Radice v. People of the State of New York

Decision Date10 March 1924
Docket NumberNo. 176,176
Citation264 U.S. 292,44 S.Ct. 325,68 L.Ed. 690
PartiesRADICE v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Henry W. Hill, of Buffalo, N. Y. (Mr. Dean R. Hill, of Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Walter F. Hofheims, of Buffalo, N. Y., and Irving I. Goldsmith, of Saratoga Springs, N. Y., for the People of the State of New York.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error was convicted in the City Court of Buffalo upon the charge of having violated the provisions of a statute of the state of New York, prohibiting the employment of women in restaurants in cities of the first and second class, between the hours of 10 o'clock at night and 6 o'clock in the morning. Laws of New York, 1917, c. 535, p. 1564.1

An appeal was prosecuted through intermediate appellate courts to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment was affirmed without an opinion. The record having been remitted to the City Court, the writ of error was allowed to that court. Aldrich v. AEtna Co., 8 Wall. 491, 495, 19 L. Ed. 473; Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, 601, 43 Sup. Ct. 435, 67 L. Ed. 819.

The validity of the statute is challenged upon the ground that it contravenes the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it violates (1) the due process clause, by depriving the employer and employee of their liberty of contract; and (2) the equal protection, clause, by an unreasonable and arbitrary classification.

1. The basis of the first contention is that the statute unduly and arbitrarily interferes with the liberty of two adult persons to make a contract of employment for themselves. The answer of the state is that night work of the kind prohibited so injuriously affects the physical condition of women, and so threatens to impair their peculiar and natural functions, and so exposes them to the dangers and menaces incident to night life in large cities, that a statute prohibiting such work falls within the police power of the state to preserve and promote the public health and welfare.

The Legislature had before it a mass of information from which it concluded that night work is substantially and especially detrimental to the health of women. We cannot say that the conclusion is without warrant. The loss of restful night's sleep cannot be fully made up by sleep in the daytime, especially in busy cities, subject to the disturbances incident to modern life. The injurious consequences were thought by the Legislature to bear more heavily against women than men, and, considering their more delicate organism, there would seem to be good reason for so thinking. The fact, assuming it to be such, properly may be made the basis of legislation applicable only to women. Testimony was given upon the trial to the effect that the night work in question was not harmful; but we do not find it convincing. Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by the Legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker. The state Legislature here determined that night employment of the character specified was sufficiently detrimental to the health and welfare of women engaging in it to justify its suppression, and, since we are unable to say that the finding is clearly unfounded, we are precluded from reviewing the legislative determination. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 395, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780. The language used by this court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 422, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 327 (52 L. Ed. 551, 13 Ann. Cas. 957), in respect of the physical limitations of women, is applicable and controlling:

'The limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-dontinued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.'

Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785, 24 A. L. R. 1238, is cited and relied upon; but that case presented a question entirely different from that now being considered. The statute in the Adkins Case was a wage-fixing law, pure and simple. It had nothing to do with the hours or conditions of labor. We held that it exacted from the employer 'an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having no causal connection with the business, or the contract or the work' of the employee; but, referring to the Muller Case we said (page 553) that 'the physical differences [between men and women] must be recognized in appropriate cases, and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into account.' See also Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 469, 58 L. Ed. 788; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 59 L. Ed. 628, L. R. A. 1915F, 829; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385, 35 Sup. Ct. 345, 59 L. Ed. 632; and compare Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 18, 19, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441, L. R. A. 1915C, 960.

2. Nor is the statute vulnerable to the objection that it constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The points urged under this head are (a) that the act discriminates between cities of the first and second class and other cities and communities; and (b) excludes from its operation women employed in restaurants as singers and performers, attendants in ladies' cloak rooms and parlors, as well as those...

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