellee cannot here impugn the decree below upon this point.

Is this then a case for damages, or rather for full compensation?

The entire record is now before this court; the pleadings and the evidence which were under consideration during the last term, still constitute a part of the case upon which the decision must be based.

It will be recollected that the claimant became the proprietor of the cotton at Key West, where it was found in the possession of certain salvors. The libellants were present, by their agent, who was cognizant in the proceedings, acquiesced in them, and received the portion of the proceeds of sale to which they were entitled. The captain of the wrecked vessel was also present, and all participated in what was done there.

No proceedings were ever instituted by the libellants against the authors or abettors of the acts of which they complained. No attempt was ever made to arrest them in the progress of the business, to punish them afterwards, or to pursue the money in their hands. All was reserved for this innocent purchaser. Innocent he was, for this court has decreed the sale to be valid, and his title to be incontrovertible; innocent as regards them, for he did no one act in which they had not concurred.

They avowed their object to be to break up these proceedings at Key West; and this was to be effected by the ruin of this claimant.

This court has definitively settled the question of right between these parties; the libellants had no interest in the cotton, the subject matter of the suit. It was the property of the claimant.

In the prosecution of this suit against him, however, he has been deprived of this property; he has incurred heavy expenses and losses, and he asks not vindictive damages; he asks nothing nomine paenae; he merely asks to be placed in the situation he would have occupied had these proceedings never been instituted against him. He claims in fact nothing which may not properly be awarded under the name of restitution. This is emphatically the case in regard to the first item. The property has long since been disposed of; it probably has no longer an existence; restitution in specie must be had; the mandate of this court cannot be literally executed.

This has been rendered impracticable by the acts of libellants. They seized upon the article; they withdrew it from the control of the claimant. While thus retained by them, it is so disposed of, that the owner can never be restored to the actual enjoyment of it. What then are his rights, and what will satisfy the order of this court that the property shall be restored?- He had entered into an actual contract to sell it for $17,425; that amount of money was in fact and in substance the object of the suit. The claimant had no right to the cotton which he had sold. He had a right to this amount of purchase money, and that was what the libellant sought to obtain from him. That was substituted in lieu of the cotton. To that sum, then, which was the real value of the cotton to him, the amount for which it had been sold, he is now entitled under the decree for restitution. This would have been the measure of damages had Canter brought trover for these goods. Kennedy vs. Strong, 14 Johns. 128. In replevin the same result would have happened; and it is stated by the court to be no more than an indemnification. Rowley vs. Gibbs, 14 Johns. 385.

But this seizure has been decided to be illegal and groundless. It was made upon a claim of right which has been disaffirmed. It is essentially a seizure without probable cause.

In the case of Gelston vs. Hoyt, 13 Johns. 30, and 3 Wheat. 46, it was held in the state courts as well as here, that a decree of restitution was conclusive, that the seizure was illegal, and that where such seizure was made without legal process, such decree intitled the party to recover in an action of trespass to the amount of the damage actually sustained by the seizure. Here the seizure was made through the intervention of the process of the court, but the only difference which is thereby produced is, that the claimant is not compelled to resort to an action of trespass to recover his damages; they may be awarded in the principal suit.

The...