Radfar v. City of Revere
| Decision Date | 09 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-cv-10178-IT |
| Parties | SHARON RADFAR, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF REVERE, BRIAN M. ARRIGO, individually and in his official capacity as Mayor, JAMES GUIDO, individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Police, JOSEPH I. COVINO, individually and in his official capacity as Police Sergeant, and OTHER AS YET UNNAMED OFFICERS OF THE REVERE POLICE DEPARTMENT, individually and in their official capacities as police officers, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
In this action, Plaintiff Sharon Radfar brings civil rights and tort claims against Defendant Police Officer Joseph Covino, the City of Revere, Revere Mayor Brian M. Arrigo, former Revere Police Chief James Guido, and other unnamed officers of the Revere Police Department. Complaint (“Compl.”) [#1].[1] Before the court are Covino's omnibus Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its Entirety Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Special Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Costs and Reasonable Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws c. 231 [#9] (“Covino's Mot.”) and City of Revere, Brian M. Arrigo, and James Guido's (the “Revere Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss [#18]. For the reasons that follow, Covino's Motion [#9] is DENIED and the Revere Defendants' Motion [#18] is ALLOWED. I. Background
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint [#1] the well-pleaded allegations of which are taken as true for the purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss. See Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff Sharon Radfar is a former George Mason University police officer. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 19 [#1].
Defendant Brian M. Arrigo is the Mayor of the City of Revere. Id. at ¶ 2.
Defendant James Guido was Chief of the Revere Police Department at the time of the alleged events. Id. at ¶ 3.
Defendant City of Revere is a government entity organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. at ¶ 5.
Defendant Joseph Covino is a police officer with the Revere Police Department in Revere, Massachusetts, and, during the events alleged in the Complaint [#1], was a sergeant Id. at ¶ 4.
In January 2017, Covino created an incident report in the Revere Police Department system which included false allegations concerning Plaintiff's behavior towards him and others. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 57. In this incident report, Covino identified himself as the victim, the reporting officer, and the supervising officer approving the report. Id. at ¶ 12.
Also in January 2017, Covino filed a false and misleading Complaint for Protection from Abuse in Lynn District Court in Massachusetts and appeared for a hearing before a Lynn District Court judge. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8. Covino falsely told the Lynn District Court judge that Plaintiff had threatened him and placed him in imminent fear of physical harm when she had done nothing of the kind; Covino also misrepresented messages and calls exchanged between Plaintiff and Covino and failed to disclose other pertinent information to the Lynn District Court judge. Id. at ¶ 7. Following this hearing, the Lynn District Court judge issued an Abuse Prevention Order. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.
Around the same time, Covino contacted Plaintiff's employer and falsely alleged Plaintiff had engaged/was engaging in criminal conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9.
On January 31, 2017, four uniformed officers seized Plaintiff's service weapons and gave her the Abuse Prevention Order and a letter from her employer informing her she was suspended pending an investigation of Covino's allegations of criminal conduct. Id.
Later, following a hearing attended by Plaintiff and Covino, the Lynn District Court judge vacated the Abuse Prevention Order and ordered Plaintiff's weapons returned. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 16.
Covino also contacted Virginia law enforcement entities and falsely alleged that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal conduct, id. at ¶¶ 10, 16; Defendant did not inform Virginia investigators that the Abuse Prevention Order was vacated. Id. at ¶ 17. As a result of these investigations, Plaintiff's private telephone records were the subject of a search warrant. Id. at ¶ 15.
Plaintiff later lost her job as a George Mason University police officer. Id. at ¶ 11.
Plaintiff was not charged with any crimes in Virginia or Massachusetts related to Covino's allegations. Id. at ¶ 16.
Plaintiff's Complaint [#1] concerns events she alleges occurred in 2017. On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed her Complaint [#1] asserting claims of abuse of process (Count IX) and malicious prosecution (Count X) against Defendant Covino only, id. at ¶¶ 52-59; deliberate indifference to the need for training (Count VI) against the Revere Defendants only, id. at ¶¶ 42-43; and claims against all Defendants for: (1) violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution to equal protection under law (Count I); (2) violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by selective prosecution and enforcement based on gender and national origin bias (Count II); (3) defamation (Count III); (4) deprivation of civil rights through intimidation and coercion in violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (Count IV); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); (6) conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) & (3) (Count VII); and (7) refusal to prevent wrongs committed against Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count VIII), id. at 7-12.
The Revere Defendants moved to dismiss the counts directed towards them pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Revere Defs.' Mot. Dismiss [#18].
Covino moved to dismiss the Complaint [#1] and for costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231 § 59H (the “Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law”) and also moved to dismiss the Complaint [#1] pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Covino's Mot. [#9]. Covino's Attachment A [#9-1] includes: Covino's Complaint for Protection from Abuse; Covino's affidavit describing the facts he alleges led him to file the Complaint for Protection from Abuse; the Abuse Prevention Order; and the Order terminating the Abuse Prevention Order. Attachment B [#9-2] is an affidavit detailing Covino's account of the relationship between Covino and Plaintiff; the actions Covino took in Lynn District Court and in contacting law enforcement and Plaintiff's employer; and Covino's reasons for taking those actions.
Plaintiff opposed both motions, see Opposition [#10], [#19], and filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts [#11], her Affidavit [#13], and additional evidentiary material with her Opposition [#10] to Covino's Motion [#9].
The court begins with Covino's anti-SLAPP suit motion, then turns to the motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and finally to Covino's motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
II. Covino's anti-SLAPP Suit Motion
Covino argues his “conduct in seeking relief from abuse from the court system, in contacting [Plaintiff's] employer, and then later speaking with a member of the Virginia State Police, were all protected petitioning under [Massachusetts'] anti-SLAPP statute.” Covino's Mot. 12 [#9]. He contends that because a reasonable person could conclude he had a legal basis for his petitioning activity, his activity is protected by Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP law, and Plaintiff's Complaint [#1] should be dismissed in its entirety. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff argues that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in federal court because it is a procedural rule, Opp'n to Covino's Mot. 6 [#10], and that in any event, Covino is not entitled to the anti-SLAPP statute's protection because Plaintiff's action was not brought to chill his protected petitioning activity, id. at 7-9.
In Godin v. Schencks, the First Circuit concluded that the burden of proof allocation in Maine's anti-SLAPP statute was a substantive provision, and thus applicable to pendant state claims in federal court. 629 F.3d 79, 88-89 (1st Cir. 2010). The Court also found Maine's anti-SLAPP statute “is only addressed to special procedures for state claims based on a defendant's petitioning activity” and not “general federal procedures governing all categories of cases” and is not covered by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 56. Id. at 88. The Court then found that because the Maine anti-SLAPP statute is “‘so intertwined with a state right or remedy [ ] it functions to define the scope of the state-created right[, ]' it cannot be displaced by Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56.” Id. at 89 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J. concurring)).
Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute is “in all relevant respects the same as the Maine anti-SLAPP statute.” Steinmetz v. Coyle & Caron, Inc., Civ. No. 15-13594-DJC, 2016 WL 4073135, at *3 (D. Mass. July 29, 2016); see also de Lench v. Archie, 406 F.Supp.3d 154, 157-58 (D. Mass. 2019). Accordingly, Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute applies to Plaintiff's Massachusetts claims.
Following state law, the court “‘first [ ] decide[s] . . . whether to grant' the anti-SLAPP motion before deciding other grounds for dismissal.” De Lench, 406 F.Supp.3d at 158 (quoting Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 340-41, 821 N.E.2d 60 (2005)).
“The...
To continue reading
Request your trial