Rachel H. v. Dep't of Educ.

• Citation: 868 F.3d 1085
• Decision Date: 29 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 14-16382,14-16382
• Parties: RACHEL H., by and through her parents, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, State of HAWAII, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

868 F.3d 1085

RACHEL H., by and through her parents, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, State of HAWAII, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14-16382

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 15, 2017 Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed August 29, 2017

Jay S. Handlin (argued), New York, New York, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Kaliko'onalani D. Fernandes (argued), Holly T. Shikada, and Gary S. Suganuma, Deputy Attorneys General; Clyde J. Wadsworth, Solicitor General; Douglas C. Chin, Attorney General; Department of the Attorney General, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Defendant–Appellee.

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Rachel H.'s parents brought suit on her behalf against the Hawaii Department of Education, alleging she was denied a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This alleged denial did not stem from any substantive failure to include any particular special education service in her individualized education program. Rather, Rachel's parents argued their daughter was denied a free appropriate public education because of a purported procedural error, specifically, not identifying the anticipated school where special education services would be delivered in light of a planned move to a new school district. Because we hold the IDEA does not require identification of a particular school in every instance, we affirm the district court's summary judgment for the Hawaii Department of Education.

I.

Rachel has Down syndrome

, but this has not stopped her from spending "her entire educational life fully included with typical students in a general education setting." In 2012, Rachel was finishing ninth grade at a private school paid for, in part, by the Hawaii Department of Education (Department) under a settlement agreement with Rachel's parents. In May of that year, the Department held an individualized education program (IEP) meeting to determine the special education services Rachel would receive in the upcoming school year. During the meeting, Rachel's father urged the Department to continue paying for Rachel's tuition at the private school, but the Department declined. Although agreeing that Rachel qualified for numerous special education services, including one-on-one adult support, the Department's offer of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) provided that her IEP would be "implemented on a public school campus."

At the time of the May 2012 IEP meeting, all parties involved understood that the "public school campus" offered by the Department was Kalani High School. However, neither Rachel's IEP nor the prior written notice of the proposed changes formally identified the anticipated school where Rachel's tenth grade IEP would be implemented.

Rachel's parents did not sign the May 2012 IEP. A few months later, Rachel's father informed the Department that the family was moving to Kailua, approximately 20 to 30 miles from Kalani High School. Consequently, according to Rachel's father, "Kalani [would] under no circumstances be Rachel's local public high school" given the distance from the school to their new home. He again demanded to enroll Rachel in private school at public expense.

The Department did not accede to this demand. On July 30, 2012, it wrote Rachel's parents that the May 2012 IEP was "not specific to Kalani High School." Instead, the IEP was "based on [Rachel's] current strengths and needs." Accordingly, the Department asked for the family's new address in Kailua "so the location where Rachel's IEP can be implemented can be determined." "Until [the family's] move," Rachel could attend Kalani High School if her parents wished. The Department also informed Rachel's father that, should he enroll her in private school, such enrollment would be considered a "unilateral placement at parents' expense."

The Department never proposed a new IEP meeting in light of the family's move. Nor did it ever identify a school in Kailua that could meet Rachel's special education needs. It did, however, repeatedly ask for the family's new address. Rachel's father ignored these requests until January 2013, when, in addition to giving the Department the family's new address, he filed a due process hearing request on behalf of Rachel, arguing that the Department had denied Rachel a FAPE by not identifying the anticipated school where Rachel's IEP would be implemented. He did not raise any substantive challenge to Rachel's IEP. In response, the Department argued it had complied with the IDEA's requirements and that Rachel's IEP could "be implemented on a public school campus."

An administrative hearings officer concluded that the May 2012 IEP had offered Rachel placement at Kalani High School and that the July 30, 2012 letter had not amended that offer to include any public school in Kailua. Instead, he viewed the July letter as a first step in determining which school in Kailua could serve Rachel's needs while continuing to offer Kalani High School as an option in the interim. After Rachel's parents filed this action in federal court for review of the hearings officer's decision, the district court affirmed, reasoning that an IEP need not necessarily identify a specific school where it would be implemented to comply with the IDEA. Rachel timely appealed.

II.

Congress enacted the IDEA because many children with disabilities "were excluded completely from any form of public education or were left to fend for themselves in classrooms designed for education of their nonhandicapped peers." Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 191, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). To remedy this problem, Congress offered states federal money and, in exchange, required states to provide a FAPE to all children with qualifying disabilities through the provision of special education services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). These special education services must be outlined in an IEP, "the centerpiece of the statute's education delivery system." Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE–1 , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 988, 994, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017) (quoting Honig v. Doe , 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) ). Each IEP is crafted by a team of the individuals most critical to a child's success, including parents, teachers, and school officials. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Their task is to develop a "comprehensive plan" that is " ‘tailored to the unique needs' of a particular child." Endrew F. , 137 S.Ct. at 994 (quoting Rowley , 458 U.S. at 181, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ).

A complete IEP that is fully compliant with the IDEA must be in place at the beginning of each school year for all children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F. , 137 S.Ct. at 999. To accomplish this goal, the IEP team must consider a child's current levels of academic achievement, describe how a child's disability affects his or her ability to perform, and set measurable goals of academic progress for the upcoming year through the provision of special education services. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). As relevant here, an IEP must contain "the projected date for the beginning of the services and modifications described in subclause (IV), and the anticipated frequency, location , and duration of those services and modifications." Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (emphasis added).¹

This appeal concerns the meaning of "location" in § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII). If, as Rachel's father argues, "location" means the specific school where an IEP will be implemented, then at the beginning of the 2012–13 school year the Department failed to have in place an IEP that identified an anticipated school in Kailua, Rachel's new home town, where special education services would be delivered. If, on the other hand, "location" does not mean the specific school, then the district court correctly affirmed dismissal of Rachel's claims. We hold "location" does not necessarily include the specific school where special education services will be implemented. We therefore affirm.

The IDEA does not define the term "location." See 20 U.S.C. § 1401. "When interpreting a statute, the court begins with the statutory text and interprets ‘statutory terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning, unless the statute clearly expresses an intention to the contrary.’ " I.R. ex rel. E.N. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. , 805 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Neal , 776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2015) ). Here, the ordinary dictionary definitions of the term "location" do not reveal what Congress intended by the term in this context. See Location , American Heritage Dictionary 1029 (5th ed. 2011) ("A place where something is or could be located...."); Location , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("The specific place or position of a person or thing."); Location , Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1327 (2002) ("a position or site occupied or available for occupancy (as by a building) or marked by some distinguishing feature "). These definitions generally define "location" as a specific place or position. In the context in which the term is used in § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII), this could plausibly refer to a specific school, a specific classroom, or a specific type of classroom or educational environment—such as a regular classroom, a special education classroom or a resource room. The ordinary meaning of the term location therefore does not resolve the question presented here. We therefore turn to the tools of statutory interpretation employed to give meaning to a statute's ambiguous terms.

The United States Department of Education (USDOE), charged with enforcing the IDEA, also has not defined the term. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.4 – 45. Nor has it...