Radiator Specialty Co. v. First State Ins. Co., C-C-84-517-P.
Decision Date | 16 January 1987 |
Docket Number | No. C-C-84-517-P.,C-C-84-517-P. |
Citation | 651 F. Supp. 439 |
Parties | RADIATOR SPECIALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III, Hugh B. Campbell, Jr., Weinstein, Sturges, Odom, Groves, Bigger, Jonas & Campbell, Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff.
Robert D. Cordle, Helms, Mulliss & Johnston, Charlotte, N.C., for defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for summary judgment and on Plaintiff's Motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff is a North Carolina Corporation with its principal office in the Western District of North Carolina. Defendant is a Delaware insurance corporation with its principal office in Boston, Massachusetts.
This controversy arose as a result of Ambassador Insurance Company's (Ambassador) having been determined to be insolvent by the Superior Court of Washington County, Vermont, that order having been affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court on or about August 27, 1986.
Ambassador, a Vermont company, carried the initial layer of liability coverage, with the Defendant writing the "Umbrella Liability Policy" coverage immediately above Ambassador's.
The Defendant's coverage ran from May 1, 1979 to November 13, 1980, during which period the parties agree the Plaintiff made payment of claims in the amount of $286,784.06, with two claims still open.
The Plaintiff contends that because of Ambassador's insolvency that the Defendant's excess policy should "drop down" and pay the claims against Plaintiff for which Ambassador would have been liable but for its insolvency.
Thus the question for this Court is whether the language in the Defendant's policy is ambiguous so as to entitle the Plaintiff to a favorable construction and summary judgment or at least to allow the Plaintiff to introduce extrinsic evidence in the form of expert opinions and have the determination of what the Plaintiff contends is a factual question submitted to a jury.
The Declarations of the Umbrella Liability Policy state:
Under "Insuring Agreements," the policy provides:
Schedule A (Schedule of Underlying Policies) lists Comprehensive General Liability limits of $500,000.00 for bodily injury and $500,000.00 aggregate.
This clearly means that under the Defendant's policy, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant the ultimate net loss it has suffered after deducting: (1) Any other recovery by the Plaintiff; (2) Any salvage the Plaintiff may obtain; (3) Any other insurance to which the Plaintiff may be entitled (whether recoverable or not) other than the underlying insurance the Plaintiff has purchased and insurance the Plaintiff has purchased specifically to be in excess of this policy.
It does not say "recoverable underlying insurance listed in Schedule A of underlying insurance...."
That seems to the Court to be very clear and unambiguous.
It is noted that the Defendant's policy did not provide that the underlying insurance listed in Schedule A had to be "collectible", distinguishing the Schedule A underlying policies from "other underlying insurances collectible by the insured".
Paragraph G under "Conditions" in Defendant's policy, reads:
G. PAYMENT OF ULTIMATE NET LOSS: Coverage under this policy shall not apply unless and until the INSURED, or the INSURED'S underlying insurer, shall be obligated to pay the amount of the UNDERLYING LIMIT OR RETAINED LIMIT on account....
In this case the insured (the plaintiff) was obligated to pay the amount of the underlying limit at the time Ambassador failed. The condition states that coverage of Defendant's policy does not apply "unless and until" the insured (Plaintiff) or the insured's underlying insurer, shall be obligated to pay the amount of the underlying limit ($500,000.00).
The disjunctive "or" is used so that Defendant's coverage does not apply unless and until the insured or the underlying insurer shall be obligated to pay.
The insured here was obligated to pay since the insurer was insolvent. However, the insured has not been obligated to pay more than $286,784.06 up to this date, and therefore has not paid the underlying limit of $500,000.00 and thus Defendant's policy does not afford coverage under the terms and conditions of its Insuring Agreements.
It would simply make no sense to hold that an "excess" insurer should be liable as a primary insurer. This would impose a liability on the "excess" insurer which is not bargained for in its premium that is based on the lesser risk which an excess carrier agrees to assume.
Plaintiff argues in its Memorandum in support of its Motion for summary judgment and in opposition to Defendant's Motion for summary judgment:
1. IF INSURANCE POLICIES ARE REASONABLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO TWO...
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